The EU Sold 23 Brussels Buildings for €900m. Auditors Found One Bid—and a €255m Right to Stay.

Factrail investigation | European Union / Belgium | Contract signed: 29 April 2024 | Research cutoff: 31 October 2026

SEO title: EU Commission's €900m Brussels Buildings Sale

Meta description: Auditors found one bid, a short bank guarantee and weak oversight in the EU's €900m Brussels property sale. The Commission also paid €255m to stay.

The finding: a large accounting gain did not settle the public bill

The European Commission transferred 23 Brussels buildings to Belgium's state-owned investment company, SFPIM, for €900 million on 29 April 2024. The transaction produced a €468 million accounting gain against the buildings' €432 million net book value. That is a substantial balance-sheet result, but it is not the same as €468 million of free cash savings: the Commission also bought continued use of 17 properties, with the European Parliament's budget committee recording €255 million for that right to stay. The European Court of Auditors later found that the tender attracted only one bid, that the bidder's €80 million bank guarantee lasted two months instead of the required six, and that every member of the evaluation committee was hierarchically subordinate to the responsible authorising officer. Those findings do not establish a crime or show that the sale price was below market. They do establish a serious governance problem around a public transaction whose full financial consequences are still being worked through.

The Commission had a defensible policy reason to sell: reduce its office footprint, replace inefficient buildings and help turn an office-dominated district into a mixed-use neighbourhood. But the decision to sell and the way it was executed are separate questions. The buyer was the Belgian state investment company, not an anonymous private bidder; the Commission retained the right to occupy many of the buildings; and the property rights were then channelled into a development structure involving public and private capital. The public deserves to know whether competition, valuation, independence and transition planning were strong enough for a €900 million transfer. So far, the audit record says they were not strong enough in key respects.

What was sold, and what the Commission intended to achieve

The portfolio comprised 23 office properties with 344,333 square metres of above-ground gross floor area, according to the European Parliament Committee on Budgets' April 2024 briefing. The Commission described the properties as some of its less environmentally efficient buildings. Its wider buildings policy aimed to reduce office space by 25 per cent by 2030, use fewer buildings more intensively, improve energy performance and adapt to hybrid working. In that context, selling older premises could release capital, reduce maintenance exposure and create room for redevelopment.

The contract was signed on 29 April 2024 for €900 million. The Commission's official accounts later recorded the same sale price and the book value of the properties. The sale was not a simple handover followed by an immediate exit. The Commission retained usufruct—the legal right to use property owned by someone else—for 17 of the 23 buildings, with occupancy periods running for different lengths and extending in some cases to 2029. The final departure from the portfolio was therefore scheduled to be gradual, not immediate.

The distinction matters. A buyer receiving title while the seller retains use is acquiring a different economic package from an empty building ready for redevelopment. The retained right can reduce the buyer's immediate ability to renovate, lease or convert the property. Its price should therefore be visible in the valuation and in the transaction's cash-flow model. The Commission's budget committee briefing shows that this was not an incidental detail: the candidate had to state the cost of retaining the Commission's temporary occupation rights, and that amount was €255 million for the relevant occupancy periods up to 2026–2029.

The sale was also linked to an urban-development plan. The Belgian government presented the acquisition as a way to transform the European Quarter into a more varied district, with offices alongside housing, shops, public facilities and green space. Belga reported in April 2024 that 21 buildings in the European Quarter, with around 300,000 square metres, were to be redeveloped, with roughly 750 to 800 homes expected over time. Two other properties were outside that development area and were directed to separate property interests. These were plans, not homes already delivered. Planning permissions, financing, construction costs and market conditions still determine what is built and when.

The tender: one offer, an early approach and a short guarantee

The most consequential audit findings concern the process used to select the buyer. The Commission used a two-stage procedure after pre-information notices about six buildings and then 17 additional buildings had been discussed in the Parliament's Committee on Budgets in 2022 and 2023. A two-stage process can be legitimate and useful for a complex portfolio. The problem was the outcome and the safeguards around it: the Commission received only one bid, from SFPIM, a Belgian state-owned company that had already submitted an indicative offer before the formal call for applications began.

