
War Shipping Administration
The War Shipping Administration was an emergency agency of the United States Office for Emergency Management, established on February 7, 1942…
Expert article
The War Shipping Administration was an emergency agency of the United States Office for Emergency Management, established on February 7, 1942, by Executive Order 9054 of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Issued under the First War Powers Act of December 18, 1941, the order charged an administrator, appointed by and responsible to the President, with control of the operation, purchase, charter, requisition, and use of ocean vessels under the flag or control of the United States. Combatant vessels of the Army, Navy, and Coast Guard, Navy fleet auxiliaries, transports owned by the Army and Navy, and coastwise, intercoastal, and inland shipping directed by the Office of Defense Transportation remained outside that control. The stated purpose was the most effective use of American shipping in World War II.
The order moved from the United States Maritime Commission the statutory powers over operation, purchase, charter, insurance, repair, maintenance, requisition, and ship warrants, together with such Commission personnel, records, and property as the administrator required. Ship construction stayed with the Commission: the administration's final report said the building program would take the Commission's full attention and that a separate agency was required for wartime operation of the merchant fleet. That report states that the chairman of the Maritime Commission was named War Shipping Administrator two days after the order, responsible directly to the President. Emory S. Land signed the report as administrator on January 15, 1946, and both the report and the wartime United States Government Manual identify him as a vice admiral on the Navy's retired list.
Ships under the administration formed a pool allocated to the Army, the Navy, other federal departments and agencies, and the governments of the United Nations, and the administrator was required to follow strategic military requirements. He represented the United States on shipping questions with the British Ministry of War Transport, furnished war-risk marine insurance and reinsurance under Title II of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, and was guided, for cargo essential to war production and the civilian economy, by priority schedules from the chairman of the War Production Board. With Britain, the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board was formed on January 26, 1942, to keep the two merchant pools from duplicating each other's voyages.
When the United States entered the war, the ocean fleet, counting foreign vessels acquired by negotiation, requisition, or seizure in American ports, was about 900 dry-cargo ships of 6,700,000 deadweight tons and about 440 tankers of 5,150,000 deadweight tons. By the end of the war with Japan the administration controlled 4,221 ships of 44,940,000 deadweight tons; most of the merchant fleet in September 1945 had come from new construction, and the rest from bareboat and time charters or intergovernmental arrangements. From December 7, 1941, to Japan's capitulation, the cargo lift from the United States was 268,252,000 long tons, of which 203,522,000 tons were dry cargo and 64,730,000 tons were petroleum and other bulk liquids, and about 75 percent moved on the administration's ships.
The same report counted, up to V-J Day, 733 American merchant vessels of more than 1,000 gross tons sunk, 5,638 merchant seamen and officers dead or missing, and 581 taken prisoner, and it stated that through the early part of 1943 casualties among the seagoing force were proportionately higher than in all the armed services combined. Section 202 of the Naval Appropriation Act approved July 8, 1946, transferred the administration's functions, powers, duties, funds, records, property, and personnel to the Maritime Commission effective September 1, 1946, for liquidation to be finished by December 31, 1946, and provided that the War Shipping Administration would cease to exist on September 1, 1946.
Establishment and legal authority
Executive Order 9054 and the First War Powers Act
Congress approved the First War Powers Act on December 18, 1941, eleven days after the attack on Pearl Harbor. It authorized the President to redistribute executive functions, and the funds attached to them, for the prosecution of World War II. On February 7, 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt used that act, and his authority as President and Commander in Chief, to issue Executive Order 9054. The order created the War Shipping Administration in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President “to assure the most effective utilization of the shipping of the United States for the successful prosecution of the war,” under an Administrator appointed by and responsible to the President.
He received control of the operation, purchase, charter, requisition, and use of ocean vessels under the United States flag or control. Excepted were combatant vessels of the United States Army, the United States Navy, and the United States Coast Guard, Navy fleet auxiliaries, transports owned by the Army or the Navy, and coastwise, intercoastal, and inland vessels under the Office of Defense Transportation. Ships under the Administration formed a pool for the Army, the Navy, other federal agencies, and the governments of the United Nations, allocated according to strategic military requirements. His decisions on those functions were final. United States Maritime Commission balances for the transferred work moved in amounts set by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, with the President’s approval, under section 3 of the First War Powers Act.
Division of functions with the Maritime Commission
Section 3 transferred the Commission’s powers of operation, purchase, charter, insurance, repair, maintenance, and requisition of vessels, and of issuing ship warrants, under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the Act of June 6, 1941 (Public Law 101) and Executive Order 8771, and the Ship Warrants Act of July 14, 1941 (Public Law 173). Public Law 101 authorized acquisition of merchant vessels, including idle foreign ships in United States waters. The warrants statute conditioned priority for bunkers, repairs, and cargo handling on compliance with rules for trades, cargoes, and charter hire. Personnel, records, and property the Administrator needed moved with those functions.
