# Pol Antràs

# Pol Antràs

Pol Antràs (born 30 June 1975 in Barcelona, Spain) is a Spanish economist and the Robert G. Ory Professor of Economics at [Harvard University](/organizations/harvard-university). He has taught in Harvard’s Department of Economics since 2003: as assistant professor from 2003 to 2007, as professor from 2007 to 2014, and in the Ory chair since 2015. A citizen of Spain, he works on international trade and multinational activity, and in particular on how incomplete contracts affect the way firms organize production across borders.

He earned a B.A. in economics in 1998 and an M.Sc. in economics in 1999, both with highest honors, from [Pompeu Fabra University](/organizations/pompeu-fabra-university), and a Ph.D. in economics from the [Massachusetts Institute of Technology](/organizations/massachusetts-institute-of-technology) in 2003. The dissertation, “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure,” was advised by [Daron Acemoglu](/people/daron-acemoglu) and Jaume Ventura.

That thesis paper appeared in [the Quarterly Journal of Economics](/organizations/the-quarterly-journal-of-economics) in November 2003. It reports that roughly one-third of world trade is intrafirm trade, that the intrafirm share of U.S. imports is higher in more capital-intensive industries, and that it is higher for imports from more capital-abundant countries, and it accounts for those patterns with a model that joins a Grossman–Hart–Moore property-rights view of the firm to a Helpman–Krugman model of trade under imperfect competition and product differentiation. With Elhanan Helpman, Antràs then built a North–South model in which final-good producers that differ in productivity choose whether to make intermediate inputs inside the firm or to outsource them, and whether to source them at home or abroad; the paper was published in the Journal of Political Economy in 2004. A later paper with Davin Chor, “Organizing the Global Value Chain” (Econometrica, 2013), applies a property-rights approach to sequential stages of production. Global Production: Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure ([Princeton University Press](/organizations/princeton-university-press), 2015) collects this line of work on firms, contracts, and the structure of trade.

Antràs is a research associate of the [National Bureau of Economic Research](/organizations/national-bureau-of-economic-research), in its programs on international trade and investment and on economic fluctuations and growth, and he directed the bureau’s International Trade and Organization Working Group. He is also a research fellow of the [Centre for Economic Policy Research](/organizations/centre-for-economic-policy-research). In 2018–2019 he co-directed, with Caroline Freund and Aaditya Mattoo, the World Bank Group World Development Report 2020, Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains, which asks whether global value chains still offer a path to development and concludes that they can continue to support growth, jobs, and poverty reduction if developing countries deepen reforms, industrial countries keep trade policy open and predictable, and governments revive multilateral cooperation. He was an editor of the Quarterly Journal of Economics from 2015 to 2020.

Among his honors are an [Alfred P. Sloan](/people/alfred-p-sloan) Research Fellowship, held from 2007 to 2009, and the 2009 Fundación Banco Herrero Prize, awarded to a Spanish social scientist under 40 for research in international economics and trade. He was elected a fellow of the Econometric Society in 2015 and a member of the [American Academy of Arts and Sciences](/organizations/american-academy-of-arts-and-sciences) in 2024.

## Early life and education

### Barcelona and secondary studies

Pol Antràs Puchal was born in Barcelona on 30 June 1975. A curriculum vitae filed with the Econometric Society states that he is a citizen of Spain and a permanent resident of the United States, that he is married with two daughters, that he was co-winner of the Spanish National Olympiad in Computer Science in 1992, and that he held an ASSIST scholarship in 1993–94. The Catalan newspaper *Ara* identifies him as “Pol Antràs (Barcelona, 1975).” In a January 2025 interview published by *[La Vanguardia](/organizations/la-vanguardia)*, he said he had grown up in a family of lawyers and had not been drawn to law.

### Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Antràs studied economics at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. A biographical note for the 2012 Lectures in Macroeconomics of [the Centre](/organizations/the-centre) de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI) records a B.A. and an M.Sc. in economics from Pompeu Fabra and a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2003. His vita dates the Pompeu Fabra degrees to 1998 and 1999, describes both as awarded with highest honors, calls the 1998 distinction a graduation prize for the highest grade-point average, and lists him as a research and teaching assistant there in 1998–99. On 2 December 1998, at the graduation of the university’s fifth class in the Palau de la Música Catalana, Pompeu Fabra gave him the extraordinary end-of-studies prize (*premi extraordinari de fi d’estudis*) for the licentiate in economics. The same *La Vanguardia* interview reports that a classmate, Elsa Artadi, told him doctorates could be taken in the United States, and that he regarded that conversation as the turn toward graduate study abroad. In 2000 the Pompeu Fabra department issued his working paper with Hans-Joachim Voth, “Factor prices and productivity growth during the British Industrial Revolution,” later published in *Explorations in Economic History*.

