# Weber's Party Paid Two Greek-Linked Consultants. Parliament

Published: 2026-11-02

![Manfred Weber official portrait](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d1/Manfred_Weber_MEP,_2024.jpg)
Photo: [European Parliament](/organizations/european-parliament) image; source licence requires attribution. [Image source](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Manfred_Weber_MEP,_2024.jpg).

# Weber's Party Paid Two Greek-Linked Consultants. Parliament Refused Most EU Reimbursement; Prosecutors Are Now Looking.

*Factrail investigative analysis | Brussels | 2 November 2026 | Original documentary and financial-accountability synthesis; not a finding of criminal liability.*

The finding. A European political party under [Manfred Weber](/people/manfred-weber)'s presidency paid two consultancy firms linked through their principals to Greece's governing [New Democracy](/organizations/new-democracy) party approximately €570,000 between July 2022 and January 2023, according to payment records examined by Follow the Money and its reporting partners. The European Parliament reportedly accepted only about €115,000 of the relevant expenditure for EU reimbursement. The party bore a substantial remainder, and the consultants subsequently returned some fees. In October 2026, reporters disclosed that the European Public Prosecutor's Office was investigating the arrangements following a referral by the EU anti-fraud office. These facts establish an expensive procurement decision, a funding-control intervention and a reported criminal inquiry—not that Weber, Greece's prime minister, the consultants or anyone else committed a crime. The most revealing gap is documentary: the contracts, selection files and Parliament's complete assessment have not been publicly reconciled in a way voters can test. [Follow the Money, October 23](https://www.ftm.eu/articles/investigations-into-epp-consultants); [European Parliament party-funding rules](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/contracts-and-grants/en/political-parties-and-foundations/european-political-parties).

## What is actually new, and what this investigation tests

The existence of the consulting contracts and the consultants' political connections was established by a joint journalistic investigation published in April 2026. The reported prosecutorial inquiry and a September refusal to disclose documents became public in October. Factrail has not independently obtained the underlying invoices, payment statements, OLAF referral or prosecutorial case file. Its added test is narrower and reproducible: separate the gross private-party payments, the amount eligible for EU reimbursement, the later voluntary repayments, the party's own resources and the prosecutor's legal authority. Those are different ledgers. Collapsing them into one figure would exaggerate the demonstrated taxpayer loss and obscure who had power to stop the expenditure. [Follow the Money, April 29](https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/europese-christen-democraten-betaalden-half-miljoen-aan-consultants); [Follow the Money, October 23](https://www.ftm.eu/articles/investigations-into-epp-consultants).

The EPP is a European political party; its parliamentary group is a separate institutional organisation. Weber chairs both, but that overlap does not make their accounts or legal responsibilities interchangeable. The payments under scrutiny are described by the reporting as party consultancy contracts. This matters because the European Parliament finances registered European political parties under a specific contribution scheme, with limits on eligible spending and restrictions on indirect financing of national parties. It is not evidence that the parliamentary group's separate administrative budget paid the consultants. The correct accounting question is which party expenses were reimbursable, not whether every euro spent by an EPP-associated organisation was automatically public money. [Parliament funding guidance](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/contracts-and-grants/en/political-parties-and-foundations/european-political-parties); [Regulation 1141/2014](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/1141/oj).

## The documentary timeline: appointments, payments, scrutiny, inquiry

31 May–1 June 2022: control of the party changed. At the EPP Congress in Rotterdam, delegates elected Weber party president and, on Weber's proposal, elected Thanasis Bakolas secretary general. The EPP's own contemporary announcement confirms both appointments. Bakolas had previously been a long-serving adviser to Greek Prime Minister [Kyriakos Mitsotakis](/people/kyriakos-mitsotakis). An appointment by a political party is not suspicious in itself, but it fixes the decision chain: the secretary general subsequently had operational responsibility, while the president had political authority and influence over the leadership appointment. [EPP Rotterdam Congress announcement](https://www.epp.eu/news/highlights-of-the-epp-congress-in-rotterdam); [EPP Congress record](https://new.epp.eu/structure/congress).