Ship construction was not transferred. The Commission kept the building program, and its chairman, Emory S. Land, was named Administrator on February 9, 1942, while remaining chairman. Before the split, the Commission’s Division of Emergency Shipping supervised import and export movements, but military and lend-lease carriage by private operators was still largely voluntary. Land’s report of January 15, 1946, said the building program would absorb the Commission and that wartime operation required a separate agency.
Executive Order 9244 of September 16, 1942, under the First War Powers Act and the Second War Powers Act of March 27, 1942, added operating facilities, further 1941 statutes, insurance under the Merchant Marine Acts of 1920 and 1936 as well as Public Law 101, and Commission powers over contracts, audits, property transfers, and admiralty suits. Other departments had to report shipping requirements, except for excluded military vessels and secret missions. The Administrator was also tied to domestic claimants: the War Department and the Naval Transportation Service for military movement, the Office of Defense Transportation for coastal and inland connections, and priority schedules from the Chairman of the War Production Board for cargo essential to production and the civilian economy.
Allied coordination
The February order made Allied dealing a duty of the office. The Administrator was to represent the United States with the Ministry of War Transport of the United Kingdom and with similar agencies of allied nations, and he could sit on joint boards with associated governments.
On January 26, 1942, Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill announced that American and British shipping would, in principle, be a common pool, while each government kept executive control. The Ministry of War Transport would still direct movement under British control, and the appropriate United States authority would direct United States shipping and shipping of other powers under United States control. A Washington board of one American member and one British member, and a London board of the Minister and an American representative, were to adjust the two systems “in one harmonious policy.” Members were to consult the Soviet Union, China, and other United Nations. After February 7 the War Shipping Administration was the American side of that board. Studies prepared for it in 1942–43 by the Administration and the Ministry are in the National Archives, and the Administration’s 1946 report described the board as the means of avoiding duplicated use of the two merchant pools.
Organization and leadership
The Administrator and deputy offices
The War Shipping Administration, an agency of the Office for Emergency Management, kept headquarters in the Department of Commerce Building in Washington, D.C.. The Administrator was appointed by, and responsible to, the President. On February 9, 1942, two days after Executive Order 9054, United States Maritime Commission chairman Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, United States Navy (retired), was named Administrator. He held both offices through the war, so Commission construction and Administration operation met in one person; the 1945 United States Government Manual listed him as a vice admiral.
The March 1943 Handbook of Emergency War Agencies named three deputies: Rear Admiral Howard L. Vickery for construction; Captain Edward Macauley, Navy retired, for labor relations, manning, training, and recruitment; and Lewis W. Douglas for vessel utilization and planning. Douglas held that post from May 1942 to March 1944. Files of that office continue under Granville Conway for 1944–46. Conway had been Atlantic Coast director in New York City; by March 1945 he was deputy for vessel utilization. Macauley, a Commission member in December 1941, remained the personnel deputy through the 1945 listing. Vickery, by 1945 also Commission vice chairman, linked shipbuilding to the operating fleet. The final report adds a deputy for fiscal affairs, covering charters, freight rates, insurance, and lend-lease accounts. S. Duvall Schell was executive officer in 1943 and executive deputy administrator in 1945. Beside the Administrator were General Counsel William Radner, Comptroller J. M. Quinn, and Coordinator of Ship Defense Installations Vice Admiral A. P. Fairfield, Navy retired, whose records concern the arming of merchant ships.
Divisions and field organization
On December 31, 1943, Washington employed 1,159 of 4,615 people worldwide: 3,157 in United States field service and 299 abroad. Much of the experienced staff came from the Maritime Commission, and some Commission service divisions worked for both agencies.
The vessel-utilization deputy had seven assistant deputies over 27 divisions, including small vessels, maintenance and salvage, ship control, tankers, fiscal affairs, and the Pacific. Ship control covered allocations and assignments, statistics, ship requirements, and cargo requirements; ship operations covered traffic and foreign charters and ship warrants; and a separate office followed the Russian shipping area. Maintenance and repair, transferred from the Commission and enlarged, worked with a New York coordinator of repairs and conversion shared with the Navy.
The personnel side had a medical director, three assistant deputies—for training, recruitment and manning, and maritime labor relations—and ten divisions. The operating organizations were Recruitment and Manning, Training, and Maritime Labor Relations. In 1945 the medical director was Dr. Justin K. Fuller of the Public Health Service. Training, including the United States Maritime Service, the cadet program, and state maritime academies, went to the United States Coast Guard by Executive Order 9083 of February 27, 1942, and returned by Executive Order 9198 of July 11, 1942. A legal division of six units sat in New York, New Orleans, and San Francisco, and in the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean, India, and the South Pacific.
In March 1943 the Atlantic Coast District—Maine through Jacksonville, Florida, plus Canadian and Newfoundland ports—was at 45 Broadway, New York, under Conway. Chester H. Marshall’s Gulf district was in the Federal Office Building in New Orleans; A. R. Lintner’s Pacific district was at 200 Bush Street, San Francisco; and the Great Lakes office was in Cleveland. Overseas districts were at Havana, Port of Spain, and the American Embassy in London. By early 1945 Walter W. Schwenk directed the Atlantic coast and Assistant Deputy John E. Cushing the Pacific organization. A Division of Foreign Service coordinated representatives abroad, and most administrative officers were recruited from commercial shipping firms.