### Doctoral training at MIT

He did his doctoral work in the economics department of MIT in [Cambridge, Massachusetts](/organizations/cambridge-massachusetts). RePEc Genealogy records the 2003 terminal degree and names Daron Acemoglu and Jaume Ventura as advisors. The vita titles the dissertation “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure,” gives Ventura’s affiliation as CREI and Pompeu Fabra, and lists a [Bank of Spain](/organizations/bank-of-spain) fellowship for 1999–2003, a [Robert M. Solow](/people/robert-solow) Fellowship at MIT for 1999–2000, a research assistantship at MIT from 1999 to 2002, and a 2002 visiting studentship in the International Economics Section at [Princeton University](/organizations/princeton-university). *La Vanguardia* wrote that he had flown to the United States, and to Boston, about twenty-five years before the 2025 interview and had lived there since. A paper of the same title as the dissertation appeared in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* in 2003. It reported that the share of intrafirm imports in U.S. imports was higher in more capital-intensive exporting industries and in imports from countries with higher capital–labor ratios, and it set an incomplete-contracting, property-rights model of firm boundaries inside a trade model with imperfect competition and differentiated products.

## Academic career

### Harvard appointments

Antràs joined the Department of Economics at Harvard University in 2003 as an assistant professor, the year he received his Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was promoted to professor in 2007. From 2005 to 2008 he was the department’s inaugural Andrew E. Furer Fellow, an appointment that overlapped the end of his assistant professorship.

On 24 December 2014 the department announced that he had been named to the Robert G. Ory Professorship of Economics, which he has held since 2015. The chair was established through gifts from Andrew D. Ory, Linda G. Hammett Ory, Robert G. Ory, and Marjorie Ory. In the announcement, the department described it as recognizing an outstanding scholar in economics whose research relates to enterprise creation. The same notice recorded that he had taught at Harvard since 2003 and had directed the International Trade and Organization working group at the National Bureau of Economic Research.

In 2016 the [National Science Foundation](/organizations/national-science-foundation) supported his project “Trade Frictions and Global Value Chains” under award 1628852, with Antràs as principal investigator. The NBER lists the grant as running from 1 August 2016 to 31 July 2020 and describes it as a study of where sequential stages of production are located when trade is costly.

### Visiting posts and research affiliations

He has held two visiting appointments in MIT’s economics department: visiting assistant professor in 2006–2007 and visiting professor in 2014–2015. In 2011 he was a guest teacher at the [London School of Economics](/organizations/london-school-of-economics), and in 2018 he was visiting faculty at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center at the [Harvard Kennedy School](/organizations/harvard-kennedy-school).

He has been an NBER research associate since 2008. The bureau’s profile places him in the International Trade and Investment and Economic Fluctuations and Growth programs. From 2007 to 2009 he directed the NBER’s International Trade and Organization working group; the program’s 1 May 2009 meeting lists him as organizer. He has been a research fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research since 2009.

At Harvard’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs he has been a faculty associate since 2005, a steering-committee member from 2022, and, in 2019, a Weatherhead Center Distinguished Research Faculty Associate.

### Teaching and doctoral supervision

His regular Harvard teaching has centered on international trade. He has offered the Ph.D. course Advanced Topics in International Trade (Economics 2535) in most spring terms since 2004, specifically the springs of 2004–2006, 2008–2010, 2012, and 2014–2025. He has taught the undergraduate course International Trade and Investment (Economics 1535) in numerous terms from fall 2007 through fall 2025, and the undergraduate seminar Globalization and Inequality (Economics 980DD) in the falls of 2016, 2017, and 2025. Away from Harvard he taught MIT’s Ph.D. course International Economics I (14.581) in spring 2007 and MIT’s undergraduate International Trade (14.54) in fall 2014, and the LSE Ph.D. course EC532 in February 2011.

The students he lists under doctoral supervision include several who later held university posts. [Oleg Itskhoki](/people/oleg-itskhoki), whose own curriculum vitae names Elhanan Helpman, Gita Gopinath, Aleh Tsyvinski, and Antràs as advisers on his 2009 Harvard dissertation, taught at Princeton University and the [University of California, Los Angeles](/organizations/university-of-california-los-angeles) before returning to Harvard, where he is the Slusky Family Professor of Economics. Kalina Manova, whom Antràs lists from the 2007 cohort, took her Ph.D. at Harvard that year and is professor of economics at [University College London](/organizations/university-college-london), after appointments at [Stanford University](/organizations/stanford-university) and the [University of Oxford](/organizations/university-of-oxford). Thomas Sampson, also on that supervision list, received a Harvard Ph.D. in 2011 and is an associate professor at the LSE. The same list places Davin Chor at [Singapore Management University](/organizations/singapore-management-university) and later the [Tuck School of Business](/organizations/tuck-school-of-business) at [Dartmouth College](/organizations/dartmouth-college), and Matilde Bombardini at the [University of British Columbia](/organizations/university-of-british-columbia) and later the [Haas School of Business](/organizations/haas-school-of-business) at the [University of California, Berkeley](/organizations/university-of-california-berkeley).