An indicative approach before a formal process does not automatically mean that the later competition was unlawful. Public authorities and prospective buyers can have preliminary discussions before a tender. The question is whether the later process gave other qualified parties a fair opportunity, whether the authority tested the market adequately, and whether the evaluation rules were applied consistently. With only one offer, the Commission had no competing bid against which to test price, occupancy terms or risk allocation. That does not prove the price was wrong. It does mean the public cannot infer that €900 million was the best available offer merely because it was the only offer received.

The guarantee issue is more concrete. The call for applications required a bank guarantee of €80 million, valid for six months, to secure the bidder's commitment to the contract, including the retained-occupancy arrangement. The sole bidder submitted a guarantee in its own name that was valid for only two months. The Commission accepted it and concluded the contract within that shorter period. The European Court of Auditors expressly found that the guarantee did not comply with the original requirements.

A bank guarantee is not the purchase price and does not mean the bidder had only €80 million available. It is a form of security intended to protect the seller if the bidder fails to complete or honour specified obligations. The required six-month validity gave the Commission a longer period of protection during a transaction involving multiple properties and linked contracts. Accepting a two-month instrument changed that protection. The auditor's finding is about compliance with the stated tender condition; it is not a finding that SFPIM defaulted, that the guarantee was called, or that the Commission suffered a loss because of its shorter duration.

The second governance weakness concerned the evaluation committee. The Court found that all its members were subordinate to the responsible authorising officer and therefore that the committee lacked sufficient independence. This is a structural concern. It does not establish that any member was instructed to favour SFPIM, that anyone had a personal financial interest, or that the committee deliberately manipulated the result. It does mean that the people assessing a major asset sale were not sufficiently separated in the hierarchy from the official responsible for authorising the transaction.

Political accountability must be distinguished from administrative control. At the time of the sale, Johannes Hahn held the Commission portfolio for Budget and Administration and was the political commissioner associated with the transaction. The European Court of Auditors' finding identifies the responsible authorising officer as the hierarchy above all committee members; the public audit passage does not identify that official by name. It would therefore be unsafe to infer that Hahn personally made the award, chaired the committee or directed its assessment. The formal delegation instrument, the committee's membership and the decision trail are precisely the records needed to establish who exercised each power. On the buyer side, SFPIM had to approve its bid and investment exposure; Cityforward and its project companies then had their own investment decisions to make; and Brussels planning authorities retained control over permits. The September 2026 staff-union letter addressed the later financial questions to Piotr Serafin, the Commissioner responsible for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration at the time.

The Court's recommendation was specific: for future property-sale transactions, the Commission should ensure that evaluation committees are not made up entirely of people hierarchically subordinate to the responsible authorising officer. The target date was for committees appointed after 1 June 2026. That recommendation matters because it turns the episode from an isolated controversy into a test of whether the Commission has changed its controls. A new rule on paper is not enough; future committee appointments and tender files must show that independence has been improved.

The €255m right to stay changes the meaning of the headline price

The €900 million headline is real, but it is not the only material number. In its 8–9 April 2024 newsletter, the European Parliament's Committee on Budgets said that the candidate's offer had to include the cost of the Commission's temporary continued occupation. It recorded that the retained usufruct amounted to €255 million for occupancy of some buildings up to 2026–2029. The European Court of Auditors later reported an €85 million payment for continued use as the first of three annual instalments under the April 2024 contract.

The correct reading is not that the Commission sold buildings and then unexpectedly discovered it needed offices. The continued occupation was part of the deal structure. The Commission needed time to move staff, consolidate services and make replacement premises available. That operational need is understandable. The accountability question is whether the duration, price and timetable of the retained rights were assessed transparently before the sale, and whether the Commission's replacement-space plan was realistic enough to avoid repeated extensions.

The Commission's Draft Budget 2027 Working Document VII makes the transition costs more visible. It says the €900 million proceeds are being used to pay residual debts associated with the buildings, cover the prolonged use of seven sold buildings, acquire the new Conference Centre and finance occupation of new buildings. It forecasts that €437.5 million of the sale revenue will remain at the end of 2026. That is a forecast in a draft budget document, not a final audited cash balance for the end of 2026. The same document projects further uses of the remaining sale proceeds between 2027 and 2034.