Associated boards
The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, announced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill on January 26, 1942, was to adjust the British Ministry of War Transport and the Administration “in one harmonious policy.” It had members in Washington and in London. In the 1945 manual the United States member was Land; the British members were W. O. Hart, head of the British Merchant Shipping Mission, and Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport. Studies prepared for the board in 1942–43 are filed with the vessel-utilization deputy.
The Maritime War Emergency Board followed a December 17, 1941, Commission conference with operators and unions on seamen’s war-risk pay. National Archives dates the appointment to December 19, 1941, and describes the board as chaired by the personnel deputy, with representatives of the U.S. Conciliation Service and the National War Labor Board (1942–1945). It regulated war-risk insurance, hazardous-duty bonuses, pay when a ship was lost, and reimbursement for lost effects, and was abolished on September 1, 1950. The Pacific Coast Maritime Industry Board, chaired in 1943 by Paul Eliel, joined employers and longshore workers to speed cargo handling on that coast. The personnel deputy’s records include minutes of the United Seamen’s Service, created by the Administration to provide recreational, medical, and other services for merchant seamen.
Acquisition, charter, and agency operation
Requisition, purchase, and charter
Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended on August 7, 1939, authorized the United States Maritime Commission, in a proclaimed national emergency or when the President found national defense required it, to requisition or purchase vessels owned by citizens of the United States or under construction in the United States, or to requisition or charter their use, and to pay just compensation. Under the Ship Warrants Act of July 14, 1941, warrants for United States-documented vessels, other citizen-owned vessels, and, on application, foreign-flag vessels exchanged priority for cargo handling, bunkers, repairs, and dry docks for agreed trades, voyages, cargoes or passengers, and a maximum charter rate, while manning and upkeep stayed with the owner or charterer.
The Act of June 6, 1941, also let the Commission charter vessels of any flag, on a time-charter or bareboat basis, when more tonnage was needed for foreign commerce or defense commodities, purchase suitable ships, and operate them or charter them on to citizen operators or other federal agencies. Until April 18, 1942, American lines still carried military and lend-lease cargoes largely by voluntary arrangement under the Commission’s Division of Emergency Shipping. Executive Order 9054 had already given the War Shipping Administration the operation, purchase, charter, requisition, and use of ocean vessels under the United States flag or United States control, except specified armed-service ships and certain domestic services. The general order of April 18 made American-flag oceangoing ships subject to requisition for title or for use.
The basic time-charter rate was $4 per deadweight ton for 20-year-old ships of about 8 to 10½ knots, against a 1941 world rate the Administration put at $10.20, and the value for taking title was $65 per deadweight ton for a comparable ship of about 8½ knots, against a 1941 peak it put at $139. An Advisory Board on Just Compensation of three federal circuit judges, named by Franklin D. Roosevelt on October 15, 1943, reported on December 7, though the Comptroller General had told Congress the rates were too high. Early in 1944 the title value was cut to $56.25 per deadweight ton and a basic bareboat rate of $1.25 was set, the latter estimated to save about $50 million. About 70 percent of the dry-cargo fleet then controlled was new construction and about 23 percent ships already owned by American companies; by September 1945 the Administration described the non-construction remainder as bareboat and time charters or intergovernmental arrangements.
The general agency system
Qualified steamship companies, rather than a government operating department, became the agents—about 130 by the end of 1943—and were paid fixed fees plus charter hire on vessels of their own that had been requisitioned. The forms approved on April 8, 1942, and published on September 25, were the General Agency Agreement, GAA-4/4/42, for ships the Administration owned or held as owner pro hac vice, and the Time Charter Agreement, TCA-4/4/42, for ships on time charter. The general agent was appointed as agent, not as an independent contractor, to manage assigned vessels under orders on trade, voyages, cargoes, priorities, charters, and freight; tankers, tugs, barges, and certain small craft were outside that form unless the Administrator included them. For the account of the United States the agent equipped, supplied, and maintained the ship, kept the accounts, and procured a master—an employee of the United States, with authority over navigation—and a crew hired through ordinary commercial channels and paid with government funds.
Where another United States-flag line was the recognized berth operator, it could be named a berth sub-agent to book cargo, issue bills of lading, and do the port work. The Administration assumed operating responsibility and war-risk insurance, so employment was no longer set by the owner’s voyage profit, while the lines themselves remained the operating organizations.
Foreign-flag and seized tonnage
Foreign tonnage entered the same pool by negotiation, requisition, and seizure in American ports. On April 10, 1941, Roosevelt told Congress that section 902 did not reach foreign-owned ships lying idle in American harbors and asked for power to take them, with compensation. The Act of June 6, 1941, effective through June 30, 1942, authorized purchase, charter, requisition of use, or taking of title or possession of any foreign merchant vessel lying idle in waters under United States jurisdiction, including the Philippine Islands and the Canal Zone, when necessary to national defense. Executive Order 8771, issued that day, directed the Commission to take the ships, operate them itself or by an agent, charter them, and document them under United States law or the law of a neutral country of the Western Hemisphere.
