Merz Rejects an AfD Alliance After Two State Victories. Who Benefits?

The Alternative for Germany won 43.8% of second votes in Saxony-Anhalt's September 6, 2026 state election and 38.2% in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania's September 20 election, becoming the largest party in both states. Chancellor Friedrich Merz nevertheless reiterated his rejection of cooperation with the AfD at a CSU conference on October 24, according to Reuters. His federal CDU/CSU-SPD coalition is under acute public pressure: ARD's October DeutschlandTrend reported only 10% satisfaction with the federal government and 10% with the chancellor, while the AfD led national vote intention at 27%. The immediate political beneficiary is the AfD, which can present itself as the largest electoral force in eastern states while accusing established parties of denying it office. Yet the decisions about governing depend on legislative majorities, coalition acceptability and the rules of parliamentary government, not simply on first place in votes. Merz faces a tactical trap: cooperating with the AfD could fracture his party's democratic boundary and partner relations, while refusing it leaves the AfD room to claim exclusion even as it has no absolute majority. prolonged reform conflict could strengthen protest voting further. This outcome is plausible but not proven by polls alone.

The constitutional and electoral distinction

Germany's federal republic uses proportional parliamentary systems in which a party's vote share is converted to seats under legal rules. Winning the largest share does not automatically confer the office of minister-president or an enforceable right to choose coalition partners. Saxony-Anhalt's official results show 43.8% of list votes for AfD; the independent OSW analysis describes 39 of 83 seats, short of an absolute majority. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania the official state parliament reports 32 of 71 seats for AfD, also below a governing majority on its own. Both cases require additional parliamentary support for a government that depends on a majority vote or durable toleration. These numbers neither erase the democratic legitimacy of AfD voters nor require rival parties to endorse the party's programme. Parliamentary freedom includes the right of elected members to negotiate cooperation and refuse it, subject to constitutional rules. Presenting either result as an AfD absolute majority would be an arithmetic error. Presenting refusal to join its government as cancellation of the vote would be a legal error.

Why the September elections changed Berlin's calculus

The regional results were politically significant because they inflicted severe damage on the mainstream parties that comprise or support national governing arrangements. In Saxony-Anhalt the CDU fell to 17.2% of second votes, down 19.9 percentage points from 2021; AfD gained 23 points. The SPD received 9.3%, while the Greens and Die Linke were close to nine percent each. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania SPD remained strong with 35.5%, but the CDU received 4.9% and fell just below the electoral threshold, leaving it without a seat in the new state legislature. The official 71-seat configuration became AfD 32, SPD 29, Die Linke 5 and Greens 5. This is not a single nationwide swing mechanically reproduced in every state. Berlin's September 20 election had Die Linke first at 25.7% of second votes, with CDU at 18.8% and AfD at 16.3%, according to federal electoral data. Together the three elections point to political fragmentation and geographically divergent protest coalitions rather than one uniform direction of voter preference.

The firewall is a political decision with costs

Merz's refusal to work with the AfD is part of a longstanding boundary maintained by CDU leaders against cooperation with a party widely contested over nationalism, immigration and democratic norms. Whether that stance will persist at every level of government is a political question; federal and state coalition choices are distinct. The advantage of refusing coalition is that CDU can preserve its core commitments, avoid internal legitimacy disputes and make the AfD defend its programme from outside executive office. The cost is strategic: where the AfD commands the largest bloc, assembling alternatives may require unusually broad or ideologically uncomfortable alliances. Such arrangements can struggle to deliver reforms and can be attacked as elite coordination. But the alternative also has costs. Cooperation could alienate centrist voters, strain SPD ties and alter Germany's European policy credibility. A serious analysis cannot assert without evidence that all collaboration would cause authoritarianism, or that non-collaboration is undemocratic. It should examine constitutional constraints, party programmes, concrete coalition offers and performance outcomes.

The beneficiary ledger: who wins from exclusion?

A win in seats is a measurable result; gains in institutional authority or material welfare are not yet established. Parties cannot treat public funds as a direct prize merely because they became the largest faction. Coalition bargaining determines executive access, while parliamentary representation supplies scrutiny, debate and legislative votes.

