# Europe's Defence Boom: Who Wins the Contracts?

Published: 2026-11-02

![Rheinmetall defence-industry buildings at Unterlüß, Germany](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a7/Unterl%C3%BC%C3%9F_-_Rheinmetall_Defence.jpg)
Photo: Oxfordian Kissuth / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0.

## 00 Verdict

Europe's rearmament is simultaneously a security project, an industrial policy and an allocation decision about scarce public money. The central question is not whether European states face a serious military threat. Russia's war against Ukraine and the requirement to replace depleted military inventories give governments powerful reasons to rebuild deterrence. The harder question is who converts that political imperative into signed orders, production jobs, profits and long-term financial claims on taxpayers. Rheinmetall, [BAE Systems](/organizations/bae-systems) and Leonardo enter this period with sizeable reported order books and established supplier relationships. United States manufacturers also compete through Foreign Military Sales, a government-to-government procurement channel that can purchase speed and interoperability while directing industrial value overseas. None of those observations alone shows misconduct. They show why a defence percentage is not an industrial outcome. A higher NATO spending ratio can finance ammunition plants, troops, maintenance, multinational missile programmes or imported aircraft, with very different economic effects. The public ledger should identify both the security capability acquired and the ultimate payers. If procurement is delayed, cost-plus incentives dominate, or capacity fails to materialise, the public may carry debt before obtaining protection. If production scales and readiness improves, citizens receive a genuine security benefit that conventional income indicators do not capture. The contest is over execution, price, transparency and democratic opportunity cost, not an invented binary between defence and welfare.

The [defence-industrial production capacity](/drivers/defence-industrial-production-capacity) driver is central to this procurement surge: appropriations only translate into military capacity when factories produce deliverable equipment. The [European Defence Agency](/organizations/european-defence-agency) helps coordinate defence cooperation, while the [European Commission](/organizations/european-commission) influences financing and common procurement instruments. The actual winners depend on signed awards, production schedules and delivered capabilities, not headline pledges.

## 01 The binding political decision

At The Hague on 25 June 2025, NATO allies committed to reaching an annual spending benchmark of 5% of GDP by 2035. At least 3.5% is for core defence under the agreed NATO definition, and up to 1.5% for wider defence- and security-related purposes such as critical infrastructure, civil preparedness, networks and industrial capacity. This distinction matters: reporting 5% as a promise to buy weapons would misstate the instrument. Governments must submit annual plans, and a 2029 review is built into the declaration. An alliance-wide target also does not mean Brussels can send procurement orders to every national ministry. The budget decision belongs largely to sovereign parliaments and treasuries; NATO supplies capability goals and political pressure. The secretary-general, [Mark Rutte](/people/mark-rutte), publicly advocates readiness but does not personally appropriate national expenditure. The EU has a different lever: financing and coordination for member states. This institutional separation helps locate responsibility. A government can support the NATO commitment and still be accountable for its own taxes, borrowing, contractor selection and delivery failures. A contractor can profit from an award without having made the national security decision. Treating all these actors as one defence establishment would erase the veto points that make public-money analysis possible.

## 02 The European financing mechanism

The European Commission's Readiness 2030 plan frames up to €800 billion in potential additional defence mobilisation, not a €800 billion cheque already paid to manufacturers. Its public presentation includes roughly €650 billion of possible national fiscal space over four years from flexibility in [defence expenditure](/drivers/defence-expenditure) and a distinct €150 billion Security Action for Europe loan facility. SAFE was established in May 2025 and operates through EU borrowing followed by loans to participating states. That debt must ultimately be serviced under the loan contracts; the EU borrowing route does not turn procurement into a grant. Fiscal-rule flexibility likewise changes how expenditure is treated for surveillance rather than erasing its economic cost. National taxpayers, lenders and future cabinets still face debt-service or revenue choices. The Commission reported another €21.3 billion second SAFE call in late October 2026 and almost €13.5 billion disbursed across eleven member states by that date. A call is not a disbursement, a disbursement is not an executed supply contract, and a contract is not delivered military capacity. These stages must remain separate when measuring benefits. EU common procurement may reduce duplication and create bigger production runs; whether it actually lowers unit costs must be measured against comparable tenders, delivery schedules and maintenance obligations, not asserted because the word joint appears in a funding programme.

## 03 Rheinmetall: the German land-warfare channel

Germany's Rheinmetall is an obvious potential beneficiary of European demand for artillery ammunition, vehicles and other land capabilities because the company has existing industrial operations and customer relationships. Its 2025 corporate figures reported €9.935 billion in sales, 29% above the prior year, and an operating result of €1.841 billion. It also reported a €63.8 billion backlog at year-end, compared with €46.9 billion a year earlier. Crucially, the company says that this broader backlog includes binding orders and framework agreements. It therefore should not be described as cash already earned or as a guaranteed future profit stream. Germany accounted for 38% of 2025 sales, showing how domestic rearmament can create a concentrated regional industrial exposure. Facilities such as Rheinmetall's Unterlüß complex make this geographically tangible: procurement can sustain skilled manufacturing employment and supplier networks, but contractors still need workers, energetic supply chains, explosives inputs, testing facilities and political approval. Higher headline spending does not automatically expand annual output at the same pace. It can initially raise prices for constrained materials or compete for a limited pool of specialists. Public buyers should release the quantities ordered, amounts advanced, delivery slots, inspection results and penalties for nonperformance. These measures distinguish genuine readiness from a paper increase in orders and allow Germany's neighbours to judge whether cross-border procurement strengthens European capacity rather than simply creating a dominant domestic incumbent.

