Why Germany's AfD Rises Despite Merz's Reform Promise
By the Factrail desk · Method: how we source and score · Last reviewed
TL;DR
AfD reached 27% to CDU/CSU's 20% in the ARD poll. Voters cite representation, systemic distrust and Merz frustration. What can reforms change?
Article
Verdict — cui bono: the AfD profits from distrust, not one shared motive
STRONG INDICATION: the Alternative for Germany (AfD) benefits when citizens see a gap between Friedrich Merz's promise of national renewal and their own experience of German governance. In October's ARD-DeutschlandTrend, 27% said they would vote AfD and 20% favoured the CDU/CSU, while only 10% expressed satisfaction with the governing coalition. A separate Forsa survey found that AfD voters gave several different leading reasons for their preference, including representation, anti-system distrust and frustration with Merz. PROVEN: these are dated measurements of political opinion, not an election result or evidence of hidden foreign control. HYPOTHESIS: visible improvements from economic and welfare reforms could regain trust, but a higher GDP forecast alone has not done so. Europe's public interest is a stable, accountable Germany able to protect constitutional democracy, its social model and NATO obligations. ARD (opens in a new tab); Forsa (opens in a new tab).
The polling instrument and what it cannot establish
Infratest dimap's national ARD survey was carried out on 28–30 September 2026 with 1,303 eligible voters, using phone and online interviews. Alongside AfD's 27% and Union's 20%, the poll found Greens at 16%, SPD 13% and The Left 11%. Nearly nine in ten respondents were dissatisfied with the coalition, and Merz's personal approval registered 10%. The sample and question identify a national political mood; they do not tell us who will win a future general election, how an individual Land will vote or which government measure caused each response. WDR/ARD release (opens in a new tab).
The elected parliamentary baseline is different. The 2025 German federal election gave CDU/CSU 208 seats, AfD 152 and SPD 120 in a chamber of 630. Those are the official election allocation figures, dated to the 2025 result, not a claim about every subsequent defection or membership change. A survey ranking does not rewrite the Bundestag or automatically give Alice Weidel a cabinet appointment. Bundestag final outcome (opens in a new tab).
What AfD's own intending voters said
The Forsa survey commissioned by RTL/ntv polled 504 intending AfD supporters between 1 and 7 September. Asked for their most important reason, 34% chose the view that AfD best represented the interests of the German people. 22% chose frustration with the overall political system, 21% dissatisfaction with the Merz government and 12% the party's perceived understanding of ordinary people's problems. Only 3% said their primary reason was specifically making Alice Weidel chancellor. Among former CDU/CSU voters planning to switch to AfD, 37% cited Merz-government disappointment. Forsa indicated an uncertainty margin of about four percentage points for this subgroup survey. RTL/ntv Forsa (opens in a new tab).
This matters because it rules out glib single-cause explanations. Those with national-representation concerns do not necessarily hold identical positions on every migration or welfare policy. Dissatisfaction with institutions is not the same proposition as a desire to overturn them. The data do not prove that every AfD voter has the same values, and no ethnic or religious community can be assigned collective political responsibility on that basis.
The mechanism: broad anxiety can amplify protest appeal
WDR's separate October results show 84% worried that Germany's political parties might fail to agree on solutions to key problems. 51% feared they could not preserve their living standard; 54% worried Russia could attack additional European states; and 46% expressed concern about immigration levels. The same survey recorded major anxiety about AI, Donald Trump's policies and climate change. These concerns overlap in the general electorate and should not be mechanically mapped onto one party. They establish the background in which promises of competence are tested. WDR survey tables (opens in a new tab).
The clearest causal sequence is anxiety about costs and government problem-solving → disappointment with established parties → openness to a challenger → greater AfD polling strength → pressure on incumbent parties to show delivery. The observed measurements support the presence of anxiety, dissatisfaction and polling strength. They do not establish that an AfD government would reduce costs, reverse insecurity or reconcile every group.
Merz has announced reform; delivery is the missing test
Germany's CDU/CSU–SPD coalition announced 34 measures on 2 July 2026, covering competitiveness, bureaucracy, tax, employment and protection of the welfare state. The government says these will increase growth and safeguard jobs. These are verifiable policy announcements, not proof that every measure has passed, reached households or produced employment gains. Laws must survive parliamentary negotiation; social insurance changes affect different age and income groups, and implementation may lag enactment. Federal Government's reform announcement (opens in a new tab).