## Incomplete contracts and multinational firms

### Property rights and intrafirm trade

A large part of goods trade occurs inside multinational corporations. In 1994, 42.7 percent of U.S. goods imports and 36.3 percent of U.S. goods exports were transactions between affiliated parties, and roughly one-third of world trade is intrafirm. In 23 manufacturing industries in 1987, 1989, 1992, and 1994, the intrafirm share of U.S. imports rose with capital intensity: chemicals tended to come from affiliates, textiles from unaffiliated sellers. Across 28 exporters in 1992, the share rose with the exporter’s capital–labor ratio—largely intrafirm from Switzerland, largely at arm’s length from Egypt.

*Log share of U.S. intrafirm imports plotted against log capital per worker for manufacturing industries, with an upward fitted line.*

Theories in the line of Elhanan Helpman and James Markusen explain foreign production by scale economies, transport costs, or factor prices, but not why the firm owns the plant rather than licensing or subcontracting; earlier internalization arguments had instead stressed asymmetric information and non-excludable knowledge. “Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure,” in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* in November 2003, joins the property-rights theory of the firm to a model of monopolistic competition in the manner of Helpman and [Paul Krugman](/people/paul-krugman).

Sanford J. Grossman and [Oliver Hart](/people/oliver-hart), with John Moore, treat ownership as residual control under incomplete contracts: investments specific to the relationship cannot be fully specified in advance, and the asset owner has the stronger outside option, so invests more. Efficiency assigns control to the party whose investment matters more. Antràs lets some costs be shared and treats physical capital as easier to share than labor, as when multinationals supply machinery, tools, or financing to suppliers. Sharing protects the supplier but exposes the final-good producer. That exposure is large when production is capital-intensive, so integration and intrafirm trade are efficient, and small when it is labor-intensive, so outsourcing dominates.

In general equilibrium, capital-abundant countries specialize in those capital-intensive goods, so their exports are disproportionately intrafirm. With costless trade and equalized factor prices, multinationals still appear, because boundaries are organizational rather than a consequence of scale or transport costs. Capital intensity remained positive and significant after controls for human capital, research intensity, advertising, plant scale, and value added; research intensity was also positive. Across countries, capital abundance stayed significant. Exporter size did not clearly affect the intrafirm share, though it raised intrafirm import volumes. Antràs noted that the tests could not separate this account from alternatives such as Holmström and Milgrom’s emphasis on measurement and job design. A 2014 survey called those correlations consistent with the theory but low-powered and not causally identified.

### The product cycle and technology adoption

“Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle” ([*American Economic Review*](/organizations/american-economic-review), September 2005) places the friction in a dynamic Ricardian model of North–South trade. Raymond Vernon had new goods made in the high-wage North and shifted South only once standardized, by choice of the innovator and often inside a multinational. Krugman (1979) let goods age at an exogenous rate; Gene Grossman and Helpman tied the shift to Southern imitation. The evidence Antràs reviewed instead showed voluntary transfers, inside the firm for newer goods and by license or subcontract for mature ones.

A Northern research center supplies a relationship-specific high-tech input and contracts for manufacturing. Quality is verifiable only when both stages are in the same country, so international contracts on quality and price do not bind. Standardization is a fall, with the good’s age, in the elasticity of output with respect to the high-tech input. Manufacturing stays in the North until the Southern wage saving outweighs hold-up. Ownership raises the research center’s ex-post bargaining share and weakens the manufacturer’s incentive, so the move South occurs first within the firm and only later at arm’s length. Relative to arm’s-length deals alone, the intrafirm route moves production South earlier, with an ambiguous wage effect. Faster creation of new goods widens world income differences, while faster standardization narrows them, and better international enforcement benefits the South, with an ambiguous welfare effect in the North.

The May 2005 *AER Papers and Proceedings* essay restates location and control in one partial-equilibrium model. Integration raises the final-good producer’s share of revenue, so headquarter-intensive goods are integrated and component-intensive goods outsourced. If only cross-border contracts fail, a decline in headquarter intensity—the essay’s measure of standardization—again orders production as domestic, then a foreign affiliate, then an independent foreign supplier.

“Contracts and Technology Adoption,” with Daron Acemoglu and Helpman (*American Economic Review*, June 2007), studies technology rather than the ownership of a given supplier. Technology is the range of intermediate inputs. A fraction of each supplier’s relationship-specific activities is contractible; the rest is chosen before a multilateral bargain whose division follows the Shapley value, as in Hart and Moore. Greater incompleteness leads firms to adopt a less advanced technology, with a larger loss when inputs are more complementary, and illustrative calculations made those productivity gaps large. The country with better institutions then exports the more complementary, and more contract-dependent, sectors. The authors treat this as consistent with evidence, including Nathan Nunn’s, that legal-system quality affects contract-intensive exports about as much as human-capital abundance. The 2014 article “Grossman–Hart (1986) Goes Global,” in the *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, surveys this open-economy literature: incomplete contracts determine both integration and the location of stages, and therefore comparative advantage, while the direct evidence on ownership is still only suggestive.

