# Nevada Geothermal Lease Sale: Who Got the Rights?

Published: 2026-11-03

![Steamboat geothermal complex near Reno, Nevada](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Steamboat_Geothermal_Plants%2C_Nevada.jpg)
Photo: ThinkGeoEnergy / Wikimedia Commons, CC BY 2.0. The pictured site is illustrative and is not identified as a parcel sold in October 2026.

Factrail investigation | United States / Nevada | Decision: 20 October 2026 | Researched: 3 November 2026 | Independent QA pending

The finding. The [Donald Trump administration](https://factrail.ai/people/donald-trump) auctioned federal geothermal leasing rights in Nevada on October 20, producing $4.83 million in reported receipts and high bids on 60 parcels. The same auction also exposed a harder question than whether geothermal power is useful: how should the [White House](https://factrail.ai/organizations/white-house) and federal land agencies allocate overlapping claims on public land when proposed solar plants have already entered federal review? Government bidding records name Ormat Nevada, Invenergy Geothermal Development, United Minerals and Mining and other successful bidders. [NextEra Energy](/organizations/nextera-energy) had objected to parcels overlapping its proposed Sawtooth solar project; the [Bureau of Land Management](/organizations/bureau-of-land-management) refused its requested broad accommodation. A lease bid is not a power plant, a land-use right is not a final construction permit, and no document examined proves that a politician intervened for a bidder. But the sequence reveals who exercises the allocation power, who acquires a commercial option, and which competing developers must negotiate around it.

## What the records add beyond the auction headline

The most important original comparison is between three distinct government records: the [BLM's signed policy direction on annual geothermal auctions](https://www.blm.gov/policy/im2026-004), its [parcel-by-parcel bidding record](https://www.blm.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2026-10/GEONV-2026-Q4-%20Bidding%20Results.pdf), and the [Government Accountability Office's audit of the permitting machinery](https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-108040/index.html). Read together, they show a federal agency accelerating the first gate to development while independent auditors say the later gates lack a unified status tracker and published procedural handbooks. This is a tension between policy speed and administrative visibility, not evidence that any individual lease was unlawful.

There is also a precision problem in public summaries. BLM's August announcement offered 83 parcels totaling 265,691 acres. Its final one-page sale-results summary lists 83 parcels offered on auction day but 265,154.61 acres, a slightly smaller acreage base. Of those, 60 parcels comprising 186,641 acres received bids. The reported $4,829,720 total receipts must not be confused with the $4,444,112 sum of high bids. The [official results summary](https://www.blm.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2026-10/GEONV-2026-Q4%20-%20Sale%20Results%20Summary.pdf) separates those figures. Treating the total receipts as an amount paid solely for competitive bids, or dividing it by the larger advertised acreage to declare a universal land price, would mislead readers.

## A documentary timeline of the decision

The federal geothermal programme predates this presidency. The Geothermal Steam Act sets a framework for leasing, and BLM's own December 2025 memorandum says the statute already required competitive sales at least every two years in states with pending nominations for eligible land. The Trump administration's additional choice was to make annual sales the general policy and set quantitative targets for offering timely nominated parcels. Its [Instruction Memorandum 2026-004](https://www.blm.gov/policy/im2026-004), signed by acting assistant director Tina Roberts-Ashby on December 16, 2025, explicitly links that choice to Trump's energy executive orders and Interior Secretary [Doug Burgum](/people/doug-burgum)'s departmental orders.

On June 24, 2026, BLM [opened public input](https://www.blm.gov/announcement/blm-seeks-input-october-2026-geothermal-lease-sale-nevada) on an initial Nevada proposal involving 84 parcels and roughly 268,251 acres. On August 21, the agency [advertised](https://www.blm.gov/announcement/blm-hold-october-2026-geothermal-lease-sale-nevada) 83 parcels and 265,691 acres. The changing counts are part of normal parcel review, but they are a reason to use the final record for auction outcomes rather than an early press release.

In the review period, NextEra Energy asked the agency to remove, defer or reconfigure three geothermal parcels overlapping the company's proposed 1,000-megawatt Sawtooth Energy Center. [Reuters examined the objection and BLM's response](https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/trump-geothermal-lease-sale-collides-with-planned-nevada-solar-farms-2026-10-19/). BLM declined the requested accommodation, citing multiple uses of federal land, while indicating that priority between projects could depend on the sequence of actual authorizations. One parcel shown in earlier maps was not in the final auction offering. This prevents a blanket conclusion that every contested parcel was sold.