July 2022–January 2023: two suppliers received the money. The April investigation identified Campaign Lab, a Belgian firm associated with Gerasimos “Jerry” Zagoritis, and HD Heavyweight, a Cyprus-based firm associated with Eric Thanopoulos Parks. Zagoritis had worked for New Democracy members of the European Parliament. Parks had advised the party and Mitsotakis on communications. The reporters examined payments of approximately €570,000 over the period. Their detailed account describes an initial €58,080 Campaign Lab transfer in July, later monthly Campaign Lab payments of €50,820, and more than €308,000 paid to HD Heavyweight through January. These are amounts reported from documents seen by the journalists, not independently verified bank statements obtained by Factrail. [April investigation and payment detail](https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/europese-christen-democraten-betaalden-half-miljoen-aan-consultants).

Early 2023: the public-funding gate intervened. The reporting says the European Parliament questioned the contracts and declined to reimburse most of the consultancy costs. Roughly €115,000 was accepted for EU funding, while approximately €350,000 of 2022 expenditure was left to the EPP's own funds. These are rounded reported figures and should not be mechanically summed with every subsequent payment: the accounting periods and later refunds differ. The intervention is materially different from a criminal judgment. A cost may be ineligible, insufficiently justified or above an acceptable benchmark without anyone having committed fraud. Conversely, the existence of an external audit does not by itself prove that every procurement decision was optimal. [April investigation](https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/europese-christen-democraten-betaalden-half-miljoen-aan-consultants); [Parliament funding procedure](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/contracts-and-grants/en/political-parties-and-foundations/european-political-parties).

First quarter 2023: the contracts ended and repayments followed. The journalists estimate that the two consultants returned around €320,000 for fees paid in the early months of 2023. Both characterised their repayments as commercial goodwill rather than an admission of wrongdoing. One cannot describe the entire estimated €780,000 potential gross-payment total as money permanently retained by the firms: the higher figure includes an extension of the payment window that the October reporting described as probable, and reported refunds change the net position. Nor can one assume the refunds went directly to the EU treasury. The reporting says they went to the EPP. The precise net totals for each firm and each accounting year require invoices, credit notes and bank records. [Follow the Money, April](https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/europese-christen-democraten-betaalden-half-miljoen-aan-consultants); [Follow the Money, October](https://www.ftm.eu/articles/investigations-into-epp-consultants).

2024–2025: political leadership continued, then changed. The EPP retained Bakolas through the 2024 European election cycle. In April 2025, Weber was re-elected president, and Dolors Montserrat was selected as the new secretary general. These facts matter because accountability for the 2022 contracts cannot simply be assigned to a later officeholder; neither does a leadership change erase the earlier party's obligation to account for spending. The EPP's own Congress record documents the succession. [EPP 2025 leadership statement](https://www.epp.eu/news/manfred-weber-re-elected-as-epp-president); [EPP Congress chronology](https://new.epp.eu/structure/congress).

April 29 and September 4, 2026: the issue became a transparency test. Follow the Money published its original investigation in April. In September, the Parliament refused the outlet's request for contracts and tender documents, according to the October follow-up, citing commercial interests; it also cited the risk to an ongoing investigation when declining related communications. This refusal is reported from a decision described by the journalists; Factrail has not obtained the full refusal letter or tested the applicable exceptions in court. A confidentiality exception can be legitimate, but it leaves a separate public-accountability deficit: readers cannot compare the tender, deliverables, assessment and repayment calculation themselves. [Follow the Money, October 23](https://www.ftm.eu/articles/investigations-into-epp-consultants).