On the night of March 29–30, 1941, the United States Coast Guard took control of 35 of 41 Danish vessels in American ports; the Department of State recorded no sabotage and called the seizure preventive. German and Italian ships were taken the same night. French ships that had taken refuge in United States ports were under discussion from the spring of 1941; on December 12 French crews were removed from those vessels, and on December 16 the Commission requisitioned the liner Normandie, with just compensation.
In November 1939 Standard Oil of New Jersey transferred tankers to the flag of Panama. Section 902, as Roosevelt described it, already authorized requisition of vessels owned by United States citizens. In the early-1944 count, ships acquired from foreign nations were about 7 percent of the controlled dry-cargo fleet, and foreign charters and ship warrants remained an Administration fiscal duty.
Allocation and cargo operations
Executive Order 9054, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 7, 1942, placed War Shipping Administration vessels in a pool for the United States Army, the United States Navy, other federal agencies, and United Nations governments. The Administrator had to follow strategic military requirements, consult the service departments on troop and supply movement and the Office of Defense Transportation on coastwise and inland links, and move goods needed for war production and civilian use on schedules from the Chairman of the War Production Board. Roosevelt rejected language letting the War and Navy Departments define those requirements jointly, so that a civilian agency could protect aid to the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China. From December 7, 1941, to Japan's capitulation, 268,252,000 long tons left the United States—203,522,000 dry and 64,730,000 of petroleum and other tanker liquids—and about 75 percent went in the WSA fleet. Annual lift rose from 44,117,000 long tons in 1942 to 62,113,000 in 1943, 78,553,000 in 1944, and 83,469,000 in 1945. Calls on that space came from the Army, the Navy, Lend-Lease, Allied civilian supply, commercial programs, and imports.
Military requirements and lend-lease
The armed services took most of the fleet, and a larger share after 1943. In 1942 and early 1943, 41 percent of capacity carried Army cargo and 13 percent Navy cargo, while 30 percent carried lend-lease and other civilian goods for Allies, chiefly Britain and the Soviet Union. Late in 1943 the shares were about 49 percent Army, 10 percent Navy, and 29 percent lend-lease and other Allied civilian use. Soviet lend-lease that year exceeded commitments by more than 35 percent.
In 1944, 74 percent of WSA tonnage went to the Army and Navy, up from 59 percent near the end of 1943. Army allocations were about 60 percent of the fleet; dry-cargo tonnage for the Navy was 14 percent. The dry-cargo fleet gained a net 6,605,000 deadweight tons, but Army and Navy requirements rose 8,854,000 tons, so other accounts were cut. Lend-lease deadweight fell from 5,974,000 tons at the start of 1944 to 3,460,000 on December 31: Britain's from 3,267,000 to 1,804,000, mostly the United Kingdom import program, and the Soviet Union's from 2,226,000 to 1,491,000.
WSA ships still carried 39 percent of lend-lease and civil-requirement shipments in 1942, 53 percent in 1943, 62 percent in 1944, and 58 percent in the first ten months of 1945. In 1943 they made 2,876 such sailings, 2,267 for Britain, its colonies, and dominions, 328 for the Soviet Union, and 281 for other countries; in 1944 Britain and the Soviet Union together took slightly more than 70 percent of lend-lease shipments. About 12 percent of ships hauling Soviet lend-lease were sunk in 1942, mainly bound for Murmansk.
Essential civilian and import programs
Imports gave way first when military movements and sinkings increased together. Inbound cargo during the war totaled 70,652,000 long tons dry and 35,118,000 tons in tankers. Dry imports were about one-third of dry exports, and WSA ships brought in about 73 percent of 1944 receipts. Dry-cargo imports rose from 17,509,000 long tons in 1942 to 19,480,000 in 1943. In 1944 dry-cargo arrivals were 18,566,000 tons and tanker arrivals 11,200,000 tons, mostly Caribbean crude and molasses, after civilian goods had taken the deepest cuts while sinkings were high.
Nearly half of imported dry cargo came from the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, including bauxite, copper, sugar, nitrates, and manganese. Bauxite rose from about 2 million long tons in 1942 to more than 3.5 million in 1943 despite submarine attacks, with discharge concentrated at New York and Mobile. Burlap, wool, cocoa, fibers, and chrome came back from India, Australia, Africa, Turkey, and Soviet ports.
The State Department and the Foreign Economic Administration set quotas for Latin America and other countries where some reciprocal trade was kept up. Homeward ships carried that export cargo if it did not interfere with military requirements. In 1944 the Caribbean and South America took 55 percent of U.S. commercial shipments, and the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean another 23 percent. WSA dry-cargo exports for lend-lease and civilian use reached an estimated 21,733,000 long tons in 1945.