The opinion polls and their limits

ARD's October DeutschlandTrend placed AfD at 27% national vote intention, CDU/CSU at 20%, SPD at 13%, Greens at 16% and Die Linke at 11%. It reported only one in ten respondents satisfied with coalition performance and with Merz personally. ZDF's early October poll found 59% of respondents thought government reforms were going in the wrong direction, with 30% approving their direction. These figures document exceptionally weak public confidence, but they are measurements of samples at particular dates rather than national election results. A poll does not establish that 27% of Germans will vote AfD at the next federal election, still less that 27% endorse every AfD platform position. Nor does 10% satisfaction prove the government has lost its legal parliamentary mandate. Citizens can remain dissatisfied yet prefer the coalition to a specific alternative. The useful causal question is whether the coalition's policy performance can change those attitudes before the next election, not whether a momentary polling snapshot has already displaced constitutional government.

Policy conflict behind the numbers

The governing alliance faces disputes over welfare expenditure, care policy, pensions, tax design and the pace of reform. Tagesschau's October reporting described friction between the CDU/CSU and SPD over nursing care and a proposed sugar tax, amid demands for relief and limits on public spending. Merz's October 24 warning called for faster pension, taxation and social-policy changes. These disputes are not abstract ideological theatre: every reform creates groups that receive or lose benefits, contributions or protections. Pension reform confronts ageing demographics and the intergenerational distribution of financing; care reform changes obligations for beneficiaries, workers, insurers and taxpayers. Tax decisions can relieve some households while requiring a compensating spending or revenue choice. Under a weak coalition, each concession can appear insufficient to one party's supporters and excessive to the other's. Opponents gain opportunities to blame the government for both inaction and unpopular action. Without a costed alternative, however, electoral protest is not itself an operational programme to solve these trade-offs.

The role of the CSU conference

Merz's October 24 remarks came at a CSU political gathering, making his audience important. CSU leadership represents Bavaria and shares the federal parliamentary bloc with the CDU, but its policy emphases and electoral anxieties are not always identical to those of its sister party. A chancellor speaking to the CSU must signal common purpose, particularly when national polling and recent state results suggest erosion of conservative credibility. Reuters reported that Merz warned about domestic extremism and foreign attempts to destabilise Germany, while rejecting cooperation with AfD. He also criticised potential cooperation by other mainstream parties with Die Linke in Berlin, an argument that his opponents can portray as an inconsistent approach to coalition freedom. The distinction is that a party may set different substantive standards for different potential partners, though it must explain those standards to voters. The conference did not itself select a new state government or legislate reform. Its significance lay in Merz's attempt to hold a fractured governing and party coalition around a common political account of security and change.

The AfD's regional opportunity

The AfD's two eastern victories create a platform for parliamentary influence even without an immediate coalition partner. As the largest parliamentary faction in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, it can claim a powerful mandate to question government policy, propose legislation and shape public debate according to parliamentary procedures. Yet the movement from votes to executive control is not automatic. In Saxony-Anhalt, 39 seats do not supply an absolute majority in an 83-seat parliament. In Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 32 seats fall short of 36 required for an absolute majority in a 71-seat chamber. Alternative party combinations may therefore command the numbers for government even if every constituent party had fewer votes. Those combinations must still demonstrate programme coherence and stable confidence. Voters may punish alliances they perceive as opportunistic; they may also reward competence and constitutional responsibility. The next observable test is the formation and performance of state governments, not a commentator's preference for one coalition arithmetic over another.

What the Berlin result complicates

Berlin supplies an important counterexample to the claim that all German discontent flows toward the same party. The final state result placed Die Linke first, with AfD third behind CDU. Merz's warning against SPD and Greens partnering with Die Linke shows that his coalition boundary debate extends beyond the AfD question. But Berlin's separate constitutional, electoral and policy context means it would be misleading to treat every left-wing state negotiation as a mirror image of a far-right coalition. Parties have distinct programmes and historical roles, and actual agreements must be assessed on their contents. The 153-seat Berlin legislature also reflects a different proportional landscape from the eastern states where AfD came first. A more useful national conclusion is that the old centre parties face pressures from both left and right, which reduces the number of easy governing combinations. The political benefits accrue to parties able to present credible policy alternatives, but also to protest movements able to exploit repeated negotiating deadlock.

