# Pace of Climate Transition ## What this driver is Pace of climate transition is one continuing substitution mechanism: how fast final energy and electricity actually shift from fossil fuels toward renewable and other low-carbon sources, measured first on IEA/World Bank renewable share of total final energy consumption and corroborated by IRENA capacity additions against the COP28 tripling goal. It is a mechanism, not a COP slogan, not a welfare score, and not the warming bundle. The driver is not [climate crisis](/drivers/climate-crisis), which is the civilizational warming-and-harm node. It is not [fossil fuel phaseout struggle](/drivers/fossil-phaseout-struggle), not [renewable energy buildout](/drivers/energy-renewable-buildout), not [decarbonization policy](/drivers/env-decarbonization-policy), and not [climate-finance availability](/drivers/climate-finance-availability). Buildout is capacity added; this node is the share of energy actually consumed. Policy and finance are instruments. Warming is the physical stock. It applies globally from the Paris NDC cycle through COP28 decision 1/CMA.5 (13 December 2023), which called for tripling renewable power capacity and doubling the energy-efficiency improvement rate by 2030, and through IRENA’s 2024 and 2025 capacity years. It is not ukraine-war and not [territorial-revisionism](/drivers/territorial-revisionism). The live Factrail series already uses World Bank EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS (renewable energy consumption as a share of total final energy consumption; IEA source). Across the stored 2020–2022 observations the normalized values are 0.29558019 (2020), 0.29080189 (2021), and 0.29570423 (2022). Those are the live points. A higher value means a higher renewable share of TFEC, not a welfare verdict by itself. ## Mechanism The pace moves welfare through named channels. First, substitution in final energy. A solar farm that is built but curtailed, or a heat pump that is sold into a gas-heated stock that is not retired, does not move TFEC share. EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS is the consumption share, not the nameplate GW. That is why this node is not renewable energy buildout. Second, the COP28 tripling test. Decision 1/CMA.5 called on Parties to triple renewable power capacity by 2030. IRENA’s Renewable Capacity Statistics 2025 (26 March 2025) recorded 585 GW added in 2024, 92.5% of global power expansion, taking the stock to 4,448 GW, and said that still falls short of about 11.2 TW needed to triple (https://www.irena.org/News/pressreleases/2025/Mar/Record-Breaking-Annual-Growth-in-Renewable-Power-Capacity). IRENA’s 1 April 2026 release recorded 692 GW added in 2025, stock 5,149 GW (https://www.irena.org/News/pressreleases/2026/Apr/Near-700-GW-Surge-in-2025-Proves-Renewable-Energy-Resilience). Those GW are IRENA’s. This page does not invent a unique Factrail GW or Contribution.size. Third, concentration. IRENA itself flags that a handful of countries supply most additions. A global GW record can coexist with a stalled TFEC share in oil- and gas-using transport and heat. The 2020–2022 live TFEC points barely moved. That is the pace problem, not a press-release success. Fourth, grids and permitting. Capacity that cannot connect, or that waits years for a line, does not substitute. Efficiency (the other COP28 doubling) is a neighbouring channel on [economy-wide energy efficiency](/drivers/economy-wide-energy-efficiency). Fifth, reversal risk. Timing is a year for a capacity vintage and a decade for TFEC share. A later EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS release, or an IRENA year that IRENA itself says is on the 11 TW path, would be a new point. ## Evidence base The best evidence is the live World Bank/IEA TFEC share plus IRENA capacity statistics and the CMA decision. World Bank EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS for 2020–2022 is already stored (https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/all/indicator/EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS?date=2020:2025&format=json&per_page=20000). The conversion on this driver remains percentage divided by 100. 2022 is 0.29570423. IRENA 26 March 2025 and 1 April 2026 press releases are the capacity corroboration, including the explicit shortfall versus the ~11 TW tripling stock. COP28 UAE Consensus / 1/CMA.5 is the tripling-and-doubling instrument (https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era). IPCC AR6 remains domain context, not a hidden annual value. Evidence is strongest for a published TFEC share, an IRENA capacity year, and a CMA paragraph. It is weaker for any unique “jobs created” integer. It is weakest where a GW record is asked to rebate an almost-flat 2020–2022 TFEC share. ## Effect on welfare indicators This driver, when TFEC actually shifts, is a first-order channel into fossil CO2 and a co-channel into combustion particulate. - [Global CO2 emissions per capita](/indicators/env-co2-emissions-per-capita-global): direction lower per-capita CO2 when renewable TFEC share rises and displaces fossil use. Horizon: years. Confidence: medium — capacity is not generation, and generation is not TFEC. No invented GtCO2. - [Renewable share of global electricity generation](/indicators/energy-renewable-electricity-share-global): direction higher electricity share when the transition actually runs. Horizon: years. Confidence: high for the sign; this is a neighbouring generation meter, not the TFEC proxy itself. - [Population-weighted PM2.5 air pollution exposure (global)](/indicators/env-pm25-air-pollution-exposure-global): direction lower particulate when coal and oil combustion fall. Horizon: years. Confidence: medium. A gas-for-coal switch can cut PM2.5 without moving this driver far. Missing coefficients stay missing. The welfare sign of a faster honest transition is positive on those lower-is-better pollution and CO2 series. A GW headline that does not move TFEC is not that sign. ## Interactions and contested points Reinforcement is obvious when a record IRENA year and a rising TFEC share sit together. Offsetting is the claim that a GW record rebates a flat TFEC share or a widening Production Gap. Those are different nodes. The strongest competing view is that 585 GW and 692 GW mean the pace is already sufficient. IRENA itself said 2024 still fell short of the tripling stock. This node stores the record additions and the shortfall in the same IRENA sentences. It does not. Buildout is nameplate. This node is consumption share plus the tripling test. They have LIVE companions. They are not collapsed here. Established: live 2020–2022 EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS points; COP28 tripling/doubling language; IRENA 2024 585 GW / 4,448 GW and 2025 692 GW / 5,149 GW as IRENA figures; distinction from climate-crisis and from buildout. Not established: a unique Factrail GW, a 2023–2025 TFEC value where World Bank has not published in this series, or that a press-release record retired oil demand. A later TFEC point would update the meter. It would not mint a second pace driver. ## Dated facts _No published facts on this page yet._ ## Methodology https://factrail.ai/methodology Canonical: https://factrail.ai/drivers/pace-of-climate-transition