Theaters, routes, and port operations
Of 1944 dry cargo, about 15 million long tons went to the United Kingdom and the Continent, 13 million to Pacific areas, 8 million to the Mediterranean, 6 million to South America and the Caribbean, 5 million to the Soviet Union, and 3 million to India and Ceylon. About two-thirds of Army shipments went to the United Kingdom–Continent, the Mediterranean, and the southwest Pacific; about 86 percent of Navy shipments went to the Pacific, some 60 percent to the central Pacific alone. Pacific allocations for the two services rose from 2,301,000 deadweight tons on January 1, 1944, to 4,526,000 on December 31. Army employment in the United Kingdom–Continent grew from 1,970,000 deadweight tons on January 1 to 6,508,000 by September, much of it shuttling after the Normandy landings.
The shortest U.S. route to the Soviet Union ran through the Denmark Strait and around North Cape to Murmansk. The Mediterranean was long closed as a path to Soviet ports, the Persian Gulf required a voyage around the Cape of Good Hope, and war with Japan limited American use of Vladivostok. On all flags, not WSA ships alone, Western Hemisphere cargo for the Soviet Union from June 22, 1941, to September 20, 1945, was heaviest in the Pacific: an Army table gives 8,243,397 long tons (47.1 percent) to the Soviet Far East, 4,159,117 (23.8 percent) to the Persian Gulf, and 3,964,231 (22.7 percent) to North Russia, with yearly totals adding to 17,499,861 long tons. North Pacific ports, including the Columbia River, loaded about 2.5 million tons of Soviet lend-lease in 1944.
Atlantic ports served Europe, the Pacific coast was a separate WSA region for Pacific shipments, and Gulf ports handled South and Central American imports, with some southwest Pacific cargo continuing through the Panama Canal. In 1944 about one-third of dry-cargo ships were overseas at a time, discharging or held for local military work, which slowed Pacific turnaround in particular. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, announced on January 26, 1942, could only advise. Each country directed its own ships, and American allocation stayed with the WSA.
The controlled fleet
Growth in numbers and tonnage
The pool the War Shipping Administration operated was not a fleet the agency built. Construction stayed with the United States Maritime Commission, created under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936; the administration took ships for operation, allocation, repair, and conversion. On United States entry into World War II, oceangoing tonnage available for that control, already enlarged by foreign ships acquired through negotiation, requisition, and seizure in American ports, was about 900 dry-cargo vessels of 6,700,000 deadweight tons and some 440 tankers of 5,150,000 deadweight tons. The Commission put American oceangoing capacity at about 11 million deadweight tons at the attack on Pearl Harbor. The administration later noted that less than one-third of the prewar tonnage had been in foreign trade, much of it coastal or old.
Later growth followed Commission deliveries. Through June 30, 1945, the Commission recorded 5,377 vessels of all types and 52,761,723 deadweight tons delivered, more than 98 percent of that tonnage after Pearl Harbor. That total included naval and military types as well as merchant ships. Regular Liberty dry-cargo ships built for the United States numbered 2,587—2 in 1941, 542 in 1942, 1,232 in 1943, 727 in 1944, and 84 in the first half of 1945.
Ships in administration operation rose more slowly than deliveries. The count was 1,639 at the end of 1942, 2,847 at the end of 1943, and 3,744 at the end of 1944, when the net gain in the dry-cargo fleet was 6,605,000 deadweight tons. By June 1945 the controlled fleet numbered 4,125 vessels of 44,435,000 deadweight tons, and by the end of the war with Japan it numbered 4,221 ships of 44,940,000 deadweight tons. Most of the September 1945 fleet came from new construction; the rest was held on bareboat or time charter or by intergovernmental arrangement. Under lend-lease or charter the administration also transferred 509 vessels, chiefly Liberty ships and prewar ships, to Allied flags while the United States kept title, 341 of them to the United Kingdom and 93 to the Soviet Union. It credited the Allied convoy system, antisubmarine work, and the building method with outrunning sinkings. Losses, including marine casualties, equaled 39 percent of new construction in 1942, 11 percent in 1943, less than 8 percent in 1944, and 4 percent in 1945.
Dry-cargo ships, tankers, and smaller craft
About 75 percent of the vessels under administration control were Liberty-type ships, described as relatively slow vessels of 10,800 deadweight tons. Victory ship construction waited on turbines. The Commission put the design into production in November 1943, delivered the first, United Victory, on February 29, 1944, and let no further Liberty contracts after April 1944. The administration classed the Victory as an emergency ship of about the Liberty’s tonnage, with speeds of 15 to 17 knots, and said it supplanted Liberty building in 1945; the Commission described geared turbines of 6,000 or 8,500 horsepower as allowing up to 18.5 knots. Of the dry-cargo fleet as then constituted, about 24 percent could make 14½ knots or better, 74 percent could make 10 to 14.4 knots, and 2 percent was slower than 10 knots.