There is also a positive official growth signal. On 8 October, the Federal Government increased its 2026 real GDP growth forecast to 1.3%, attributing resilience partly to exports and public investment in defence and infrastructure. This is a projection, not year-end national accounts. Growth concentrated in exporters or public contracts may fail to reassure a person facing a pension-contribution increase or a precarious manufacturing job. Measurable wage growth, reliable healthcare appointments, housing affordability and enterprise investment are stronger tests of the promised renewal than a single forecast announcement. Government forecast (opens in a new tab).
Who has decision power and veto rights?
Merz and ministers set priorities and propose reforms. The SPD is an indispensable coalition partner for many governing agreements; Bundestag lawmakers must adopt legislation, sometimes alongside state-level and Bundesrat procedures. States and municipalities implement parts of social policy. AfD leaders can organise opposition, promote proposals and campaign but cannot change national contributions or executive appointments solely because a poll places the party first. The CDU's public refusal to cooperate with AfD creates an additional political constraint, although this explainer is about why support moves, not the separate coalition-firewall arithmetic. CDU statement (opens in a new tab).
Beneficiary table — who wins from the credibility gap?
| Actor or group | Advantage or exposure | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| AfD leadership | Greater attention and protest-vote appeal during government dissatisfaction | STRONG INDICATION |
| Former Union voters considering AfD | Alternative route for dissatisfaction; policy gain unknown | PROVEN survey motive |
| Merz and CDU/CSU | Opportunity to recover trust if reforms demonstrably work | HYPOTHESIS |
| SPD and welfare constituencies | Negotiating leverage over social-policy distribution | STRONG INDICATION |
| German workers and pensioners | Exposure to employment and contributions changes | STRONG INDICATION, specific effect unmeasured |
| Germany's EU and NATO partners | Benefit from stable security and trade cooperation | PROVEN strategic stakes; future effects hypothetical |
| Russia's leadership | Might favour weaker EU unity on Ukraine | HYPOTHESIS, no evidence here of directing polling |
Cui bono does not prove conspiracy. Russia could benefit strategically from a particular later policy, but no cited poll or reform announcement proves Moscow financed a voter trend. Such allegations would need dated documents, transactions and independent corroboration.
Human welfare, best counterargument and timeline
A reform programme can be politically sound yet lose support before people experience its benefit. Equally, temporary growth may not solve structural pension and healthcare finance. If industrial workers feel excluded and pensioners fear losing services, the political cost falls on both the government and citizens. The strongest counterargument to blaming Merz alone is Forsa's finding that only 21% of sampled AfD supporters chose his government as their top motive; other respondents named longer-standing representation or system concerns. External shocks also constrain Berlin's fiscal and security choices. Forsa (opens in a new tab).
July: coalition reform package announced. 1–7 September: Forsa records distinct AfD motivations. 28–30 September: ARD gathers polling data. 1 October: ARD releases the political-mood results. 8 October: government issues the stronger growth forecast. The coexistence of improved projections and low trust is central to the story—not evidence that voters simply ignored one press release. ARD (opens in a new tab); Government.
What remains unproven, and what should be watched?
HYPOTHESIS: reform delivery will shrink AfD's vote share. HYPOTHESIS: AfD's 27% will become a federal majority. HYPOTHESIS: Germany's actual commitments to Ukraine or NATO will shift because of a poll. Watch adopted reform laws, wages after inflation, employment, actual social-service outcomes, transparent repeat polls and election returns.
FAQ: Why are Germans choosing AfD according to the survey?
The cited intending-voter sample includes multiple explanations, led by perceived national representation (34%), system dissatisfaction (22%) and dissatisfaction with the Merz administration (21%).
FAQ: Does AfD polling ahead mean Merz has lost office?
No. The incumbent federal government depends on institutional parliamentary processes, not hypothetical election percentages.
Sources
- Infratest dimap — ARD DeutschlandTrend October 2026 (2026-10-01) (opens in a new tab)
- WDR — ARD political mood survey and coalition rating (2026-10-01) (opens in a new tab)
- WDR — Social-welfare fears and survey methodology (2026-10-01) (opens in a new tab)
- RTL/ntv/Forsa — AfD voter motivation survey in September 2026 (2026-09-08) (opens in a new tab)
- German Federal Government — Reform package for pension, jobs and taxes (2026-07-02) (opens in a new tab)
- German Federal Government — Autumn 2026 economic forecast (2026-10-08) (opens in a new tab)
- German Bundestag — Final official 2025 federal election seat allocation (2025-03-14) (opens in a new tab)
- CDU — Merz: no common ground with AfD (2025-10-20) (opens in a new tab)
- Deutsche Welle — ARD DeutschlandTrend analysis of dissatisfaction (2026-10-01) (opens in a new tab)
Evidence
The sources this article cites, claim-bearing material first.
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