# US OFAC Russia SDN/sanctions expansions 2022

Date: 2022

## The fact

On 24 February 2022 the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control imposed expansive Russia-related measures under Executive Order 14024. The Treasury press release of that date records correspondent and payable-through account prohibitions on Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia (Directive 2) and full blocking sanctions on VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company and named other institutions, together with Directive 3 debt-and-equity restrictions. OFAC FAQ 966 restates the same 22–24 February 2022 sequence: a financial-services sector determination on 22 February, Directive 2 and Directive 3 on 24 February, and blocking of specified Russian financial institutions including VEB, VTB, Otkritie, Promsvyazbank, Sovcombank and Novikombank. This Fact is the 2022 U.S. SDN/sanctions expansion wave as recorded by Treasury, not a unique frozen-asset coefficient and not a SWIFT Council Decision.

## Context

E.O. 14024 (15 April 2021) already authorised Treasury, in consultation with State, to determine sectors of the Russian economy for sanctions. The 22 February 2022 financial-services sector determination opened that gate. The 24 February package followed Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine that morning and President Biden’s public announcement of financial costs. [Joe Biden](/people/env-person-joe-biden) announced the political frame; OFAC wrote the directives. [Antony Blinken](/people/sec-antony-blinken) held State. [Vladimir Putin](/people/vladimir-putin) is the listed Russian principal in parallel EU and UK acts the same week; he did not author the OFAC directives.

Treasury said the 24 February measures targeted institutions holding nearly 80 percent of Russian banking assets. That percentage is Treasury’s contemporaneous characterisation in jy0608, not a measured change in Russian M2. Correspondent-account prohibitions on Sberbank were timed to take effect 26 March 2022. Full blocking of VTB was immediate as of the designation. SWIFT disconnection of selected banks is a later EU/G7 instrument (March 2022) and is stored as a neighbouring Fact if present.

Further 2022 OFAC expansions — 11 March designations of named elites, 6 April blocking of Sberbank and additional persons, 8 May board-member designations — densify the same year’s SDN/sanctions file.

Keep 24 February 2022 OFAC directives off the EU 23–25 February Council packages and off the March SWIFT cut. Keep Directive 2’s March 26 effective date off the February designation date. Do not treat a Treasury “80 percent of banking assets” sentence as a unique welfare size.

OFAC may designate persons and issue directives under IEEPA and E.O. 14024. That office cannot enact an EU CFSP Decision, disconnect a bank from SWIFT, or print a unique frozen-asset coefficient not in the Treasury instrument.

## Evidence and sources

U.S. Department of the Treasury / OFAC carries the official instrument or communique. Reuters records the same dated act independently.

## Significance

The attached driver is [sanctions-pressure](/drivers/sanctions-pressure). The 2022 OFAC expansions are the U.S. financial-sanctions densification at war onset: correspondent-account isolation of Sberbank, SDN blocking of VTB and named banks, and Directive 3 debt/equity limits. Interpretation of evasion, energy carve-outs, or later secondary measures lives on the impact path, not as a rant in this event record.

## What is established and what is not

Established: On 24 February 2022 OFAC issued Directive 2 and Directive 3 under E.O. 14024 and blocked named Russian financial institutions including VTB; Treasury’s jy0608 press release and OFAC FAQ 966 record the same acts; Reuters independently reported Sberbank correspondent-account isolation and VTB SDN listing.

Not established: A unique dollar amount of frozen assets, that SWIFT disconnection was an OFAC act on 24 February, or a measured change in Russian GDP or EU inflation caused by these directives without a separate dated series.

What would change the picture: a contradictory original with a different date or name, a later repeal, a court that vacated the instrument, or a measured series that can be argued, with lag and alternatives, as a consequence of this instrument rather than of later institutions.

The date is the date of this instrument, not a licence to back-date every later harm or benefit.

The President announced the policy. The Secretary of State is a consulting officer under E.O. 14024. Russian counterparties did not write the U.S. list.. A later repeal, court stay, or successor order would be a different Fact with a different date. That pair identifies US OFAC Russia SDN/sanctions expansions 2022, not a later speech about US OFAC Russia SDN/sanctions expansions 2022.

Co-authors and later implementers named in Context remain on the file. US OFAC Russia SDN/sanctions expansions 2022 on 2022 is not a licence to treat every later U.S. Department of the Treasury / OFAC communique as this same act. If a later repeal, stay, or successor instrument exists, it needs its own date and its own row. This dossier refuses to average US OFAC Russia SDN/sanctions expansions 2022 into a personality. The contribution described on this Person row is limited to OFAC issued the directives. The President announced the policy. The Secretary of State is a consulting officer under E.O. 14024. Russian counterparties did not write the U.S. list. That limit is the alternative to treating office-holding as authorship of every later series.

## Drivers

- Sanctions Pressure: https://factrail.ai/drivers/sanctions-pressure

## Sources

_Sources are listed on the canonical page._

## Methodology

https://factrail.ai/methodology

Canonical: https://factrail.ai/facts/us-ofac-russia-sdn-expansions-2022