October 23, 2026: a criminal investigation was reported. Follow the Money, Inside Story and Süddeutsche Zeitung reported that the European Public Prosecutor's Office was examining the consultancy arrangements following an OLAF referral, with Belgian investigators involved. The EPP said it had not been formally notified and would cooperate. The EPPO declined to discuss the case publicly. An investigation is not an indictment, an indictment is not a conviction, and a media account of an inquiry is not a public charging document. No verified public charging decision against Weber, Bakolas, Zagoritis or Parks has been established in the materials reviewed for this article. [Follow the Money investigation update](https://www.ftm.eu/articles/investigations-into-epp-consultants); [Kathimerini report, October 23](https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1319082/eu-prosecutor-investigates-epp-consultancy-contracts-linked-to-greeces-ruling-party/).

## The decision and veto map: who could do what?

Weber, the political sponsor. The party's official record confirms he proposed Bakolas for secretary general. Weber was president when the disputed suppliers were hired. That is meaningful governance responsibility, not proof that he signed their contracts, selected their prices, approved each invoice or knew of any potential irregularity. Those propositions need minutes, delegated-authority rules, correspondence and signed instruments. The strongest evidence available assigns the operational contract role to Bakolas and the party's financial apparatus, not to an invented presidential signature. [EPP Congress statement](https://www.epp.eu/news/highlights-of-the-epp-congress-in-rotterdam); [FTM, October](https://www.ftm.eu/articles/investigations-into-epp-consultants).

Bakolas, the executive gate. The joint reporting identifies him as the secretary general who arranged the contracts. He had longstanding professional ties to Mitsotakis. That history explains access and recruitment networks but does not prove that Mitsotakis directed the procurement, received money or obtained a personal benefit. The Greek prime minister is not shown by the cited records to have had a formal veto over the EPP's consultancy budget. Any allegation of direction from Athens would require separate contemporaneous evidence. [FTM, April](https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/europese-christen-democraten-betaalden-half-miljoen-aan-consultants); [To Vima, October 23](https://www.tovima.com/politics/eu-prosecutor-probes-epp-over-costly-consultancy-contracts/).

The suppliers, the direct commercial beneficiaries. Campaign Lab and HD Heavyweight are the identified firms receiving the fees. The principals' political relationships are documented by the reporting; the firms' actual margins, ultimate distribution of receipts, tax treatment and any payments to subcontractors are not established here. Gross revenue is not personal profit. It would be equally wrong to assert that the suppliers provided no work: the EPP and the consultants describe substantial communications and organisational services, while former employees interviewed by the reporters challenge the value delivered. [FTM, April](https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/europese-christen-democraten-betaalden-half-miljoen-aan-consultants).

The Parliament, the reimbursement veto. Under the European party-funding system, Parliament can determine final eligible expenditure and contribution amounts after reviewing accounts. Its reported refusal to cover most of the consultant fees is evidence of a financial control being exercised, not proof that it had approved the original supplier selection. The crucial unresolved issue is whether the control was timely, sufficiently documented and accompanied by appropriate escalation where necessary. The reported absence of a visible referral in the early process does not establish a legal duty was breached without the actual file and governing referral thresholds. [European Parliament funding procedure](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/contracts-and-grants/en/political-parties-and-foundations/european-political-parties); [FTM, April](https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/europese-christen-democraten-betaalden-half-miljoen-aan-consultants).

OLAF and EPPO, different enforcement functions. OLAF's reported referral to the EPPO is not itself a conviction or a determination of criminal intent. The EPPO's formal mandate concerns offences affecting the Union's financial interests, and it may pursue investigations through participating states' judicial systems. It must seek inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. A case about whether a party expense was eligible for EU funding is not automatically a case of criminal diversion; the prosecutorial question requires evidence of the relevant offence and mental elements. [EPPO mission and jurisdiction](https://www.eppo.europa.eu/about/mission-and-tasks_en); [EU establishment of EPPO](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/the-establishment-of-the-european-public-prosecutor-s-office.html?fromSummary=01).