On October 20, BLM accepted high bids on 60 parcels. On October 21, [Utility Dive reported](https://www.utilitydive.com/news/geothermal-lease-sale-blm-nevada-nextera/833603/) the results and identified the overlap between two parcels acquired by United Minerals and Mining and the Sawtooth proposal. The agency's [October 20 release](https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-geothermal-lease-sales-nevada-net-over-4-million) explicitly cautioned that leases may be issued only after review and payment. That is the legal stage at the end of this timeline: accepted bids, not operating plants.

## Who had the power to decide—and who could still stop a project?

[President Donald Trump](/people/mig-donald-trump) established the administration's broad energy priorities. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum exercises political and departmental oversight. BLM national headquarters wrote the annual-sale policy; state and field offices administered the parcel review, environmental process and auction. BLM Nevada Acting State Director Justin Abernathy publicly defended the sale as supporting domestic energy, local revenue and security. His statement does not show that he personally selected the winning bidders; the disclosed process was competitive bidding.

The [BLM policy memorandum](https://www.blm.gov/policy/im2026-004) asks state offices to aim to include at least 90% of timely nominated BLM-managed parcels that are open and available, with a different two-year goal for qualifying parcels managed by another surface agency. Those are administrative targets with eligibility conditions, not a legal command to auction protected land regardless of environmental law. The memorandum also says the bureau generally need not defer nominations solely because a land-use-plan amendment is pending unless law or regulation requires it.

The second gate belongs to environmental and project-specific review. A geothermal lease gives a holder an avenue to explore and seek subsequent approvals; it does not authorize unlimited ground disturbance or automatic construction. Other land-use rights, wildlife protections, cultural resources, water requirements and judicial review may still constrain a development. Solar right-of-way applications have their own review and decision process. Neither NextEra's application nor a geothermal bidder's success at auction is equivalent to final project permission.

The practical veto map is therefore layered: BLM can refuse or condition an individual authorization; other regulators may control water, grid interconnection or other approvals; courts can review legally challenged federal decisions; and developers can choose not to invest. The public may participate at legally specified stages, but participation does not give every commenter a veto. A claimed senior right is contingent on the relevant authorization sequence, not on which company appeared in a news article first.

## The named beneficiaries are bidders, not yet electricity producers

The [official bidding-results PDF](https://www.blm.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2026-10/GEONV-2026-Q4-%20Bidding%20Results.pdf) identifies high bidders including Ormat Nevada Inc., Invenergy Geothermal Development LLC, United Minerals and Mining LLC, Zanskar Geothermal & Minerals Inc., Navram Resources LLC, Castor Renewables LLC, Glovate LLC, Hexagon Development LLC, TLS Geothermics Corp, Skyladder Capital LLC and others. These are names on federal auction records, not proof that all are ultimate corporate beneficiaries or that they will build generating facilities.

Ormat is the clearest commercially identifiable example. [Utility Dive's post-auction reporting](https://www.utilitydive.com/news/geothermal-lease-sale-blm-nevada-nextera/833603/) calculated that Ormat spent about $2.3 million to win eight parcels covering approximately 20,263 acres. The BLM bidding PDF separately shows Ormat Nevada as high bidder on several numbered parcels, including NV-2026-10-2318 at a high bid of $201 per acre and NV-2026-10-7059 at $176 per acre. The precise bidder ledger is stronger evidence of competitive outcomes than an inference about hidden influence.

Ormat already had an independent commercial reason to seek geothermal opportunities. That agreement illustrates demand for firm power from large customers. It does not establish that the October auction parcels serve that contract; a parcel-level contractual link was not demonstrated.

The contested Sawtooth overlap has a different winner. The bidding ledger lists United Minerals and Mining as high bidder on parcels including NV-2026-10-2308 and NV-2026-10-2309. [Utility Dive linked two United Minerals and Mining winning parcels](https://www.utilitydive.com/news/geothermal-lease-sale-blm-nevada-nextera/833603/) to the proposed Sawtooth footprint, reporting roughly $15,400 for each. The dollar figure is not a purchase of fee-simple land and cannot be compared directly to the proposed cost of a 1-gigawatt solar development. It is an entry price into a conditional federal leasing framework.