The remainder mixed Commission “C” types, from coastal ships of about 5,000 deadweight tons to C4 freighters of 13,500, with pre-1939 freighters, combination passenger-and-cargo ships, refrigerator ships, and bulk carriers. The administration counted roughly 20 major merchant, military, and emergency dry-cargo types and about 10 major tanker types. Many auxiliaries used by the United States Army and the United States Navy—troopships, cargo ships, modified tank carriers, and aircraft carriers—were completions or conversions of those designs rather than a separate merchant inventory.
Tankers were fewer and larger: principally standard “T” ships of 15,900 to 23,000 deadweight tons, emergency tankers on modified Liberty hulls, and privately built or pre-1939 ships. The illustrated standard was the T2 tanker, some of which also carried aircraft on a special deck. In fiscal 1945 the Commission delivered 217 tankers on merchant account and 38 as Navy oilers. At the small end, the administration’s service fleet was 48 seagoing tugs of the V4-M-A1 design, 4 tugs of miscellaneous types, 4 coastwise tugs, 37 harbor tugs, and 50 barges, scows, and heavy-lift derricks.
Conversions and maintenance
Repair moved with operations, so the Commission’s Division of Maintenance and Repair was transferred to the administration and enlarged, and a Division of Foreign Repairs and Salvage was added for overseas ports. The Maintenance and Repair Organization dated from May 7, 1942. An Office of Coordinator for Ship Repairs and Conversion in New York, joint with the Navy, fed work to repair yards across the country, with about 230 other firms on specialized jobs. That office also directed arming, degaussing against magnetic mines, winterizing for Arctic and North Russian runs, and extra water tanks where fresh water was scarce.
Conversions covered troop transports, hospital ships, and other special types, including Allied ships under lend-lease. The troop-carrier program fitted about 400 vessels, among them the liner George Washington and 97 Victory ships given prefabricated troop quarters, at about $290 million. Other jobs carried 300 to 600 mules, fitted Liberty ships first for prisoners of war and later as troop carriers, equipped several Liberties to lay hollow cable for a cross-Channel pipeline, and gave tankers gear for fueling warships at sea.
The Repair and Maintenance Organization handled more than 42,000 jobs at an approximate cost of $1,480,087,000: 36,476 on administration vessels, about $1,168,740,000, and 5,600 on foreign vessels under lend-lease, about $311,347,000. Contracts in Australia, Belgium, Egypt, England, and South Africa set rates comparable to each country’s own ships, and 62 engineering representatives supervised routine and battle-damage repairs from stockpiles that included gear taken off badly damaged vessels.
Personnel, training, and labor
Recruitment and manning
About 55,000 merchant seamen and officers were sailing in the United States Merchant Marine in December 1941, too few for the new ships or for the replacement of men lost at sea. In the spring of 1942, delays for want of crews averaged about 45 ships a month. The War Shipping Administration placed recruitment, training, and labor relations under one deputy administrator and kept crews in the civilian employment system of the industry, although the work was done under combat conditions. Its report to the President credited that arrangement with a peak seagoing force of 250,000.
The Recruitment and Manning Organization registered seamen with the United States Employment Service in September 1942, then recruited directly and with the Office of War Information and the National War Advertising Council. Nearly 100,000 experienced men working ashore were brought back. Public Law 87, enacted in the summer of 1943 with union and agency support, guaranteed seniority and reemployment rights to those who left shore jobs to return to sea. The Selective Service System authorized the organization to certify active seamen for occupational deferment.
It made 346,100 assignments to ships but hired only about a quarter of all seamen; operators and unions hired the rest, while standby pools and movement by rail, road, boat, and air covered last-minute gaps. Delays fell from 12 to 15 a fortnight in mid-1942 to two or three by the end of 1943, turnover dropped to less than one-fourth of the prewar rate, and most of the men the office repatriated from overseas signed on again.
Training programs
Training for officers and ratings had run since 1938 under the United States Maritime Commission as part of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. Executive Order 9083 of February 28, 1942, moved the United States Maritime Service, the cadet program, and federal supervision of state nautical schools to the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard. On July 11, 1942, Executive Order 9198, issued under the First War Powers Act, transferred those functions, with related records, property, funds, and most personnel, to the War Shipping Administrator; regular Coast Guard officers and enlisted men were not transferred.
Three units carried the expanded program. The Merchant Marine Cadet Corps trained deck and engine officers, chiefly at the United States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York, with basic schools at Pass Christian, Mississippi, and San Mateo, California. Cadets had to qualify as midshipmen in the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve and serve at sea, and the wartime course was shortened. Joseph B. Williams, who entered in 1943 and graduated in 1944, was the Academy’s first African American graduate.
The Maritime Service trained unlicensed deck, engine, and steward ratings at Sheepshead Bay, New York, and at Avalon, California, and St. Petersburg, Florida, with radio schools, license courses for men who already had sea time, upgrade schools, and training ships that included the Joseph Conrad and the American Mariner. Five state maritime academies, in California, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, stayed under federal supervision because they received federal funds.