Staff representatives have highlighted a further line they describe as “usufruct for staying longer”: €24.59 million in 2027 and €25.62 million in 2028 for the continued use of seven buildings already sold. The Commission's own 2027 building document lists €24.596 million under usufruct retention and states that sale proceeds will cover the prolongation of use of seven sold buildings. The 2028 figure is reported by the staff representatives from the budget material. These later extensions should not simply be added to the original €255 million as if every figure were the same payment or period. The public documents do not yet provide one consolidated, reconciled schedule showing the original retained rights, later extensions, actual payments, and the full cost of replacement accommodation in one place.

That missing reconciliation is central to the financial verdict. The sale created a large accounting gain and a substantial cash receipt. It also created or retained costs that have to be understood alongside the headline. If the Commission had to keep using some buildings longer because new offices were delayed, that may have been the least costly operational option. If the extensions resulted from weak planning or an overly optimistic move-out schedule, they may have reduced the transaction's expected economic benefit. The published documents do not settle which explanation applies to each building.

The accounting gain is not the same as net savings

The Commission's 2024 consolidated annual accounts state that the 23 buildings had a net book value of €432 million and that the €900 million sale generated a €468 million gain, fully recognised at the time of sale. That is an accounting result based on the recorded value of the assets. It is not a finding by the European Court of Auditors that the Commission achieved €468 million in net savings over the life of the transaction.

The accounts also explain what the proceeds are intended to finance: new buildings, repayment of remaining financial liabilities and renovation of existing buildings. The Commission's 2027 building document adds the retained use of seven sold buildings and the new Conference Centre to the list of uses. A complete economic assessment would compare the proceeds with the value of the assets transferred, the cost of retained occupancy, the cost of replacement offices, residual debts, refurbishment and relocation, and the future value of the buildings the Commission keeps.

There is a difference between three measures. First, the €900 million is the gross sale price recorded for the portfolio. Second, the €468 million is the accounting gain over the assets' net book value. Third, the net long-term benefit to the EU budget depends on cash flows and costs over time. Those measures answer different questions. Using the accounting gain as a shorthand for the public benefit would be misleading; treating the entire sale as a loss because the Commission paid to stay would be equally misleading.

The timing of cash also matters. A sale can release money now while moving some costs into later years. The Commission's forecast shows the sale proceeds supporting building needs through 2034. The expected €437.5 million balance at the end of 2026 is a starting point for future expenditure, not a surplus that can be spent on unrelated priorities without considering those commitments. Parliament and taxpayers need the forecast to be reconciled with actual payments and the real dates on which staff leave the properties.

Who gains the development opportunity—and who carries the risk

SFPIM acquired full ownership of all 23 properties for €900 million. Linklaters, which advised Cityforward on the transaction, says SFPIM retained the usufruct for 17 buildings and granted long-term lease rights on 21 of the 23 buildings to 21 special-purpose companies held by Cityforward. The same legal adviser describes Cityforward as a Belgian fund managed by Whitewood and held by SFPIM, Whitewood and Ethias. The portfolio acquisition was supported by bank financing from Belfius, ING, KBC, BNP Paribas Fortis, BIL and Helaba.

That structure distributes opportunity and risk. SFPIM is a state-owned investment company, so the acquisition sits within Belgium's public investment sphere. Cityforward and its partners obtain long-term development rights and the chance to convert ageing offices into a mix of uses. The banks provide debt and receive the contractual return attached to that financing, while bearing the credit risk specified in their agreements. Developers and property investors can benefit if planning permissions, construction costs, occupancy and sale values support the redevelopment case. None of those potential returns should be confused with cash already earned.

The development chain is not merely theoretical. Home Invest Belgium announced in March 2025 that it had reached an agreement in principle with Cityforward for nine residential projects in Brussels' European Quarter, with potential for around 800 homes and 75,000 square metres. Its announcement said the projects were part of a portfolio of 17 office buildings that are or were leased to the Commission, and that construction depended on the necessary permits and definitive agreements. The company described its ambition as sustainable, energy-efficient and affordable housing. That is a stated development objective, not evidence that rents will be capped at an affordable level or that 800 homes have been delivered.