## The developer on the other side of the map

NextEra's proposed Sawtooth Energy Center in Nye County illustrates why federal land allocation is more than a contest over auction receipts. [Reuters reported](https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/trump-geothermal-lease-sale-collides-with-planned-nevada-solar-farms-2026-10-19/) that NextEra said three proposed geothermal parcels overlapped approximately 6,000 acres, around 60% of its project site. BLM's response did not simply declare geothermal inherently superior. It asserted its multiple-use management authority and told the solar developer that future coordination with a leaseholder could be necessary.

Other developers raised similar concerns. Leeward Renewable Energy identified an overlap of about 735 acres with its proposed Lone Mountain solar project. Reuters also identified proposed developments associated with Invenergy's Nivloc project and Arevia Power's Gold Dust project. Some were associated with the broader Esmeralda 7 concept, whose collective environmental review had been canceled in 2025, although individual projects could seek separate review. These are proposals and permitting histories, not a portfolio of operating plants whose production was demonstrably displaced.

A parcel's overlap does not prove that two technologies are physically incompatible across every acre. Geothermal plants may have concentrated surface footprints but require wells, access roads and underground resources; utility-scale solar uses broad surface areas and related transmission infrastructure. The nature of any conflict depends on parcel geometry, subsurface access, sequencing, site design and final permits. That is why the public-interest test should ask for a documented site-level compatibility assessment, not an automatic verdict for either technology.

## The money route: public receipts, private options and future risk

BLM's August notice describes a statutory distribution under which Nevada receives 50% of applicable geothermal bid, rental and royalty receipts, affected counties receive 25%, and the federal Treasury receives 25%. The [auction announcement](https://www.blm.gov/announcement/blm-hold-october-2026-geothermal-lease-sale-nevada) states that allocation; the [October result](https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-geothermal-lease-sales-nevada-net-over-4-million) reports gross receipts. A cash-flow analysis would need actual payment and disbursement records to determine what each government received, when, and after which adjustments. No such reconciliation was obtained for this article.

The public financial upside includes immediate competitive receipts and possible later rentals, royalties and local economic activity. The private upside is the opportunity to pursue valuable subsurface energy resources and potentially contract with utilities or data-center customers. The risks include unsuccessful exploration, delayed permits, environmental mitigation and the opportunity cost of foreclosing or complicating other uses. The auction result cannot establish future profit, employment, electricity output or consumer savings.

It is equally important not to equate high bidding with public value in isolation. An expensive lease can remain undeveloped. Conversely, a low initial bid may lead to a productive project generating later royalties. BLM's [GAO-audited programme history](https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-108040/index.html) shows 19 competitive geothermal lease sales yielding about $39.4 million from 2020 through 2025, while the number of active geothermal leases rose from 599 in March 2025 to 749 in March 2026. Neither statistic answers how many new megawatts were delivered because of the October 2026 auction.

## An audit exposes the bottleneck after the auction

The most consequential accountability document is the [GAO report publicly released on October 8](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108040). Auditors found geothermal acreage nominated for potential leasing increased from roughly 25,800 acres in 2020 to more than one million acres in 2025. BLM approved 68 geothermal drilling permits in fiscal 2024, up from seven in 2019. The demand surge was real; it was not invented to justify a political programme.

But the agency could not readily assemble a comprehensive picture of how many geothermal permits were under review, approved, denied or withdrawn across its field offices. Some offices used their own spreadsheets; the old Geothermal Resources Automated Support System had been decommissioned in 2021, and the replacement did not provide a comparable geothermal permit-tracking function. GAO also found that geothermal handbooks had remained in draft since at least 2022, despite officials reporting no obstacle to finalizing them. The audit recommended public handbooks, a unified permit tracker and measurable processing-time goals. All three recommendations were listed as open on the [GAO product page](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-26-108040) when inspected.

This matters because the [White House](/organizations/white-house) can count auctions and acreage much more easily than completed electricity plants. Without consistent tracking, even well-intentioned officials have a weaker basis for diagnosing where development stalls. The audit also recorded staffing constraints: one Nevada office reported 60% overall vacancies and only one of six geologist posts filled. These observations do not prove that the October Nevada sale was mishandled; they identify system-level capacity risks that the political target for more frequent sales does not by itself solve.

