# Why a New Congress Cannot Simply Erase Trump's Tariffs

Published: 2026-11-02

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# Why a New Congress Cannot Simply Erase Trump's Tariffs

Washington, Ottawa, London and Brussels, 2 November 2026. The US midterm election can change the balance of power on Capitol Hill, but it will not automatically change the tariff due on a container arriving at an American port. For exporters in the United Kingdom, European Union and Canada, the critical difference is between power to investigate, power to pass legislation, and power already delegated to the president under trade statutes. A victory for either party may shape negotiations while leaving existing duties in force.

The firms best positioned for uncertainty are those large enough to maintain specialists in customs law, shift sourcing and carry inventory through a policy dispute. Smaller producers and importers may be forced to absorb duties, delay investment or raise prices before politicians finish negotiating. That uneven burden is the central reason to evaluate the legal mechanism rather than simply forecasting a market rally or selloff after November 3.

## What changed this year

A major part of the legal picture shifted in February 2026. [Congressional Research Service](/organizations/congressional-research-service) reporting says the Supreme Court rejected use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act as authority for certain tariffs imposed by the administration. [President Donald Trump](/people/mig-donald-trump) then imposed a temporary surcharge using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974; that measure expired in July. The administration continued pursuing measures under other trade authorities. A tariff headline from early 2025 is therefore not necessarily an accurate description of the law applying today.

On July 23 the US Trade Representative announced Section 301 actions concerning other economies' restrictions on forced-labour goods. The published announcement set different rates and product exemptions across economies. Canada and the UK were placed in a group assigned a 10 percent rate for covered products, while certain EU goods had separate treatment. This is not a claim that all products from those countries face identical duties. The exact product, effective instrument and exemption matter.

Canada opened another front in August. Finance Canada reported US tariff action affecting $27.6 billion of Canadian goods, and Ottawa announced counter-tariffs designed to match selected US measures. A detailed Canadian list effective September 8 identifies 15, 25 and 50 percent duties on specified American goods. This reciprocal pressure can harm businesses in both countries even where each government claims it is defending domestic producers.

The EU's framework is different. The [European Commission](/organizations/european-commission) reports that the EU-US trade arrangement announced in 2025 has been implemented through changes including eliminating tariffs on American industrial goods from July 1, 2026. The framework established principles for US treatment of European exports and differentiated sensitive categories. Any credible comparison needs to separate a diplomatic framework, the implementing legal act and the actual customs rate for a product.

## The mechanism at the border

US import duties are calculated using the Harmonized Tariff Schedule and applicable additional measures. The importer needs the correct product classification, origin, transaction details and effective date. An exception for one code does not necessarily cover a related item. If an exporter does not know its exact classification or whether a notice has changed, its pricing model can become unreliable even while diplomatic negotiations appear stable.

Presidential tariff authority is not unlimited, but it is real when Congress has delegated relevant powers. A court may reject use of one law while other statutes remain available. Congress can amend legislation, demand reporting, investigate administration decisions and consider targeted restrictions. A change in House control cannot bypass the Senate, the presidential veto or judicial review. Those institutional constraints make immediate across-the-board tariff cancellation an unlikely assumption for a commercial contract.

The [US House of Representatives](/organizations/us-house-of-representatives) may hold more aggressive hearings if leadership changes. That could bring useful disclosures about how exemptions are granted, which sectors bear costs and whether administration forecasts match observed trade. But an oversight hearing is not a customs instruction. Importers should continue checking the live tariff schedule until a legally effective change appears.

The strongest argument for tariffs is that they can protect selected domestic industries, increase bargaining leverage and change sourcing incentives. The strongest argument against indiscriminate use is that importers and customers pay more while firms spend resources working around uncertain rules. Both claims need sector-specific evidence. Protection for one steel producer may raise input costs for a downstream machinery manufacturer; the net result depends on production, substitution and demand.

## The unequal distribution of costs

A large company can seek alternative suppliers, renegotiate contracts and distribute customs costs across a wide customer base. A small exporter supplying one American buyer has fewer options. It may accept a lower margin, pass on the duty and risk losing orders, or stop selling to that market. Even a temporary tariff can be damaging when a company must finance it before being paid by the customer.

A tariff is paid at the border by the legally responsible importer, but its economic incidence can spread to foreign suppliers, domestic distributors, workers and final consumers. The actual distribution changes with the availability of substitutes and the commercial bargaining power of each party. There is no credible single rule that says every tariff is borne entirely by foreign exporters or entirely by American shoppers.