Separately, Linklaters says one of the Cityforward special-purpose companies was sold to Alides, while rights on the two other buildings were acquired by Vicinity and Matexi. The transaction therefore created several downstream positions rather than a single buyer simply holding 23 empty offices. A full public account should identify each property, its current owner, the holder of its long lease, the intended redevelopment, and any conditions attached to the transfer.

The potential public benefit is significant. Brussels needs housing, mixed-use streets and better use of underperforming office space. The Commission needs a smaller and more efficient estate. Belgium has an interest in keeping EU institutions anchored in Brussels and improving the district around them. A project that produces well-designed homes, public facilities and lower-energy offices could benefit residents and the city as well as the investors.

But the distribution of gains is not guaranteed to be even. Investors and lenders have contractual rights; local residents have hopes and planning processes. If housing is delivered at market rents rather than genuinely affordable levels, the social return will be weaker than the public messaging suggests. If office conversions are delayed, the district may remain underused for longer. If renovation costs rise, developers may seek changes to the project or reduce the amount of housing. The public record reviewed here does not provide a binding affordability schedule for the promised homes, a complete list of project-level returns, or a single document showing who bears each cost over the long-lease structures.

The Commission's staff are another group carrying the transition risk. They need functional offices while buildings are vacated and replacement premises are fitted out. Staff representatives have asked for more information about relocations, office availability and the costs of extending occupancy. Their concerns are not a substitute for an audit, but they are relevant operational evidence: a real-estate strategy is not successful merely because a sale contract is signed. It must keep the institution working without avoidable disruption and without shifting unplanned costs into later budgets.

The investigation and Parliament's response

The European Public Prosecutor's Office became involved in the transaction's public story in February 2026, when Belgian police searched several Commission premises as part of an ongoing investigation into possible irregularities. The Brussels Times reported that the EPPO confirmed evidence-gathering activities and declined to give further details so as not to jeopardise the proceedings. The Commission said it would cooperate fully and maintained that the sale followed established procedures and protocols. The Associated Press reported the same basic chronology and the Commission's position.

The existence of an investigation is not a finding of criminal conduct. As of the 31 October 2026 research cutoff, the public material reviewed for this article contains no final EPPO conclusion, charge or court judgment establishing that the sale involved fraud. It would be wrong to label SFPIM, the Commission, former officials or any individual as having committed a crime on the basis of searches or an open investigation. It would be equally wrong to treat the investigation as irrelevant: prosecutors considered the transaction sufficiently important to collect evidence, and the public still lacks the outcome.

The European Parliament's discharge process added a separate institutional judgment. In paragraph 231 of its 2024 budget-discharge resolution, adopted on 29 April 2026 and published in the Official Journal on 10 September, Parliament criticised the process for selling 23 buildings and leasing 17 back until 2029. It questioned the lack of clear impact assessments, the single bid, the bidder's guarantee and the evaluation committee's independence. It also referred to the EPPO's evidence-collection activities. Parliament's recommendations called for future sale-and-leaseback decisions to rest on thorough impact assessments, more than one offer and independent evaluation committees, and asked the Commission to provide the discharge authority with relevant documentation about the 2023 sale.

There is an important procedural nuance: Parliament granted the Commission discharge for the 2024 budget while adopting these critical observations. That means the resolution was not a criminal verdict or a decision to reject the entire budget. It was a formal parliamentary warning inside the process that holds the Commission politically accountable for how it manages EU money. The warning is specific enough that the Commission should answer it with documents, not general assurances.

The Commission's defence also deserves a fair hearing. It says the transaction followed established procedures and protocols and that it is confident the process complied with the rules. The redevelopment plan offers a plausible public rationale: fewer, greener offices, new housing and a more balanced European Quarter. The €900 million sale and €468 million accounting gain are not fictitious. The fact that one bid was received does not by itself establish that the tender was legally invalid, and the guarantee defect does not show that the buyer failed to perform. The issue is that the auditor identified concrete departures from the published tender conditions and a committee structure that did not provide adequate independence. The Commission must explain why those safeguards were not met and what it has changed.

The questions that still require answers

A complete accountability file should contain the valuation reports and assumptions used to set the sale terms; the original call for applications and every amendment; the full indicative offer submitted before the formal process; the final bid and its separate price for retained occupancy; the guarantee instrument and the legal reasoning for accepting a two-month validity period; and the minutes, membership and reporting lines of the evaluation committee. The Commission should also publish the impact assessment that compared sale, retention, renovation and alternative leaseback options.