## Offshoring and global sourcing

### Organizational choice by heterogeneous firms

In “Global Sourcing” (*[Journal of Political Economy](/organizations/journal-of-political-economy)*, June 2004), Antràs and Elhanan Helpman place Marc Melitz’s productivity differences in a North–South property-rights model. Final-good producers and component suppliers make relationship-specific investments that incomplete contracts cannot govern, whether the supplier is owned or independent, and then bargain. The firm chooses vertical integration or outsourcing and a Northern or Southern supplier: domestic outsourcing, domestic integration, arm’s-length imports, or foreign integration, meaning foreign direct investment and intrafirm trade. Southern wages are lower but fixed costs are higher, and integration, which also costs more, gives the final-good producer a larger revenue share—helpful for headquarter services and harmful for components.

That tradeoff sorts firms into offshoring. In component-intensive sectors only outsourcing is used, at home for low-productivity firms and in the South for high-productivity firms. In headquarter-intensive sectors the ranking from low to high productivity is domestic outsourcing, domestic integration, foreign outsourcing, and foreign integration. With Pareto productivity, greater dispersion raises the share of importers and, in headquarter-intensive sectors, integration relative to outsourcing. The paper contrasts the prediction with [Bureau of Economic Analysis](/organizations/bureau-of-economic-analysis) data: imports from foreign affiliates of U.S. firms fell from 23.9 percent of U.S. imports in 1977 to 16.1 percent in 1982 and stayed near that share through 1999, while imported intermediates grew.

“Contractual Frictions and Global Sourcing,” their 2008 chapter in *The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy*, lets contractibility differ by input and by country. Stronger Southern institutions raise offshoring but can shrink either its FDI share or its foreign-outsourcing share, depending on which party’s inputs become easier to contract. With Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, “Organizations and Trade” (*Annual Review of Economics*, 2009) reviews how organization changes aggregate trade results. With Stephen R. Yeaple, the 2014 *Handbook of International Economics* chapter covers which firms produce abroad, where, and why they own rather than contract, using updated Bureau of Economic Analysis evidence on U.S. multinationals.

### Knowledge, finance, and the margins of sourcing

“Offshoring in a Knowledge Economy” (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, February 2006), with Luis Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, sorts agents into hierarchies of production and problem-solving. Cross-border teams improve matches for all Southern workers and only the best Northern workers, so wage inequality rises in the South but not necessarily in the North. “Organizing Offshoring: Middle Managers and Communication Costs” (2008) adds Southern middle managers who absorb routine problems; middle skills then draw offshoring less where communication technology is advanced, and the authors report evidence consistent with that pattern.

With Ricardo J. Caballero, “Trade and Capital Flows: A Financial Frictions Perspective” (*Journal of Political Economy*, August 2009) shows that uneven financial development can make trade and capital inflows complements in the South, reversing the substitution result of the Heckscher–Ohlin model with free capital mobility. Protection intended to rebalance global capital flows can therefore backfire. “Multinational Firms, FDI Flows, and Imperfect Capital Markets,” with Mihir A. Desai and C. Fritz Foley (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August 2009), derives FDI from nonverifiable parental monitoring that outside investors require, not from a risk that locals expropriate technology. Weaker investor protection shrinks affiliates, raises the share financed by the parent, and favors FDI over licensing in confidential Bureau of Economic Analysis firm surveys.

“Poultry in Motion: A Study of International Trade Finance Practices,” with Foley (*Journal of Political Economy*, August 2015, pp. 853–901), follows transactions of one U.S. exporter of frozen and refrigerated food, chiefly poultry. Cash in advance and letters of credit are used more where enforcement is weak or distance is large, though letters of credit are rare for this firm; relationships replace prepayment, and the terms in use change the effect of a crisis. “Intermediated Trade,” with Arnaud Costinot (*Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August 2011), requires farmers to match with traders, at a search cost, before selling in centralized markets. Trade among traders magnifies the gains from trade, while farmers’ access to foreign traders can lower aggregate welfare.

“The Margins of Global Sourcing: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Firms,” with Teresa C. Fort and Felix Tintelnot (*American Economic Review*, September 2017), estimates a multi-country model in which source markets interact through one cost function and, under a condition the paper treats as empirically relevant, are complements. The data are the [United States Census Bureau](/organizations/united-states-census-bureau)’s 1997 and 2007 Economic Censuses, the Longitudinal Business Database, and customs import transactions for manufacturing firms. In 2007 importers bought on average 12 ten-digit products from about three countries, generally one country per product, and about 36 percent followed a pecking order among the ten most common sources, against under 20 percent if entry into countries were independent. Those complementarities make domestic sourcing respond differently across firms when foreign sourcing costs fall.