Security warnings and evidence boundaries

Merz accused Russia of attempting to destabilise Germany through repeated interference, according to Reuters, and framed domestic extremism as another threat. Those are consequential assertions from a sitting chancellor, but any article claiming a particular party or voter was directed by a foreign power needs independent evidence. Germany's security agencies have investigated disinformation and interference risks, yet the October 24 remarks are not by themselves proof of an operational link between Russia and every AfD electoral gain. The AfD's ideological and policy positions may be analysed from public statements and documented votes, but conspiratorial agency should not be invented to explain millions of ballots. Equally, dismissing foreign interference as impossible would be unwarranted in the face of official warnings and broader security research. The defensible frame separates observed party results, evidence of specific foreign operations and the wider political vulnerability of polarised democratic systems. A state election remains the decision of voters, even when external actors seek to shape information environments.

Who pays for an unstable political centre?

The human cost of coalition instability is best understood through policy delay and institutional uncertainty rather than sensational claims about a coming breakdown of democracy. Pension recipients and contributors need predictable rules. Small firms and energy-intensive industries need clarity on taxation and investment conditions. Workers in care services need viable funding and staffing, while recipients need dependable access. If national parties spend political capital arguing over partners instead of implementing agreed reforms, the opportunity cost may increase. Yet claims about precise lost GDP, health outcomes or poverty effects require statistical evidence beyond polling. Stability alone is not an unconditional benefit either: an unpopular policy enacted efficiently can harm households. Factrail should evaluate specific legislative decisions against measurable indicators rather than reward any coalition merely for surviving. The significance of the October crisis is that the government's ability to act has become a central political question, while the principal challenger to the right gains attention by remaining outside executive responsibility.

The strongest defence of Merz

A chancellor is entitled to maintain coalition boundaries he believes necessary for constitutional democratic commitments and his party's programme. Refusing the AfD does not prevent AfD legislators from taking the seats voters awarded them. Nor does the largest-party result require a majority to abandon deeply held disagreements over institutional norms, migration, foreign relations and economic policy. Merz can plausibly argue that working within existing coalition structures, however difficult, allows continuity in European defence and fiscal commitments. His public security warnings also address real categories of risk facing Germany. The critique is not that having a boundary is automatically wrong. It is that the boundary becomes politically credible only when the parties inside it govern effectively and explain trade-offs. If CDU/CSU and SPD cannot deliver persuasive pension, tax and care reforms, voters may increasingly interpret exclusion as a substitute for policy. That is a political vulnerability, not proof the constitutional system has failed.

The strongest criticism of Merz

The strongest critique is performance. A coalition with historically low satisfaction, a weak economic narrative and visible reform disputes cannot rely indefinitely on telling the electorate whom it refuses to govern with. The official September results show substantial regional losses for CDU and a sharp increase in AfD support. Voters are registering discontent through ordinary democratic elections. Describing every AfD supporter as motivated by one ideology or foreign influence would oversimplify the coalition's failure to address varied grievances. Merz's public call for unity needs to be measured against legislation, budgets and improvement in lived conditions, not only security rhetoric. The national government should provide costed and sequenced reform plans, transparent negotiations and accountability for trade-offs. Criticism must also acknowledge the inherited structural difficulties of pensions, care costs and energy shocks. Some reforms are unpopular precisely because they confront genuine constraints. The relevant judgment should therefore compare policy outcomes, not assume every unpopular government act is incompetent.

Scenario A: a credible reform bargain

One scenario is a negotiated CDU/CSU-SPD package that delivers concrete, publicly intelligible reform without causing a coalition rupture. A workable settlement could contain phased pension and care changes, a clearer revenue plan and measurable support for employment or competitiveness. Its success would be observed through enacted laws, budget details and implementation metrics rather than a single bounce in polling. If public confidence improves, the AfD could remain strong in eastern states while losing its national lead; political geography need not move uniformly. This scenario offers incumbents an opportunity to show that coalition democracy can accommodate disagreement and produce decisions. But there is no basis for assigning a probability from one Reuters report or one poll. Politicians will have to demonstrate fiscal feasibility, not merely rehearse leadership unity. State governments may remain unstable or difficult to form even if the federal coalition finds a compromise, so regional outcomes should be separately recorded.