## 04 BAE Systems: a transatlantic portfolio

BAE Systems demonstrates why a British champion cannot be analysed as if its every order were financed by the United Kingdom. In its 2025 full-year release, the group reported £30.7 billion in sales, up 10%, £36.8 billion in order intake and a record £83.6 billion order backlog. The group's geographic and business spread includes major activity in the United States as well as the United Kingdom and other markets. Its corporate-wide figures consequently cannot be presented as the amount captured from the NATO European spending ramp. But its systems position in complex naval, combat, electronic and support programmes matters. Governments that buy integrated platforms often accept decades of maintenance, software upgrades, training and spare-parts dependency. Those recurring commitments are part of the real public cost even when press releases foreground the initial equipment award. Britain may benefit through skilled work, exports and technology depth; it may also bear higher financing pressure if Treasury allocations grow without an accompanying revenue plan. The practical scrutiny test is whether ministries publish realistic whole-life costs and delivery risk, and whether elected lawmakers can compare domestic industrial benefits with cheaper or more interoperable alternatives. The answer can differ by capability. A domestic frigate programme and an imported off-the-shelf system cannot be scored with one simple nationalist preference.

## 05 Leonardo: Italian ownership and multinational work

Leonardo's 2025 figures reported €19.5 billion in revenue, €23.8 billion in new orders and a €46.6 billion order backlog, according to its 2026 remuneration disclosure. These are company-wide figures, not a map of SAFE loan allocations. Leonardo's footprint in electronics, helicopters, aircraft, cyber capabilities and joint ventures makes it a potential recipient across several procurement categories. Its shareholder structure is a separate accountability issue: the [Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance](/organizations/italian-ministry-of-economy-and-finance) held approximately 30.2% in the company's disclosed ownership snapshot. That means Italian public institutions can be present both as purchasers of defence capability and as shareholders in a producer. Public shareholding may deliver dividends or strategic influence, but it does not cancel the public cost of a procurement contract, and it creates a reason to disclose conflicts and procurement safeguards carefully. Leonardo's multinational supply partnerships also complicate the term European content. A system assembled in Italy may incorporate technologies, intellectual property, electronics and subcontracting sourced internationally. To judge whether defence spending builds a resilient European supply chain, investigators need the shares of contract value retained locally, critical foreign dependencies and maintenance rights. Claims that every euro spent on a European brand stays in Europe would be unsupportable. Governments should test resilience of bottleneck components instead of relying on corporate headquarters as a substitute for supply-chain evidence.

## 06 The United States FMS pipeline

Foreign Military Sales is a government-administered route under which partner governments can acquire US defence articles and services. A Congressional Research Service overview records $104.4 billion in FY2025 activity across the FMS system, including $75.9 billion of allied- and partner-funded arms sales and separate security-assistance components. This is a global FMS figure, not the European procurement total, and should never be assigned wholesale to NATO's European spending increase. Europe still has reasons to use FMS for mature, interoperable air and missile defence and aircraft systems, especially where urgent capability gaps cannot wait for a new European production line. US primes and associated suppliers may therefore receive industrial revenue while European governments receive a faster route to deployed systems. The trade-off appears in export permissions, upgrade control, spare-parts logistics, lead times and access to software and mission data. A headline sale notification is not equivalent to an executed contract, a final invoice, or an operational squadron. European auditors should track the exact stage and whether orders crowd out scarce alternative investment. A rational procurement portfolio may include US imports and European co-production; insisting that every purchase be European regardless of readiness can itself impose a security cost. The relevant question is whether the dependency is understood, priced and mitigated.

## 07 Who captures value across borders

A national flag on an equipment brochure is a poor guide to the distribution of value. Rheinmetall's German presence, BAE Systems' British identity and Leonardo's Italian shareholding do not imply that every supplier, engineering hour or royalty belongs to those states. The ultimate beneficiary map should separate prime contractors, subcontractors, host communities, shareholders, patent holders, lenders and the defence ministry obtaining a useful asset. It should also distinguish production commitments from the delivery of functioning capability. The Commission's SAFE framework seeks more joint procurement and greater participation of eligible European industrial chains, while the Readiness Roadmap sets milestones for common purchasing and the closure of capability shortfalls. Those goals create incentives, but progress needs measurable outcomes. A fair comparison between a European and US offer would include urgency, price, performance, financing, local industrial spillovers, cyber dependence and sustainment. It also needs a counterfactual: if one contractor loses a tender, which supplier can provide equivalent capability and by when? In many constrained defence categories the answer is not obvious. Concentration may achieve economies of scale but reduce competitive pressure later. Fragmentation may spread work politically but multiply designs and spare-part inventories. Policy should expose these competing costs and not treat the distribution of manufacturing jobs as the same thing as the distribution of military protection.