## Global value chains

Research on global value chains treats production as stages that can be split across firms and countries. Input–output accounting separates gross trade into domestic and foreign value added and into flows counted more than once when intermediates cross borders repeatedly: Robert C. Johnson and Guillermo Noguera measure the value-added content of bilateral trade, and Robert Koopman, Zhi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei decompose gross exports into value-added and double-counted terms. A separate literature on organization, to which Pol Antràs has contributed with several coauthors, studies where stages are owned and where they are located.

### Sequential production and firm boundaries

In “Organizing the Global Value Chain” (Econometrica, November 2013, pp. 2127–2204), Antràs and Davin Chor model a continuum of ordered stages at which a final-good producer, under incomplete contracts, contracts with a distinct supplier for a customized component. The incentive to integrate a supplier varies with that supplier’s upstream or downstream position, and the direction of the relationship depends on the demand elasticity facing the final-good producer. Combining the U.S. Census Bureau’s Related Party Trade database with Christian Broda and David Weinstein’s import demand elasticities, they find patterns broadly consistent with those predictions and construct two measures of an industry’s average position from U.S. input–output tables.

Laura Alfaro, Antràs, Chor, and Paola Conconi take the choice to the firm in “Internalizing Global Value Chains: A Firm-Level Analysis” (Journal of Political Economy 127, no. 2, April 2019, pp. 508–559). From activities in more than 100 countries and from input–output tables, they measure the upstreamness of integrated and nonintegrated inputs. Whether a firm integrates upstream or downstream suppliers depends on the elasticity of demand it faces, and also on the relative contractibility of stages and on productivity.

### Upstreamness, geography, and measurement

Antràs, Chor, Thibault Fally, and Russell Hillberry show that two indexes of industry upstreamness—an average distance from final use, and a rule that treats industries selling to other upstream industries as themselves upstream—are equivalent, and that both match a forward-linkage multiplier in input–output analysis. The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings version (May 2012, pp. 412–416) computes the index for 426 industries in the 2002 U.S. tables, checks its stability in the OECD STAN database, and relates the upstreamness of exports to institutions, financial development, and factor endowments. Fally’s separate paper, “Production Staging: Measurement and Facts,” defined a count of embodied stages and a distance to final demand on U.S. tables.

A 2018 chapter by Antràs and Chor in Lili Yan Ing and Miaojie Yu’s *World Trade Evolution* (Routledge) reviews distance from final demand and from primary factors in the World Input-Output Database for 1995–2011, including correlations the authors call puzzling. A model in the Eaton–Kortum tradition, following Lorenzo Caliendo and Fernando Parro, interprets the table, and counterfactuals separate forces behind the positioning patterns.

With Alonso de Gortari, “On the Geography of Global Value Chains” (*Econometrica* 88, no. 4, July 2020, pp. 1553–1598) embeds multistage production in general equilibrium. Trade costs make a stage’s location depend on local marginal cost and on proximity to the preceding and following stages; other things equal, relatively downstream stages are placed in more central locations. The quantifiable version maps changes in trade costs into domestic, regional, and global participation and into real income. National Science Foundation grant 1628852, recorded at the National Bureau of Economic Research from August 2016 to July 2020, supported that project.

Their survey “Global Value Chains,” chapter 5 of *Handbook of International Economics*, volume 5 (2022), contrasts value-added accounting and quantitative models built on world input–output tables with firm-level evidence on how production is split across countries, and reviews early results on trade policy in that setting.

### The World Development Report 2020

Antràs was a co-director, with Caroline Freund and Aaditya Mattoo, of the World Bank’s World Development Report 2020, *Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains*; Daria Taglioni was task team leader.

The report asks whether chains still offer a path to development. The Bank describes them as having powered trade growth after 1990 until they accounted for almost half of trade, alongside faster growth in poorer countries, and as having stalled after the 2008 crisis. It flags technologies that could draw production toward the consumer and reduce labor demand, and conflicts among large countries that could retrench or segment chains. Its stated conclusion is that technological change is at this stage more a benefit than a harm, and that chains can continue to raise growth, improve jobs, and reduce poverty if developing countries reform to support participation, industrial countries keep policies open and predictable, and governments revive multilateral cooperation. The Bank estimates that a 1 percent increase in participation raises per capita income by more than 1 percent, about twice the association for conventional trade, and that worsening trade conflict and lost investor confidence could push as many as 30.7 million people below a $5.50-a-day line and cut global income by as much as $1.4 trillion. It also argues for social and environmental protection and for cooperation on distorting policies, because goods and services cross borders more than once.

“Conceptual Aspects of Global Value Chains” (*World Bank Economic Review* 34, no. 3, 2020, pp. 551–574) compares alternative definitions of the phenomenon and traces what each implies for measurement, for country- and firm-level participation, and for new technologies.

## Trade policy, shocks, and later research

### Agreements, tariffs, and price determination

With [Philippe Aghion](/people/philippe-aghion) and Elhanan Helpman, “Negotiating Free Trade” (Journal of International Economics, September 2007) has a leader choose sequential or multilateral bargaining according to coalition externalities. Worldwide free trade can be the equilibrium, but not if protectionist political-economy motives are strong enough, and preferential agreements can be building blocs or stumbling blocs.