## Follow the money without inventing a loss

There are at least four distinct numbers. The approximately €570,000 covers payments reporters identified through January 2023. The roughly €780,000 is a higher possible total if additional payments through March are included; the latter is not presented as a fully reconciled public ledger. About €115,000 was reportedly accepted as eligible for EU reimbursement. Around €320,000 was reportedly returned to the EPP by the consultants in connection with early-2023 fees. A fifth figure, approximately €350,000, describes the reported 2022 consultancy expense that the EPP had to finance itself after Parliament declined reimbursement. These figures cannot simply be added or subtracted as if they cover the same transactions and time windows. [FTM, April](https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/europese-christen-democraten-betaalden-half-miljoen-aan-consultants); [FTM, October](https://www.ftm.eu/articles/investigations-into-epp-consultants).

The 2014 EU framework applicable to the historical expenditure provided for public contributions to registered European political parties subject to eligibility rules and oversight. The Parliament's funding explanation says contributions may cover up to 90% of reimbursable party expenditure and cannot fund national parties or national election campaigns indirectly. A newer recast regulation, Regulation 2025/2445, entered into force later; it must not be used to retroactively pronounce the 2022 contracts unlawful. These rules explain why the distinction between political-party reserves and reimbursed expenditure matters. They do not resolve the factual question of whether a particular consultancy invoice met the 2022 eligibility test. [Regulation 1141/2014](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/1141/oj); [Parliament party-funding guide](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/contracts-and-grants/en/political-parties-and-foundations/european-political-parties); [Regulation 2025/2445](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/2445/oj/eng).

A private party spending its own lawful reserves is not the same as a treasury transferring an equivalent sum to a supplier. Yet public subsidies can indirectly affect a party's financial capacity. That makes the party's total resources, reimbursement ceiling and eligible-cost calculation relevant. It does not license an assumption that every euro in a mixed-funded budget is a euro of public loss. The independent financial reconciliation should list each invoice, payer, accounting date, eligible portion, reimbursement actually made, refund and ultimate beneficiary. Until that exists, neither a precise taxpayer-loss figure nor a private-profit figure is justified.

## The strongest counter-case deserves its full weight

The EPP says the advisers were recruited as part of a legitimate restructuring intended to improve digital communication and relationships with national member parties. Parks described a broader team and intensive work; Zagoritis defended his strategic role and said the fees related to services he performed. Both rejected former staff members' assessments that the work was disproportionately expensive. Bakolas has said the party's financial decisions, including these contracts, were audited and judged proper. The EPP says its processes were subject to financial controls and that it would cooperate with authorities. The reported repayments were described as goodwill, not admissions. [FTM, April](https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/europese-christen-democraten-betaalden-half-miljoen-aan-consultants); [FTM, October](https://www.ftm.eu/articles/investigations-into-epp-consultants).

There are good reasons not to infer misconduct from a high consulting rate alone. A political party preparing a continent-wide election campaign can reasonably hire outside specialists for short-term expertise, technology or rapid strategic restructuring. An external team may have different costs from an employee salary. Confidentiality around procurement or a live investigation may also be justified. A proper market comparison would assess scope, staff-days, deliverables, competitive bids and measurable outputs, not simply divide a gross invoice by a single employee's wage. The cited record does not contain a complete, independently audited value-for-money comparison.

There is also evidence against a simplistic claim that oversight never worked: Parliament reportedly refused most EU reimbursement, the consultants returned some money, and the issue later reached an anti-fraud and prosecutorial process. Those are distinct checks. Their existence does not establish the contracts were wise, but it does weaken a categorical assertion that no institution intervened. Separately, the EPPO previously closed a different inquiry into Weber's election-campaign financing after finding no reasonable grounds for a criminal offence, according to the October reporting. That earlier closed matter must not be presented as evidence of guilt in this new, separate case. [FTM, October](https://www.ftm.eu/articles/investigations-into-epp-consultants).

## Who benefits, who pays, and what the public can measure

The immediately identified commercial beneficiaries are Campaign Lab and HD Heavyweight, subject to the later repayments and unknown cost bases. The EPP may have received communications services, but their quality and marginal value remain contested. Politicians linked by prior employment to the consultants could have enjoyed access or reputational proximity; no sourced payment to Mitsotakis or any national party is established here. The EPP's own resources reportedly absorbed costs that Parliament rejected. The EU budget's documented exposure cannot be equated with the full gross contract value.

