US Immigration and Customs Enforcement: the agency converting immigration law into detention, investigation and removal

US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), part of the Department of Homeland Security, can arrest and detain people under federal immigration authority, execute legally authorised removals and investigate cross-border crime. Its power affects people directly: liberty, family life, workplace activity and the ability to contest removal. The institution's budget is therefore not just an administrative cost. It is a statement about how much detention space, transportation, investigative capacity and legal process the federal government is prepared to finance. Immigration enforcement may protect lawful immigration rules and public safety; it can also impose irreversible human costs if decisions are mistaken, conditions unsafe or judicial safeguards circumvented. Any assessment must distinguish authority provided by law, conduct documented by inspectors and accusations not yet adjudicated.

Institutional design and mandate

ICE was established in 2003 during the creation of DHS. The agency is not the same organisation as US Customs and Border Protection, which operates the border and ports of entry, or US Citizenship and Immigration Services, which administers many benefit applications. ICE's Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) handles arrest, custody, supervision and removal of noncitizens subject to the applicable law. Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) conducts investigations into transnational criminal activity such as trafficking, smuggling, financial crime and illicit trade. The Office of the Principal Legal Advisor provides legal representation for the government in immigration proceedings and advice to the agency. These missions overlap politically but require different evidence, powers, funding and outcome measures.

Not everyone detained by ICE has a criminal conviction. Civil immigration custody is legally distinct from imprisonment following a criminal conviction. The relevant legal questions include whether the person is subject to detention authority, whether a removal order exists, whether protected claims remain unresolved and what judicial review is available. Counting arrests as convictions would be false. Counting every transfer between facilities as a separate removal would also be misleading.

Funding and the capacity jump

The FY2026 congressional budget justification provides a detailed view of proposed operational changes, which must not be confused with final appropriations or actual cash spent. Among the changes it lists are a proposed $501 million increase for detention capacity and a proposed $205 million increase for transportation and removal operations. It also includes $24.692 million for detainee health care and $27.696 million for automated screening and vetting. Those are programme-change entries in a budget proposal, not a complete all-in figure for ICE's spending or proof that the proposed amount was disbursed exactly as written.

A subsequent federal funding law materially expanded ICE's resources. The Government Accountability Office reports that a July 2025 law provided approximately $75 billion to ICE through FY2029, including $45 billion for detention capacity. These multi-year resources are not the same thing as annual operating spending. Their real economic impact depends on procurement, staffing, contracts, facilities brought into use and contract termination costs. For fiscal 2024, the detention appropriation was approximately $3.4 billion, intended to support a bed level of 41,500. That older baseline helps show the magnitude of the policy shift without pretending every dollar buys an occupied bed.

Who decides and who can intervene

The president sets enforcement priorities within the law; DHS leadership directs policy; Congress writes legal authority and appropriates funds. ICE officers and managers implement actions under delegated powers, while immigration courts, federal courts and other reviewing bodies provide distinct legal checks. Immigration judges operate within the executive branch's immigration adjudication system, not ICE. Federal judges may hear relevant challenges but are not responsible for planning detention procurement. Inspectors general, GAO and congressional committees can identify administrative failure without themselves cancelling a removal order. State and local governments may cooperate through legal agreements, but their participation and legal limits vary.

This separation matters when a government announces enforcement targets. An agency target does not abolish asylum protections, statutory review or procedural requirements. Conversely, a judicial decision protecting one applicant does not necessarily invalidate every lawful action undertaken by the agency. The record should identify the actual order, relevant court, status of appeal and affected population.

Documented detention expansion and costs

GAO's June 2026 report on Camp East Montana describes a fast expansion of detention capacity. The facility opened in August 2025 and had a contract that required payment for meals and operational services for 5,000 people even with materially lower occupancy. GAO reported approximately 1,600 detainees there at the end of February 2026. The resulting mismatch produced avoidable expenses and exposed shortcomings against detention standards. That is a documented procurement and performance problem; it is not a finding that every contractor, officer or detainee violated the law.

Across the system, GAO reports ICE detention's average daily population rose from 39,314 on January 20, 2025 to 67,204 on April 1, 2026, about 71%. The number of authorised facilities increased from 134 to 239 over the same dates. Those measurements reflect detention-system expansion and do not by themselves measure changes in violent crime or the success of court challenges. They also do not disclose how many people were ultimately removed or later determined eligible for relief.

GAO's September 2026 review found further planning failures: ICE purchased eleven warehouses for approximately $1 billion while pursuing multiple detention-expansion initiatives. It later planned to sell seven warehouses and had incurred more than $20 million in nonrecoverable costs. Auditors recommended a strategic detention plan. The finding concerns demonstrable spending and oversight, not a proof that the whole detention estate is unnecessary. It does show how rapid expenditure can outrun planning.

Safety and inspection shortcomings

In May 2025 GAO examined four DHS detention inspection programmes and found insufficient clear performance goals and measures to assess their effectiveness. Almost universal nominal passing ratings can coexist with important identified deficiencies; a pass rate alone does not establish that people receive appropriate medical care or safe conditions. GAO recommended improving oversight. A credible evaluation should include preventable deaths, serious medical incidents, inspection findings, remedies, contractor performance and access to legal representation. Each has different measurement limitations. Auditors' findings should be distinguished from civil-rights allegations awaiting legal resolution.

Benefits, costs and competing case

Supporters argue that credible enforcement deters violations, assists criminal investigations and protects the integrity of lawful immigration channels. HSI investigations should be evaluated on actual indictments, convictions and disruption of criminal activity, rather than simply added to ERO's removal count. Critics argue that detention expansion can injure families and communities and produce escalating public expense, especially when alternatives to detention or more efficient hearings could achieve compliance. The GAO procurement findings strengthen concerns about value for money without establishing that all detention is unlawful or unnecessary.

Taxpayers pay the documented spending; detainees and relatives bear the human cost of confinement and legal uncertainty; lawful employers and the public may benefit from effective enforcement of rules. Contractors receive payments under awarded agreements, but a contract's headline ceiling is not proof of actual disbursement or wrongdoing. The central question is whether additional coercive capacity generates demonstrably lawful and proportional results and whether auditing catches costly mistakes before they become entrenched.

What should be monitored

Inspect the final fiscal-year appropriations beside the original presidential request, actual contract payments and facility utilisation. Track detention population and average length of stay separately from removals, final orders, criminal convictions and pending asylum or judicial claims. Compare GAO recommendations with DHS implementation evidence and updated inspection programmes. Contract awards should be cross-checked with their amendment history and actual performance. This is the difference between measuring an expanding agency and judging whether its expanded powers produce lawful, efficient public outcomes.

Sources

• DHS, ICE FY2026 Congressional Budget Justification (opens in a new tab)
• GAO, Immigration Detention Inspection Programs, May 2025 (opens in a new tab)
• GAO, Detention Inspection Report with fiscal 2024 baseline (opens in a new tab)
• GAO, Camp East Montana Detention Procurement, June 2026 (opens in a new tab)
• GAO, Camp East Montana detailed findings (opens in a new tab)
• GAO, Immigration Detention Expansion Planning, September 2026 (opens in a new tab)