## 08 Who pays and what public budgets lose

The expenditure reaches society through several paths. Annual taxes can finance purchases directly; governments can borrow and spread repayment into future budgets; or officials can reprioritise transport, housing, schools and welfare services. None is an automatic or uniform outcome. Some governments can increase defence appropriations while maintaining other programmes, and defence production may generate taxes and employment. Yet the opportunity cost remains because skilled labour, physical capital and fiscal capacity are finite. Bond investors may demand higher yields when borrowing expectations change, although rates also reflect inflation, central-bank policy, growth and global risk. A rise in sovereign yields cannot be attributed to NATO alone without a credible counterfactual. Households are exposed through potential tax burdens, service quality and inflation, a distributional channel related to Factrail's [Household Purchasing Power](/drivers/household-purchasing-power) analysis. Lower-income households usually have less capacity to absorb cuts in services or increases in indirect taxes. By contrast, defence-industry workers and regional suppliers may experience new jobs and investment. An accountability report should show who pays this year's invoice, who guarantees loans, which future budgets carry maintenance spending and who earns contracting profits. It should not assume that security itself has no household benefit: credible deterrence can prevent catastrophic harm that is not reflected in an immediate wage series.

## 09 What it moves: security and public money

The security indicator to follow is the share of agreed NATO capability requirements actually met, supplemented by ammunition output, inventory resilience, readiness rates and delivery delays. Successful production should move availability upward and gaps downward, but an appropriation alone does not prove that outcome. Public-money indicators include general-government defence spending as a share of GDP, nominal procurement outlays, gross financing needs, interest payments relative to revenue and the share of spending awarded competitively. The likely mechanical direction of reported defence expenditure is upward as national plans progress. The direction of deficits, borrowing costs or civilian programme spending is conditional on each government's financing choices. Economic indicators should include domestic value added, factory employment, real wages and delivery-price inflation, separating construction and start-up spending from recurring production. Procurement-integrity indicators include the number of single-bid awards, disclosed beneficial ownership, contract modifications and audit findings. Factrail's [Institutional Corruption](/drivers/institutional-corruption) is relevant as an analytical risk channel, not an accusation that the firms named here are corrupt. Readiness, transparency and household impact should be tracked alongside the defence spending ratio. A 3.5% target measures input. The democratically important output is protection delivered at an understandable, audited lifecycle cost.
## Sources
The strongest evidence is the official NATO commitment, the EU's financing regulations and communications, and audited or published supplier financial statements. These establish a spending ambition, the legal financing channels and the suppliers' existing scale. They do not establish the eventual division of future NATO procurement between individual firms or the net impact on public welfare. A separate CRS explanation establishes how FMS works and gives global activity totals, not a European-specific award ledger. The best challenge to this analysis is that extra defence spending is insurance against a threat whose avoided damage is difficult to price. That challenge is real. Europe cannot responsibly maximise short-term civilian cash flow while ignoring its own security exposure. But it is equally wrong to make a defence pledge exempt from competitive procurement, independent audit and assessment of who benefits. The test over the next budget cycles is whether orders turn into delivered stockpiles and working systems without uncontrolled escalation of prices and debt. Watch annual NATO national pathways, EU SAFE contract and disbursement disclosures, factory throughput, export approvals, serviceability and national budget revisions. Until those records are available, any precise claim about which company will win the most of the new spending would be a forecast rather than a documented result.

The [defence-industrial production capacity](https://factrail.ai/drivers/defence-industrial-production-capacity) driver helps explain the real output constraint. The [European Defence Agency](https://factrail.ai/organizations/european-defence-agency) and [European Commission](https://factrail.ai/organizations/european-commission) have distinct institutional roles; their involvement should not be conflated with a supplier's receipt of a contract.

Sources consulted:
NATO — The Hague Summit Declaration:
European Commission — Future of European Defence:
Council of the EU — What is Security Action for Europe (SAFE)?:
Rheinmetall — Financial report: Figures FY 2025:
BAE Systems — 2025 Full-Year Results:
Leonardo — 2026 Remuneration Report: 2025 Financial Highlights:
US Congressional Research Service — Transfer of Defense Articles: Foreign Military Sales:
European Commission — Readiness Roadmap 2030:
European Commission — Commission invites Member States to use €21.3 billion under SAFE:

Image: Rheinmetall factory buildings at Unterlüß, Germany, photographed by Oxfordian Kissuth in April 2017. CC BY-SA 3.0.

## Methodology

https://factrail.ai/methodology

Canonical: https://factrail.ai/articles/europe-nato-3-5-defence-procurement-rheinmetall-bae-leonardo-fms-2026