Retaliation complicates the picture further. Canada's countermeasures target goods from the United States, but Canadian firms that use those inputs can also face costs. Canadian households may pay more for an affected appliance or other imported product. Ottawa's accompanying worker and business support measures acknowledge that trade conflict creates domestic adjustment costs. Such support may cushion harm without restoring the missing certainty about future market access.

British exporters face their own choices. The government led by [Keir Starmer](https://factrail.ai/people/keir-starmer) can pursue negotiated exceptions and stable sector arrangements. Yet a UK statement promising cooperation does not itself repeal an American tariff. A manufacturer must look beyond the political agreement to the relevant published tariff rule and customer contract.

European producers likewise face heterogeneous conditions. An aircraft component, pharmaceutical ingredient, steel shipment and finished car may have different treatment. The [European Commission](https://factrail.ai/organizations/european-commission) negotiates trade policy on behalf of the EU, but a single negotiated percentage does not automatically describe all goods. Treating the entire relationship as one duty rate obscures the businesses that receive exceptions and those still exposed.

## Three political outcomes

If Republicans retain both chambers, the administration could face less organized legislative opposition to its trade programme. That does not prevent court challenges, trade-partner retaliation or new negotiations. The decisive evidence will remain published orders, implementing notices and actual changes in applied duties, rather than speeches declaring a mandate.

If Democrats gain the House but not the Senate, hearings and proposed legislation may intensify. Exporters could benefit from clearer disclosure and a stronger debate about consumer costs. Conversely, legislative gridlock might leave existing duties unchanged for longer. The difference between transparency and immediate tariff relief is central to investment planning.

If Democrats control both chambers, restrictions on delegated tariff powers may become easier to pass, but the president would still possess a veto. A majority short of the necessary threshold cannot assume its preferred tariff bill will become law. Nor can legislation rewrite every trade agreement without implementing action. The executive, judiciary and congressional chambers remain separate actors.

The [Trump administration](https://factrail.ai/people/donald-trump) can negotiate and adjust measures under existing lawful authority in any of these scenarios. A surprise agreement or new investigation could matter more to one industry than the entire House result. Markets should therefore price policy uncertainty by sector, not presume a uniform political effect.

## What to watch after November 3

The first relevant evidence is the certified composition of the new Congress and the committees that control trade oversight. Thereafter monitor legislation seeking to amend tariff authorities, federal court rulings, the USTR's notices and updates to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. For Canada, monitor the finance department's tariff-item lists and border implementation guidance. For the EU, watch the Commission's account of implementation under its bilateral framework.

A useful exporter dashboard records the tariff code, effective duty, currency-adjusted landed cost, contract renewal date, margin after duties and time required to change supply chains. Those are measurable variables. Election forecasts are not substitutes for them. When a proposed deal is announced, the business question is whether the actual code applicable to a shipment changes, on what date, and for how long.

The broader political cost is strategic. Repeated tariff threats can encourage allies to diversify investment and supply chains, even where the US remains an attractive market. That response may outlast the original measure. It is also difficult to measure from one month's trade figures, since firms can stockpile and redirect goods before changes take effect.

The public deserves an account of which industries gained protection, which households and employers paid more, and whether claimed economic goals were achieved. The November 3 election can improve or weaken oversight of those questions. It cannot, by its own force, erase the legal duties on tomorrow's imports.

## Sources

[USTR — Presidential Tariff Actions](https://ustr.gov/trade-topics/presidential-tariff-actions)

[USTR — Forced Labor Section 301 Tariff Action, July 2026](https://ustr.gov/about/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2026/july/ustr-takes-action-forced-labor-section-301-investigations)

[Congressional Research Service — U.S.-UK Trade Relations, July 2026](https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF11123.html)

[Finance Canada — Countermeasures and Worker Support, August 2026](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2026/08/canada-announces-targeted-countermeasures-and-substantive-support-for-workers-and-businesses-in-response-to-us-tariffs.html)

[Finance Canada — List of Counter-Tariff Products, September 2026](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/international-trade-finance-policy/canadas-response-us-tariffs/complete-list-us-products-subject-to-counter-tariffs.html)

[European Commission — EU Trade Relations with the United States](https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/united-states_en)

[European Commission — EU-US Joint Trade Framework, August 2025](https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/joint-statement-united-states-european-union-framework-agreement-reciprocal-fair-and-balanced-trade-2025-08-21_en)

[US International Trade Commission — Harmonized Tariff Schedule](https://hts.usitc.gov/?showFullTree=true)

## Methodology

https://factrail.ai/methodology

Canonical: https://factrail.ai/articles/post-midterm-congress-tariff-powers-eu-uk-canada-2026