With Robert W. Staiger, “Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements” (American Economic Review, December 2012) compares Nash and efficient policies for customized inputs under incomplete contracts, and argues that offshoring weakens the [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade](/organizations/general-agreement-on-tariffs-and-trade) and [World Trade Organization](/organizations/world-trade-organization) reliance on market access, reciprocity, and nondiscrimination. “Trade Agreements and the Nature of Price Determination” (May 2012 Papers and Proceedings) finds that tariffs plus a market-access rule reach efficiency only when prices clear markets; bargained prices leave behind-the-border policies as a terms-of-trade instrument.

With Teresa C. Fort, Agustín Gutiérrez, and Felix Tintelnot, “Trade Policy and Global Sourcing: An Efficiency Rationale for Tariff Escalation” (*Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics* 2, no. 1, March 2024, pp. 1–44) gives an efficiency reason for higher final-good than input tariffs under increasing returns, because final-good protection expands downstream production while an input tariff can relocate it. In a United States–China tariff exercise, any U.S. welfare gains come overwhelmingly from final-good tariffs. With Evgenii Fadeev, Fort, and Tintelnot, “Export-Platform FDI: Cannibalization or Complementarity?” (*AEA Papers and Proceedings*, May 2024) and “Exporting, Global Sourcing, and Multinational Activity” (Review of Economics and Statistics, May 2026) cover export-platform plants and third-market effects of shared fixed costs.

### Inequality, pandemics, and deglobalization

“Globalization, Inequality and Welfare,” with Alonso de Gortari and Oleg Itskhoki (*Journal of International Economics* 108, September 2017, pp. 387–412), circulated earlier as “Inequality, Costly Redistribution and Welfare in an Open Economy.” Using U.S. IRS and Congressional Budget Office data for 1979–2007, it finds that inequality in disposable income erodes about 20 percent of the gains from trade, while lump-sum redistribution would have raised those gains by about 15 percent.

“Venting Out: Exports during a Domestic Slump,” with Miguel Almunia, David Lopez-Rodriguez, and Eduardo Morales (*American Economic Review*, November 2021), finds that Spanish manufacturers whose home sales fell more in the Great Recession exported more. With nonconstant marginal costs, that response accounts for about half of the rise in Spanish goods exports.

With Stephen Redding and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, “Globalization and Pandemics” (*American Economic Review*, April 2023) treats trade-related business travel as a cross-country disease externality. Deaths or lower labor supply raise prices in unhealthy countries and deter travel; agents who internalize risk cut travel more to high-trade-cost places, initially lowering trade relative to output.

“De-Globalisation? Global Value Chains in the Post-COVID-19 Age,” written for the European Central Bank Forum on Central Banking and included in the 2021 proceedings, also appeared as National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 28115. It finds little evidence of deglobalization, reading the slowdown in trade relative to output after the Great Recession as the sequel to an unsustainable earlier rise, with politics and institutions—possibly worsened by the [COVID-19 pandemic](/drivers/covid-19-pandemic)—a larger risk than technology. He commented on Pinelopi Goldberg and Tristan Reed in the Brookings Institution’s *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, spring 2023, pp. 397–409.

“The Uncharted Waters of International Trade,” the 2024 FBBVA Lecture of the European Economic Association, given at the 2024 ASSA meetings and in Madrid in December 2024, was published in the Journal of the European Economic Association 23, no. 1 (February 2025), pp. 1–51. It reviews recent firm-level and quantitative work and points to oligopoly, cross-field research, data, and artificial intelligence in trade policy as open areas.

### Interest rates, specialization, and political economy

“Interest Rates and World Trade: An ‘Austrian’ Perspective” (*AEA Papers and Proceedings* 113, May 2023, pp. 65–69) follows Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk in making production take time. Interest rates change production length, labor productivity, and the financing cost of exports.

“An ‘Austrian’ Model of Global Value Chains” (NBER Working Paper 30901, January 2023) is unpublished; his Econometric Society curriculum vitae lists it as a reject-and-resubmit at the *American Economic Review*. Longer stages raise productivity but tie up more working capital, so low-interest-rate countries specialize in time-intensive stages unless rates equalize. A March 2026 revision with Adrian Kulesza, “An ‘Austrian’ Model of International Specialization” (NBER Working Paper 34983), is still a working paper and finds that financially developed countries export more in long-period sectors.

With Gerard Padró i Miquel, “Foreign Influence and Welfare” (*Journal of International Economics* 84, no. 2, July 2011, pp. 135–148) lets incumbents shift foreign elections, so policy weights foreign welfare. Influence can internalize cross-border externalities, but imbalances can make it harmful, and tariffs are more distorted when the influenced country is small and natural barriers are low. “Exporting Ideology: The Right and Left of Foreign Influence” (Quarterly Journal of Political Science 20, no. 1, January 2025, pp. 33–70) adds mobile capital: pro-capital governments want low capital taxes abroad and pro-labor governments high ones, and each promotes its own type of party.