Scenario B: continuing deadlock and opposition growth

In a second scenario, the coalition continues to dispute budget and welfare terms, and the AfD sustains a high polling position. State-level governing negotiations may be portrayed as unnatural alliances formed solely to exclude the largest party, amplifying AfD's claims that an established elite is resisting voters. Such a narrative can attract supporters even when the legal claim behind it is false, because political legitimacy is partly perceived. The national government could lose agenda-setting capacity while fighting internal disputes, delaying investment and social policy decisions. Yet a decline in government satisfaction does not guarantee AfD expansion indefinitely; other opposition parties may also gain, and events can alter public priorities rapidly. The test is subsequent representative polling combined with actual legislative records and coalition negotiations. A careful analyst should not state that an AfD-led federal government is inevitable, or that political instability alone predicts constitutional collapse.

Scenario C: boundary debate fractures the conservatives

The third scenario involves intensified disputes within CDU/CSU or between conservatives and SPD about acceptable state partnerships and federal cooperation. A unilateral local deal with AfD, if one were attempted, might trigger disciplinary or organisational conflict; persistent refusal without alternative majorities could also strain local party operations. The possible effects include leadership changes, further fragmenting electoral alliances or renewed strategic debate over how conservatives compete with AfD. None has occurred merely because Merz spoke in October. The evidence threshold for reporting a boundary change would be a formally announced agreement, recorded cooperation, a party decision or documented legislative action. Rumours or speculative coalition arithmetic are insufficient. Similarly, an internal argument over the succession to federal president should not be mistaken for a constitutional transfer of power. This scenario highlights why party discipline matters in a federal system with numerous state arenas and one national government.

Causal chain and welfare implications

The identifiable facts are the September state election results, the October public-opinion measurements, reported coalition disagreements and Merz's October 24 speech. These actions and events affect drivers such as coalition bargaining power, legislative throughput and trust in mainstream parties. Those drivers could influence economic confidence, security policy continuity and social-service predictability. But no responsibly quantified welfare impact follows directly from AfD's vote share or the chancellor's popularity. Assigning a negative or positive Factrail Person score without a traceable model, outcome data and a norm would be invented arithmetic. A better evidence graph separates the state electoral mandate from policy implementation, then traces actual laws to observed benefits and harms. The central question is whether Germany's competing parties can convert electoral legitimacy into workable administration under constitutional constraints. Polls indicate discontent; legislative records and lived outcomes will show whether it was answered.

Where this fits

The standoff is personal as well as institutional. Friedrich Merz led the CDU into government after repeating his 2024 firewall pledge (opens in a new tab), while Alice Weidel (opens in a new tab) has built the Alternative for Germany into the leading party in parts of the east. Much of that growth rides on anti-immigration sentiment (opens in a new tab), which is why policy delivery, not only coalition arithmetic, will decide who gains.

What to watch next

Monitor formal coalition agreements and minister-president votes in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, not only national party statements. Track CDU/CSU and SPD votes on pension, care and fiscal reform, identifying which party accepts each compromise. Compare future Infratest and ZDF polls with their sampling dates, question wording and uncertainty rather than turning one monthly reading into permanent voter behaviour. Review any publicly documented change in cooperation rules regarding AfD and the specific governmental level it concerns. Follow the Berlin coalition negotiations separately because the Left Party's victory raises a different bargaining problem. On security, look for attributed and corroborated evidence of interference rather than conflating nationalist policy with direct foreign control. Above all, evaluate whether the federal government offers a credible account of who benefits and who pays for reforms. Electoral frustration will remain politically important regardless of who ultimately holds regional ministerial office.

This analysis draws on reporting and documents including Reuters, Merz calls for unity after state defeats (opens in a new tab), Saxony-Anhalt, official September 2026 results (opens in a new tab), Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, official election results (opens in a new tab), State parliament Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, seat summary (opens in a new tab), Berlin, official state election results (opens in a new tab), Infratest dimap ARD DeutschlandTrend October 2026 (opens in a new tab), ZDF Politbarometer October 2026 (opens in a new tab), Tagesschau, coalition friction on economic reform (opens in a new tab), and OSW analysis of Saxony-Anhalt result (opens in a new tab).