Merz chancellorship and post-traffic-light realignment

A failed first ballot and a new German centre-right coalition

Friedrich Merz became Germany's chancellor on 6 May 2025 after an unusually troubled parliamentary vote, marking the end of the coalition led by Social Democrat Olaf Scholz. The transition responded to economic stagnation, public dissatisfaction with the outgoing three-party government, disputes over migration and renewed European security demands. The critical issue was not only which party held the chancellorship, but whether a new coalition could manage public finances, coalition discipline and the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany without weakening democratic competition.

The preceding traffic-light coalition of Social Democrats, Greens and Free Democrats struggled through disagreements over spending and fiscal rules. In November 2024 the alliance collapsed after Scholz dismissed his finance minister, Christian Lindner, and the governing parties could no longer sustain a workable budget compromise. Scholz subsequently lost a confidence vote, clearing the way for an early federal election on 23 February 2025. The official Federal Returning Officer's results gave the Christian Democratic Union and Bavarian Christian Social Union the largest combined bloc, while Alternative for Germany became a major opposition force. The Social Democrats suffered heavy losses, ending their position as the senior governing party.

Negotiations produced an agreement between the CDU/CSU and SPD. The parties publicly presented a coalition programme in April 2025 and subsequently completed the formation of the government. It combined commitments to economic growth, infrastructure investment, stronger defence and a stricter approach to irregular migration. The balancing act reflected anti-immigration sentiment, which rival parties were also attempting to mobilise. Coalition planners had to decide whether restrictive rhetoric would translate into administratively workable measures consistent with constitutional and European obligations.

On 6 May 2025 Merz unexpectedly failed to obtain the required absolute majority of Bundestag members in his first chancellor election ballot. The failure exposed uncertainty about internal party discipline before the cabinet had even begun governing. A second ballot that day elected him chancellor with 325 votes, according to the Bundestag's published account. This made the new government's start a test of parliamentary confidence rather than an unqualified triumph for the largest electoral bloc. The episode also reinforced how German coalition formation works: elections determine representation, while a separately assembled parliamentary majority determines the chancellor.

Merz's government inherited decisions on defence expenditure as Russia's war against Ukraine continued and NATO allies pressed for stronger European capabilities. Fiscal flexibility, procurement timetables and industrial capacity were practical constraints on campaign promises. His coalition also confronted the challenge of restoring economic confidence while competing with Alternative for Germany across regional and national elections. The rise of that party shaped political competition without making it a coalition partner in the 2025 government. Supporters of Merz argued that a more conventional centre-right-led alliance could provide clearer priorities after years of coalition deadlock. Critics questioned whether the SPD and CDU/CSU could reconcile spending commitments and whether tougher migration policy would satisfy voters without conceding rhetorical ground to the far right. The observable record by May 2025 established who won the election, which parties agreed to govern and how Merz finally secured office. Later outcomes must be judged against actual parliamentary votes, fiscal measures and service delivery, not the promise of an immediate political reset.