## Books

### Global Production

*Global Production: Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure* grew out of the 2012 CREI Lectures in Macroeconomics, given in Barcelona. Princeton University Press published the book in that series in December 2015. A review in the *Journal of Economic Literature*, matching [Library of Congress](/organizations/library-of-congress) cataloging, dates the cloth edition to 2016 (ISBN 978-0-691-16827-2; viii + 328 pages). A paperback followed in 2020 (ISBN 978-0-691-20903-6).

The subject is where firms buy inputs and whether they produce those inputs inside the firm. A workhorse chapter extends Marc Melitz’s model so that more productive firms offshore manufacturing and, with many countries, source from more places. The “Location” chapters then add incomplete contracts: relationship-specific investments, partial contractibility, and sequential production change the return to buying abroad. “Internalization” contrasts a transaction-cost account of integration with the property-rights approach of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, and of Hart and John Moore, in which ownership goes to the party whose noncontractible investments matter more, so integration is more attractive when production is headquarter-intensive. Sequential stages are treated again in that setting.

James Rauch (June 2016) found “substantial value added” in the synthesis and called the book a “must-read” for specialists, while judging the audience narrower than it could have been. General-equilibrium and welfare effects are set aside, the exposition stays close to the journal articles, and horizontal foreign direct investment is not taken up. He notes Antràs’s statement that a baseline test on U.S. imports gave “no evidence in support of our contracting models of global sourcing,” whereas interactions of input specificity and headquarter intensity with rule of law were more robust. In related-party trade data, research-and-development intensity and capital intensity rise with the intrafirm import share, but freight costs have the opposite sign from one sorting prediction. Anna Gumpert’s 2017 review in the *Journal of Economics*, which also links the book to the 2012 lectures, wrote that it “offers far more than the sum of its parts” and “will prove a useful reference for a broad audience.”

### Surveys and edited volumes

With Davin Chor, Antràs wrote “Global Value Chains” for the *Handbook of International Economics*, volume 5 (Elsevier, 2022, pp. 297–376), edited by Gita Gopinath, Elhanan Helpman, and [Kenneth Rogoff](/people/kenneth-rogoff). An abridgement of their 2021 survey, the chapter compares world input–output measurement with firm-level evidence, then reviews quantitative and firm-level theories and trade policy under fragmented production. “Multinational Firms and the Structure of International Trade,” with Stephen R. Yeaple (volume 4, 2014, pp. 55–130), asks why only some firms operate abroad, where they locate production, and why they own foreign facilities rather than contract locally, and reports updated empirical results.

Antràs, Wilhelm Kohler, and Erdal Yalcin wrote the introduction to *Developments in Global Sourcing*. His curriculum vitae dates that introduction to 2017; the CESifo Seminar Series volume, edited by Kohler and Yalcin, was published by [MIT Press](/organizations/mit-press) on 16 February 2018 (ISBN 978-0-262-03757-0). With David Zilberman he co-edited *Risks in Agricultural Supply Chains*, an NBER conference volume from the [University of Chicago Press](/organizations/university-of-chicago-press) (August 2023; ISBN 978-0-226-82922-7). The May 2021 conference papers examine incentives, macroeconomic policy, and technology when agricultural chains face shocks such as climate change, COVID-19, and African swine fever. He co-directed, with Caroline Freund and Aaditya Mattoo, the [World Bank Group](/organizations/world-bank-group)’s *World Development Report* *2020: Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains*. His curriculum vitae lists as in preparation *The Economics of Global Value Chains*, with Chor and based on the 2018 Ohlin Lecture, and *International Trade in the 21st Century*.

## Editorial work and professional service

### Journal editorships

The curriculum vitae Pol Antràs deposited with the Econometric Society lists editorial appointments from the mid-2000s through 2020. He was an associate editor of the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* from 2005 to 2014 and an editor from 2015 to 2020. An archived August 2015 page of the journal, edited at Harvard University’s Department of Economics, named him an editor with Robert J. Barro, [Lawrence F. Katz](/people/lawrence-f-katz), and [Andrei Shleifer](/people/andrei-shleifer). A note on the Asia Global Institute site gives the same 2015–2020 span, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas states that he served as editor, without the years.

On the *Journal of International Economics*, the vita lists an associate editorship from 2005 to 2008 and a co-editorship from 2011 to 2013. Elsevier’s board page, archived in May 2012, placed P. Antras of Harvard among the co-editors. He was a foreign editor of the *Review of Economic Studies* from 2011 to 2014; board pages archived in March 2012 and July 2014 list him in that role. The June 2010 issue of the *American Economic Review* carried him on the Board of Editors, in line with the vita’s dates of 2010–2014.