The financial record should be equally clear. It should reconcile the €900 million gross proceeds with the €255 million retained-occupancy arrangement, the three €85 million instalments identified by the Court, residual debt repayments, new-building commitments, the Conference Centre and the later extensions for seven buildings. It should distinguish payments already made from forecasts, commitments and planned appropriations. The €437.5 million end-2026 balance should be updated when actual figures are available. The Commission should explain whether the €24.59 million and €25.62 million extensions are additional to the original occupancy package, how the seven properties were selected, and what operational event required each extension.

The property record should identify who now holds title, who holds each long-lease right, what development permissions have been granted, how many homes are under construction, and what affordability conditions are legally enforceable. If the project is meant to produce public value beyond a profitable redevelopment, that value should be measured: homes delivered, public facilities opened, office space modernised, energy use reduced and public access improved. Announced capacity is not the same as completed housing.

The investigation should be allowed to proceed without political pressure or premature conclusions. But confidentiality during an active investigation does not remove Parliament's right to request the administrative record or the public's right to understand how a high-value asset sale was managed. The Commission can protect investigative material while still disclosing non-sensitive information about valuation, tender design, committee independence, payments and implementation.

Factrail context and separate accountability mechanisms

The sale took place within the Commission presidency of Ursula von der Leyen (opens in a new tab), though that institutional context does not prove personal involvement in tender decisions. Factrail's institutional-corruption driver (opens in a new tab) frames the governance safeguards to examine without presuming corrupt conduct. The Commission's energy-efficiency rationale can be compared with the wider energy-security mechanism (opens in a new tab), but a building sale is not itself an observed change in energy security.

What it moves

• EU administrative property spending: the €900 million sale created a large one-off receipt and a €468 million accounting gain, but the direction of the long-term net saving remains uncertain until retained-use, replacement-office, debt and renovation costs are reconciled.
• Occupancy and leaseback costs: the €255 million original retained-use arrangement and the €85 million annual instalment structure put a measurable price on the Commission's decision to stay in 17 sold buildings for a transition period. Later extensions for seven buildings add a further budget pressure that needs a reconciled information.
• Future EU building appropriations: the Commission's 2027 draft budget forecasts continued use of sale proceeds through 2034 and an expected €437.5 million balance at the end of 2026. Actual outturns will show whether that forecast holds.
• Brussels housing supply: the redevelopment pipeline points towards roughly 750–800 homes in the wider district and around 800 units in Home Invest Belgium's nine-project portfolio, subject to permits and construction. The indicator moves upward only when homes are approved, financed and delivered.
• Office-market and property values: the conversion of 21 long-leasehold properties from single-use institutional offices into mixed-use assets could change local office supply, residential supply and redevelopment values. The direction depends on the pace of permissions, financing and demand.
• EU procurement credibility: the one-bid outcome, short guarantee and weak committee independence increase pressure for transparent tender records and demonstrably independent evaluation in future asset sales.
• EPPO case status: the investigation creates a continuing accountability signal, but no public finding of criminal liability is available in the material reviewed by 31 October 2026.

The bottom line

This sale may yet deliver a useful urban transformation and a rational reduction in the Commission's office estate. It also produced a substantial accounting gain. Neither fact cancels the audit findings. A single bid, a guarantee that did not meet the stated validity period and an evaluation committee whose members all sat below the responsible authorising officer are not minor presentation issues in a €900 million public transaction. The €255 million occupancy arrangement and later extensions make the need for a full financial reconciliation more urgent, not less.

The strongest defensible criticism is institutional, not criminal: the Commission pursued a major asset sale without safeguards that its external auditor considered adequate, while the public still cannot see one complete account of the transaction's net cost, the later occupancy extensions and the downstream development obligations. The remedy is not to presume guilt or to declare the redevelopment a failure before it is built. It is to publish the tender record, explain the guarantee decision, demonstrate independent evaluation, reconcile all occupancy payments and report the housing and energy outcomes. A public institution that sells assets worth €900 million should be able to show not only what it received, but what it paid to keep using them and what citizens ultimately got in return.