GAO's historical average from nomination to lease sale was 455 days for BLM-managed nominations actually offered in 2019–2025, with a much longer average for certain other federal surface agencies. That is a selected completed-case measure, not the average wait of every outstanding application. It cannot be used to promise that the new annual-sale policy will shorten all future projects by a specific number of days.

## The strongest counter-case: geothermal is not a disguised fossil-fuel programme

The administration's most substantial argument deserves serious treatment. Geothermal energy can provide electricity around the clock without depending on daylight or wind conditions. It can complement rather than replace solar and wind, and drilling innovation has expanded interest in deeper resources. The [GAO audit](https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-26-108040/index.html) estimated that federal-land geothermal plants represented about 2,600 megawatts of capacity and roughly 65% of US geothermal capacity. The agency's 2026 auction therefore serves a genuine energy category with an existing operating base.

BLM also points to competitive auctions, published notices, environmental review and later permit checks. An open auction is not the same as an undisclosed grant to a favoured company. The policy did not eliminate the statutory availability test or confer construction authority merely by accepting a bid. Some developers may be able to coordinate co-location or different project designs. More reliable power could help address rising grid demand, including from data centres, although specific bill savings from this auction remain unmeasured.

The serious objection is not that geothermal development should never occur. It is that a government prioritizing one low-carbon technology while subjecting another to different political review should explain the legal and economic basis of those choices and maintain a fair, documented process for conflicts on the same land. Reuters separately reported litigation and an April 2026 preliminary injunction against certain wind and solar restrictions. That judicial episode is a distinct legal matter; it does not invalidate the October geothermal sale, and its final disposition must not be inferred from a preliminary ruling.

## What the records do not establish

There is no verified evidence in the documents reviewed of an illegal contribution, quid pro quo, secret beneficial owner or direct instruction from Trump or Burgum to award a particular parcel to Ormat, United Minerals and Mining or another bidder. Public high-bid records do not answer every corporate ownership question, but a missing ownership investigation is not affirmative evidence of wrongdoing. The relationship between Ormat's separate Google-linked power agreement and the parcels acquired in October is unproven.

Nor is it established that NextEra's solar project has been permanently blocked. The company's application was pending in the reporting reviewed, and at least one disputed parcel was removed before auction. The sequence of subsequent leases and rights-of-way, exact parcel maps, site-specific stipulations, final project decisions and any negotiated accommodation will determine the practical outcome. No direct right-of-reply requests were sent by Factrail to the companies or government officials for this article; their positions are taken from attributed public documents and independent reporting.

The strongest additional documentary tests would be the signed leases, the complete bid and payment ledger, final environmental decision records for the overlapping parcels, BLM's response-to-comments attachments, any executed right-of-way grants and a current permit-status export. A lobbying or campaign-finance allegation would require separate named records, timing and causal evidence before it belonged in a finding.

## The public accountability test

The October 20 auction produced a measurable result: accepted bids on 60 parcels and $4.83 million in gross receipts. It did not produce 60 power plants. The political decision to prioritize annual geothermal auctions was made openly through BLM policy, while the conflict with solar proposals became visible through developer objections and the auction record. The real governance test is whether BLM can show, parcel by parcel, that the subsequent permitting process resolves competing claims fairly, observes environmental and cultural protections, and converts public resource rights into measurable public value.

The effect on [greenhouse-gas emissions intensity](https://factrail.ai/drivers/greenhouse-gas-emissions-intensity) depends on generation actually brought online, not auction receipts. A government that promises energy abundance should be judged not only by the acreage it offers but by the permits it can account for, the power it ultimately brings online, the revenues actually distributed, and the projects it delays or displaces. Those outcomes remain to be documented. The audit's three open recommendations provide a concrete starting point for Congress and the Interior Department to demand the missing evidence.

## Source and verification note

Independent reporting inspected: [Reuters on the land conflict](https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/trump-geothermal-lease-sale-collides-with-planned-nevada-solar-farms-2026-10-19/) and [Utility Dive on actual auction outcomes](https://www.utilitydive.com/news/geothermal-lease-sale-blm-nevada-nextera/833603/). These are distinct editorial lineages; BLM's own pages are not counted as independent reporting from one another.

## Methodology

https://factrail.ai/methodology

Canonical: https://factrail.ai/articles/trump-nevada-geothermal-auction-solar-overlap-2026