The same vita records the editorial committee of the *Annual Review of Economics* (2011–2014); associate editorships of the *Journal of the European Economic Association* (2007–2012), *SERIEs* (2010–2014), the *Revista de Economía Aplicada* (2006–2011), and *Investigaciones Económicas* (2005–2009); and the editorial board of the *Review of International Economics* (2006–2014). Dallas Fed and Asia Global Institute profiles name the *American Economic Review*, *Review of Economic Studies*, *Journal of International Economics*, and *Annual Review of Economics* among other boards, without every title or year. The vita also lists membership in the [American Economic Association](/organizations/american-economic-association) and the Econometric Society, and refereeing for journals, academic presses, and public research funders.

### Advisory boards and institutes

A later block of the vita, which he marks as unremunerated, covers outside boards. It dates the Dallas Fed Academic Advisory Council from 2024; the bank lists him as a member and as the Robert G. Ory Professor of Economics at Harvard. From 2023 it lists the advisory board of the Asia Global Institute at the [University of Hong Kong](/organizations/university-of-hong-kong), where that board page includes him, and the Supply Chain Intelligence Institute Austria. The Austrian institute places him on its International Advisory Board, which it describes as meeting annually on the direction of its research, rather than on its executive board.

In Barcelona, the vita dates the Academic Council of the Barcelona School of Economics from 2019 and the Scientific Council from 2022; both bodies list him. The school states that the Academic Council appoints trustees from fellows of the Econometric Society or the European Economic Association, or from recent presidents of the Spanish Economic Association, and that Scientific Council members visit Barcelona to review programs, research, and institutional development. Earlier unremunerated entries are the Consejo Asesor Estudios y Análisis Económico of [“la Caixa”](/organizations/la-caixa) (2012–2015) and the patronat of the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (2010–2015). Posts at the National Bureau of Economic Research and as a research fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research are listed separately on the vita and belong with his academic appointments rather than these boards.

## Awards and lectures

### Prizes and elections

At the 1998 graduation of Pompeu Fabra University, Pol Antràs Puchal received the extraordinary end-of-studies prize in economics. In 2003 he was a speaker at the fifteenth Review of Economic Studies Tour, the journal’s meetings for selected graduating doctoral students. In February 2007, as an assistant professor at Harvard University, he received a two-year research fellowship from the [Alfred P. Sloan Foundation](/organizations/alfred-p-sloan-foundation). [The Harvard Crimson](/organizations/the-harvard-crimson) reported that the department’s other nominees that year were Roland Fryer Jr. and Aleh Tsyvinski.

On 4 June 2009 José Oliu, president of Banco Herrero and of the jury, announced in Oviedo that Antràs had won the eighth Fundación Banco Herrero Prize for research in international economics and trade. Europa Press reported that the jury credited his use of firm characteristics, rather than countries alone, in models of trade and investment, and his work on outsourcing, offshoring, ownership and institutions. The prize was presented on 6 October 2009 at Banco Herrero in Oviedo, where he also lectured. A 2011 account of the prize, given annually since 2002 and listing him as the 2009 winner, described it as open to researchers under 40 in economics, business and the social sciences. The Banco Sabadell Foundation, which continues the award as its prize for economic research, lists Pol Antràs Puchal for 2009.

The Econometric Society records his election as a fellow in 2015. In 2024 the Harvard Gazette listed him among 14 Harvard faculty elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, identifying him as the Robert G. Ory Professor of Economics, with induction in Cambridge, Massachusetts, that September.

### Named lectures

In June 2012 he gave the CREI Lectures in Macroeconomics in Barcelona: three sessions, on 20–22 June, titled “Contracts and the Global Organization of Production,” at Pompeu Fabra’s Ciutadella campus and co-sponsored by Princeton University Press.

He gave the 2018 Ohlin Lecture at the [Stockholm School of Economics](/organizations/stockholm-school-of-economics), the series the school organizes in honor of Bertil Ohlin. Its list of past lectures records the title “Global Value Chains: the Economics of Spiders and Snakes,” and states that the lectures treat problems close to Ohlin’s interests and are later published by MIT Press.

In December 2010 he spoke in Madrid at the Spanish Economic Association’s XXXV symposium on Spanish exports in the 2000s. His curriculum vitae lists that talk as the year’s SERIEs lecture, and the association’s record of meetings places the congress at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. On 2 June 2022 he gave the nineteenth Luca d’Agliano Lecture in Development Economics at the Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto in Turin, titled “De-Globalization? Global Value Chains and the Global Economic Turmoil.” On 25 October 2024 he gave the Jan Tinbergen Lecture, “New Perspectives on Global Value Chains,” at the Dutch Economists’ Day in [The Hague](/organizations/the-hague). On 10 December 2024, again in Madrid, he gave the JEEA–Fundación BBVA Lecture, “The Uncharted Waters of International Trade,” which the foundation records as published in the Journal of the European Economic Association in February 2025.

## Dated facts

_No published facts on this page yet._

## Methodology

https://factrail.ai/methodology

Canonical: https://factrail.ai/people/pol-antras
