# UAE regional diplomacy and post-oil state strategy

### Diplomatic normalization, military entanglements and the non-oil transition

The United Arab Emirates used oil wealth, sovereign investment, regional security commitments and diplomatic bargaining to enlarge its influence during the 2010s and 2020s. That strategy combined genuine economic diversification with coercive regional actions and a continuing dependence on hydrocarbon exports. The UAE joined the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in March 2015, committing military resources to a conflict that inflicted severe humanitarian costs. Emirati-backed Yemeni forces remained influential even as Abu Dhabi reduced its direct troop footprint in 2019. The intervention made the UAE an important actor in the wider [Yemen and Red Sea confrontation](/drivers/yemen-houthi-red-sea), not simply a neutral commercial hub for regional trade.

In August 2020, the UAE and Israel announced plans to normalize their relationship. On September 15, 2020, officials signed a bilateral treaty at the [White House](/organizations/white-house) as part of the [Abraham Accords](/facts/abraham-accords). The normalization agreement opened opportunities for official travel, business cooperation and security coordination, but it did not resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its supporters described a diplomatic breakthrough with economic benefits; critics argued that the arrangement reduced Arab leverage over Israeli occupation without securing an independent Palestinian state. The significance of normalization lies both in the new interstate relationship and in the political choice to pursue strategic and commercial interests without prior resolution of that dispute.

The diversification effort accelerated alongside these diplomatic initiatives. Abu Dhabi invested in industries and logistics, while Dubai expanded finance, tourism, property and aviation. On November 22, 2023, the [World Bank](/organizations/world-bank) forecast 4.5 percent growth in UAE non-oil output for 2023, compared with only 0.7 percent growth in oil output under production constraints. The contrasting numbers demonstrate real movement beyond extraction in domestic activity, yet [fossil-fuel dependence](/drivers/fossil-fuel-dependence) continued to shape government revenue, global market exposure and the scale of overseas investment. The UAE remained a major oil producer and a participant in OPEC+ output negotiations; diversification did not amount to an exit from the petroleum economy.

The UAE hosted the COP28 climate conference in Dubai from November 30 to December 13, 2023. COP28 president Sultan al-Jaber also led the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, raising questions among environmental advocates about how a major producer would manage conflicts between production plans and climate diplomacy. On December 13, the negotiating parties adopted the first COP outcome explicitly calling for a transition away from fossil fuels, while the UN Secretary-General insisted that actual phaseout remained necessary. The agreement's language represented a diplomatic success for the host but was weaker than the immediate phaseout demanded by many campaigners. International climate leadership and expanded hydrocarbon production coexisted within the Emirati strategy.

Emirati external influence also became controversial in relation to Sudan's civil war after April 2023. Sudanese authorities accused the UAE of supporting the Rapid Support Forces; Abu Dhabi has denied providing such support. These allegations, distinguished from adjudicated findings, placed attention on the cross-border financing and arms networks that can prolong Sudan's civil war. Meanwhile [global oil-market balance](/drivers/global-oil-market-balance) remained vulnerable to OPEC+ decisions, attacks on maritime routes and volatility in demand. The UAE's trajectory is thus not a simple transition from oil state to post-oil innovation economy. It is a combined project of foreign-policy leverage, commercial integration, security partnerships and selective economic reform. The gains in non-oil output and recognized diplomacy must be assessed alongside the human costs and unresolved accountability questions of regional intervention.

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## Methodology

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