The institutional cost is more measurable as an accountability problem than as a proven criminal loss. Party funding is designed to support political pluralism while preventing EU subsidies from quietly financing national campaigns or ineligible private interests. The public needs to see whether those boundaries were enforced. The proposed indicators are the share of consultant fees approved for reimbursement, amount ultimately repaid to the party, time between expenditure and financial challenge, number of documented competitive bids, and whether a formal referral was made and when. No Factrail welfare score or graph relationship is asserted: these are proposed measurements, not observed indicator series. [European Parliament party-funding guidance](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/contracts-and-grants/en/political-parties-and-foundations/european-political-parties); [EPPO mission](https://www.eppo.europa.eu/about/mission-and-tasks_en).

The Parliament's September refusal to release the underlying records makes independent evaluation harder. Its stated rationale, as reported, included commercial confidentiality and the protection of an ongoing investigation. The narrower question is whether a redacted contract summary, anonymised pricing comparison or final eligibility decision could be disclosed without harming those legitimate interests. That is a transparency proposal, not a claim that current law necessarily compels immediate disclosure. An independent appeal decision or a later release would materially change the evidence available to readers.

## What would change the conclusion

Five records would decide the most important open questions: the signed consultancy agreements and selection file; invoices, credit notes and bank-confirmed refunds by firm; the Parliament's final 2022 eligible-cost determination; the relevant EPP financial statements and internal approval minutes; and any future public EPPO decision identifying a legal outcome. The EPP's 2022 audit report and a Parliament explanatory note have identifiable official PDF links, but those PDFs were not independently readable in this research session, so their contents are not asserted as directly inspected here. [2022 EPP audit report, official PDF link](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/contracts-and-grants/files/political-parties-and-foundations/audit-reports-and-donations/2024/epp-report-2022.pdf); [Parliament note, official PDF link](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/publications/notes/2024/0186/EP-PE_NT%282024%290186%282024-02-19%29_XL.pdf).

A documented tender and credible work product could strengthen the EPP's commercial explanation. Proof of knowingly false invoices, concealed third-party transfers or misrepresented eligible expenditure would change the legal and financial assessment in the opposite direction. Neither has been established in the accessible record. No outreach to the named people or companies was made by Factrail for this article; their responses above are attributed to the reporting organisations that obtained them. This article should not be released as a finding of wrongdoing without independent legal and source review.

## Source and method note

This analysis triangulates official EPP leadership records, European Parliament funding guidance, the EU party-financing regulations and the EPPO's published mandate with the original April and October reporting by Follow the Money and its collaborators. The joint journalistic investigation is one reporting lineage, even when republished by multiple outlets; its interviews and nonpublic payment documents were not independently re-obtained. The Parliament's annual audit PDFs were located but not text-verified. The October inquiry is reported by journalists and not accompanied here by a public EPPO case document. The reproducible new contribution is the separation of decision authority, eligibility control, cash-flow periods and criminal stage—not a claim to have discovered unpublished transactions.

Bottom line: A party's high-fee contracts, partial rejection of public reimbursement and a reported prosecutorial inquiry justify sustained scrutiny of Weber-era governance. They do not yet justify treating every consultant euro as stolen taxpayer money, or treating political proximity as a proven criminal bargain. The decisive next evidence is the contract and audit trail, not a louder accusation.

## Related Factrail context

For broader background on the institutions and policy issues, consult [ursula-von-der-leyen](https://factrail.ai/people/ursula-von-der-leyen), [european-commission](https://factrail.ai/organizations/european-commission), and [democratic resilience](https://factrail.ai/drivers/democratic-resilience). These background references do not prove direct responsibility for the transactions discussed above.

## Methodology

https://factrail.ai/methodology

Canonical: https://factrail.ai/articles/epp-weber-greek-consultants-eu-reimbursement-investigation-2026