Latest: what the 2026 audit trail still requires

As of 1 November 2026, the available official record supports two distinct lines of scrutiny. First, the European Court of Auditors described a competition process in which only one bid was received, an €80 million guarantee was valid for two months rather than the required six, and the evaluation committee lacked sufficient independence. That is an audit finding about control quality, not a judicial verdict about bribery or the final fair value of the buildings. The auditor also identified the first €85 million payment for retained use. European Court of Auditors — 2024 EU audit in brief (opens in a new tab) provides an independent official check on the amounts and the procurement deficiencies.

Second, the European Parliament's 2026 discharge examination expressed concern about the same transaction and its governance. Its published committee text notes the missing comprehensive transaction impact assessment and reiterates questions about the sole bidder, guarantee and committee independence. European Parliament — 2026 Commission discharge report (opens in a new tab) is therefore a useful later accountability milestone. It should not be confused with a criminal judgment. The publicly reported EPPO evidence-gathering operation in February 2026 has not, in the published records reviewed as of 31 October 2026, produced an announced final judicial finding.

The financial test remains concrete: publish the gross sale proceeds, actual retained-use payments by property and year, extension payments, residual liabilities, and documented redevelopment outcomes in a single reconciliation. The original €900 million transfer cannot be treated as net savings without subtracting the relevant occupancy and transition costs. Likewise, projected housing counts are not delivered apartments. Researchers should compare future budget execution and occupancy records with the commitments stated when the sale was approved. Until those records and any final prosecutorial decision are public, the strongest substantiated conclusion concerns inadequate safeguards and an incomplete public cost picture, not proven private wrongdoing.

Sources

1. European Court of Auditors — Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU Budget for the 2024 Financial Year, Chapter 10, paragraph 10.18 (2025) (opens in a new tab)
2. European Parliament Committee on Budgets — BUDG Newsletter, Issue 08-2024: Sale of Commission Buildings in Brussels (8–9 April 2024) (opens in a new tab)
3. European Commission — The Commission Sells 23 of Its Buildings in Belgium to Make the European Quarter Greener and More Mixed-Use (29 April 2024) (opens in a new tab)
4. European Commission — Consolidated Annual Accounts of the European Union for the Financial Year 2024, COM(2025) 359 (25 June 2025) (opens in a new tab)
5. Linklaters — Advising Cityforward on the Structuring, Financing, Signing and Completion of Project Schuman (30 April 2024) (opens in a new tab)
6. Home Invest Belgium — Agreement in Principle with Cityforward to Build 800 Sustainable Housing Units in Brussels' European District (5 March 2025) (opens in a new tab)
7. European Commission — Draft Budget 2027, Working Document VII: Commission Buildings (10 June 2026) (opens in a new tab)
8. European Parliament — Resolution (EU) 2026/1577: Observations on the Commission's 2024 Budget Discharge (29 April 2026; Official Journal publication 10 September 2026) (opens in a new tab)
9. Associated Press — Prosecutors Investigate the EU's Executive Branch over the Sale of Buildings to Belgium (12 February 2026) (opens in a new tab)
10. The Brussels Times — Belgian Police Raid European Commission in Property Sales Investigation (12 February 2026) (opens in a new tab)
11. Generation 2004 — The €900 Million Question: What We Still Don't Know about the Commission's Building Sell-Off (30 June 2026) (opens in a new tab)
12. Renouveau & Démocratie — Further Expansion of Executive Agencies in Brussels' North District and the Actual Financial Results of the Sale of 23 Commission Buildings (29 September 2026) (opens in a new tab)
13. Brussels Bouwmeester — LOI 130: Redevelopment of the European Commission's Rue de la Loi 130 Premises (opens in a new tab)

Editorial limitations: the EPPO investigation had no public final outcome in the material reviewed by 31 October 2026. No allegation of personal enrichment, bribery, fraud or criminal responsibility is made. The €255 million retained-use amount, the €85 million instalment and the later seven-building extensions are described separately; no unsupported all-in total is calculated. Relevant Factrail context links are included in the text.

Sources retained from the live page

• belganewsagency.eu (opens in a new tab)
• belganewsagency.eu (opens in a new tab)