From 1938 through December 1, 1945, the program graduated 31,986 officers—7,291 from the Cadet Corps, 21,988 from the Maritime Service, and 2,707 from the state academies—plus 7,727 radio operators, 150,734 unlicensed seamen, and 5,034 junior assistant purser-hospital corpsmen, within a reported total of 262,474 that also counted upgrade and specialist courses.
Unions, bonuses, and the Maritime War Emergency Board
When the fleet was requisitioned in April 1942, most seagoing personnel already belonged to maritime unions covered by collective-bargaining agreements. The Administration recognized those agreements and left ordinary hiring with the steamship companies acting as its general agents. The unions agreed not to strike for the duration, to strengthen the master’s authority, and not to change agreements without the Administration’s approval. The Administrator reported that there was not one strike in the maritime industry during the war and that, apart from a few isolated misunderstandings, labor disputes did not delay sailings. The industry pledge sat inside the broader no-strike, no-lockout commitment of the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and employers. Unions such as the Seafarers International Union of North America kept shipping men through union halls. A Maritime Labor Relations Organization represented the Administration on wages and conditions and dealt with the National War Labor Board.
Civilian status did not remove racial limits on command. Hugh Mulzac had held an unlimited master’s license since 1921 but, because of discrimination in hiring, had been denied a ship for more than twenty years and had worked largely as a steward. The Administration offered him the Liberty ship SS Booker T. Washington only if he recruited an all-Black crew; he refused what he called a Jim Crow ship, and the Administration then accepted a mixed crew of his choosing. The ship was launched on September 29, 1942.
War-risk pay had already been taken out of ordinary bargaining. On December 17, 1941, operators and unions met at a conference called by the Maritime Commission to stabilize compensation and insurance for seagoing personnel. The Maritime War Emergency Board was appointed on December 19, 1941, under the deputy administrator for labor relations, manning, training, and recruitment, with representatives of the United States Conciliation Service and the National War Labor Board. It set hazardous-duty bonuses, pay when a vessel was lost, reimbursement for lost effects, and war-risk insurance, including the Second Seamen’s War Risk Policy, and was not formally abolished until September 1, 1950. Under union scales described by the National WWII Museum, base pay ran about $87 to $100 a month, with another $100 a month in war zones, against $50 a month for an Army private.
Losses, defense, and insurance
Vessel and personnel losses
In a report to the President dated January 15, 1946, War Shipping Administrator Emory S. Land stated that, up to V-J Day, 733 American merchant vessels of more than 1,000 gross tons had been sunk by torpedoes, bombs, mines, and marine disasters largely caused by war conditions—more than half the tonnage of the prewar United States merchant marine. Hundreds of small craft were also lost, and other hundreds were damaged but survived attack. The report counted 5,638 merchant seamen and officers dead and missing and 581 prisoners of war, and said that through the first part of 1943 casualties among the seagoing force were proportionately greater than in all the armed services combined. Liberty ships took the brunt of enemy attack, and thousands more were injured or left in lifeboats and on rafts.
Those figures are not interchangeable with other counts. A United States Navy history of merchant-ship arming, using records through August 30, 1946, listed 482 U.S.-flag and 87 U.S.-owned foreign-flag ships lost among vessels it had armed, and 710 lost of 6,236 armed ships of all flags—a series that includes foreign-flag hulls and is not limited to American ships over 1,000 gross tons. A 2022 National World War II Museum account put deaths at 9,521 of about 243,000 mariners who served in World War II, above the 1946 count of dead and missing, and said the 733 ships were sunk by enemy attack rather than by the broader mix of war causes in Land's report.
Armament and the Naval Armed Guard
Section 6 of the Neutrality Act of 1939 prohibited arming American merchant ships during a proclaimed foreign war; Congress repealed that ban on November 17, 1941. The Navy began training gun crews about April 1941 and planned degaussing and preliminary fittings, but an Arming Merchant Ships Section in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations gave the program central direction only from January 31, 1942. Navy men of the United States Navy Armed Guard manned the principal guns and were responsible for the ship's defense, while merchant seamen passed ammunition and served lesser stations.
From December 7, 1941, to September 30, 1945, the Navy assigned 144,970 officers and enlisted men to the Armed Guard. It classified 1,683 as dead through September 30, 1945—1,326 from enemy action—and 127 as missing, and listed 27 as prisoners of war as of June 26, 1945. Through October 1, 1945, the records show 53,278 guns installed on merchant vessels and Army transports, mostly 20 mm guns together with 5-inch/38 and 3-inch/50 dual-purpose guns.
Land's report said a War Shipping Administration unit directed arming and defense installations, including degaussing against magnetic mines. National Archives Record Group 248 holds the records of Vice Admiral A. P. Fairfield, Coordinator of Ship Defense Installations, on arming merchant vessels and on antisubmarine, antitorpedo, antimine, and antiaircraft devices, 1941–47.
War-risk insurance and compensation
Executive Order 9054, issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on February 7, 1942, directed the Administrator to provide marine insurance and reinsurance against war risks under Title II of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, and transferred the Maritime Commission's insurance, operating, charter, repair, and requisition functions to him.
Public Law 523 of April 11, 1942, effective April 1, rewrote that subtitle and vested it in the War Shipping Administrator. It could insure war risks, and reinsure marine risks, when reasonable commercial cover was unavailable, when government rates would materially aid the war effort or the domestic economy, or when the service secretaries advised that coverage was militarily necessary. Policies could cover designated American and some foreign-flag vessels, cargo, freight, effects, death, injury, detention after capture, and customary liabilities, without cutting off seamen's existing legal rights. The agency set rates and settled claims, and suits proceeded under the Suits in Admiralty Act.
The 1946 report said the Administration kept insuring vessels, cargoes, crews, and service liabilities, while its share of cargo underwriting fell as requisitioning expanded and private war-risk rates dropped. Soon after V-J Day it cut the premium on seamen's individual war-risk life insurance from 50 cents to 25 cents per $1,000, supplementary to free Maritime War Emergency Board cover paying $5,000 for death and also paying for injury and lost effects. The account showed a deficit of more than $12 million in 1942 and, at the end of fiscal year 1945, a credit of $82,892,248 in receipts over paid and accrued liabilities.
Demobilization and abolition
Repatriation and the United Maritime Authority
In a report of January 15, 1946, Administrator Emory S. Land called the return of servicemen the War Shipping Administration's remaining postwar assignment and recorded 1,200 sailings in December 1945, against 800 in the busiest wartime months. The Administration reported 546 troop-return ships, able to carry 580,000 men, in a common pool with Army and Navy vessels, and said that from V-E Day to V-J Day the task was practically its own: more than 85 percent of returns through September 1, 1945, with most of the rest on British ships, including Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth. Ninety-seven Victory ships were fitted for 1,500 troops each, alongside more than 300 converted Liberty ships. From December 7, 1941, through November 30, 1945, American merchant ships, including liners turned over to the Army and Navy, carried the great majority of 7,129,907 Army personnel and 141,537 civilians sent overseas and of 4,060,888 Army personnel and 169,626 civilians who returned.
The Allied pool closed under an agreement signed in London on August 5, 1944, by the United States, the United Kingdom, and other governments. It created a United Maritime Council and Executive Board, with branches in Washington and London chaired by the War Shipping Administration and the British Ministry of War Transport, to operate from the general suspension of hostilities with Germany. Governments kept requisition powers and were not to release ships into nonessential work while tonnage was short. The agreement took effect on May 24, 1945, and was not to run beyond six months after the later suspension of hostilities in Europe or the Far East. Land wrote that the United Maritime Authority would dissolve the merchant-shipping pool on March 2, 1946, its termination date.
Return and disposal of vessels
Land wrote that ships would soon go back to their owners and that Congress was finishing a disposal law; with the pool's end, he said, government operation of the wartime fleet would close. The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, approved March 8, gave sales and charters of war-built ships to the United States Maritime Commission. Covered ships were oceangoing vessels of at least 1,500 gross tons, owned by the United States, built or contracted for from January 1, 1941, through September 2, 1945, or built and acquired between September 3, 1939, and that date. Qualified citizens could buy at 50 percent of a published prewar domestic cost for dry-cargo types and 87½ percent for tankers, adjusted for condition and war wear, ahead of foreign buyers.
After hostilities, the United States could operate ships commercially, itself or through agents, only as needed to hand them to private operators, apart from services otherwise authorized by law. Owners of eligible ships, including some United States-built tonnage taken or chartered after December 7, 1941, could exchange them for credit on a war-built purchase, less any restoration or cash already allowed so a ship could be redelivered under its charter. No sale or charter under the Act was to be made after December 31, 1947. Ships kept for defense after consultation with the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and ships still unsold on that date, with exceptions, entered a national defense reserve, withheld from trade except during a later requisition under section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
Statutory abolition and successors
Section 202 of the Navy appropriation for the year ending June 30, 1947 (chapter 543, approved July 8, 1946; 60 Stat. 501), which the National Archives calls the Naval Appropriations Act, ordered liquidation by December 31, 1946, of every function under Executive Orders 9054, 9350, 9387, 9495, and 9336. From September 1 through that December 31 only, the functions, funds, records, property, and personnel passed to the Maritime Commission on the terms that would have bound the Administration on August 30, 1946. The statute says the War Shipping Administration ceases to exist on September 1, 1946, and that any unobligated revolving-fund balance on December 31 is covered into the Treasury.
The Archives guide to Record Group 248 lists the Maritime Administration as successor, but the 1946 act gave the Commission only that liquidation. Reorganization Plan No. 21 of 1950, transmitted by President Harry S. Truman on March 13 and effective May 24, abolished the Commission. It placed a Federal Maritime Board in the Department of Commerce, independent of the Secretary on regulatory work, and a Maritime Administration in the same department. Remaining functions went to the Secretary for assignment to the Maritime Administrator, the Board chairman ex officio, and Commission records, property, personnel, and funds moved with them.
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