
Barry Nalebuff
Barry J. Nalebuff (born July 11, 1958) is an American economist and the Milton Steinbach Professor of Management at the Yale School of Management.
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Barry J. Nalebuff (born July 11, 1958) is an American economist and the Milton Steinbach Professor of Management at the Yale School of Management.
Barry J. Nalebuff (born July 11, 1958) is an American economist and the Milton Steinbach Professor of Management at the Yale School of Management. His teaching and research apply game theory to business strategy, negotiation, competition policy, and new consumer products.
He received S.B. degrees in economics and mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1980. As a Rhodes Scholar he completed an M.Phil. in 1981 and a D.Phil. in 1982 in economics at Nuffield College, University of Oxford; James Mirrlees supervised the dissertation “Prizes and Incentives.” He was a junior fellow of the Harvard Society of Fellows from 1982 to 1985 and an assistant professor of economics at Princeton University from 1985 to 1989. He joined Yale in 1989 and has held the Milton Steinbach chair since 1995. The Econometric Society elected him a fellow in 2024.
With Avinash Dixit he wrote Thinking Strategically (W. W. Norton, 1991) and The Art of Strategy (W. W. Norton, 2008). The Yale School of Management states that the two books have more than 400,000 copies in print. Co-opetition (Currency/Doubleday, 1996), written with Adam Brandenburger, looks past zero-sum games to the scope for cooperating while competing. With Ian Ayres he wrote Why Not? (Harvard Business School Press, 2003), a framework for ingenuity, and Lifecycle Investing (Basic Books, 2010), on retirement portfolios. Split the Pie (Harper Business, 2022) is based on his negotiation course at Yale. In “Bundling as an Entry Barrier” (The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2004), he argues that a firm with power in two goods can bundle them to deter a rival that sells only one.
In 1998 he and his former student Seth Goldman cofounded Honest Tea, a bottled-tea company. The Coca-Cola Company bought a 40 percent stake in 2008 and the remainder of the firm on March 1, 2011, without disclosing the price of that second step. He later cofounded Kombrewcha, a lightly alcoholic kombucha, and has worked with Goldman on Just Ice Tea. He serves on the boards of The Hershey Company, Calicraft, and Eat the Change, and advises the National Basketball Association in negotiations with the National Basketball Players Association.
Barry Nalebuff was born on July 11, 1958, and is a United States citizen. The New York Times of December 17, 1979, reporting the Americans just named Rhodes Scholars, listed him as Barry Nalebuff of Newton, Massachusetts, then a student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
As a high-school senior in the mid-1970s he visited Yale University as a prospective student and, encouraged by friends, entered an oratory contest normally limited to Yale undergraduates. He had not prepared a text and was not enrolled there, but he won, and Yale offered him admission. He chose MIT instead. He later said he had expected to become a mathematician, then decided he “didn’t quite have it, and the world doesn’t need any more pretty good mathematicians,” and that curiosity and facility with numbers led him into economics. In a 2011 alumni profile he said, “MIT is where I learned to think like an economist.”
He received degrees in economics and mathematics from MIT in 1980. His curriculum vitae records them as S.B. degrees and lists election to Phi Beta Kappa that year. At the undergraduate residence Senior House he met Helen Kauder, who earned an MIT degree in economics in 1982; they married ten years later. The December 1979 announcement placed him among 32 United States winners, alongside another Massachusetts student, Ronald Jacob Van de Krol of Peabody. The Times reported that each scholarship then provided £7,000, about $15,000, for two years at Oxford, up from £4,500 the previous year, a change William J. Barber, American secretary of the Rhodes Scholarship Trust Fund, attributed to new tuition charges.
The Rhodes Trust identifies him as “Massachusetts & Nuffield 1980.” His curriculum vitae dates the Massachusetts scholarship at Nuffield College to 1980–82 and records an M.Phil. in economics in 1981 and a D.Phil. in economics in 1982, both through the University of Oxford. It titles the dissertation “Prizes and Incentives,” names James Mirrlees as supervisor, and records the George Webb-Medley Thesis Prize for 1981.
The thesis is cited as a 1982 Nuffield D.Phil. in Nalebuff and Joseph Stiglitz’s 1983 article “Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition,” in the Bell Journal of Economics. Written with Nalebuff listed at Harvard University, the paper examines pay that depends on relative performance when effort cannot be observed directly. It argues that these schemes have desirable risk, incentive, and flexibility properties: rewards adjust automatically when a common change in the environment makes a task easier or harder for everyone, and, as the number of contestants becomes large, expected utility may approach the perfect-information benchmark. The authors thank Mirrlees among others for discussions and acknowledge support from the Rhodes Trust.
He was a Junior Fellow of the Harvard Society of Fellows. His curriculum vitae dates the fellowship to 1982–85 and the following appointment, assistant professor of economics at Princeton University, to 1985–89.
Nalebuff was an assistant professor of economics at Princeton University from 1985 to 1989. For 1988–89, Princeton’s Office of the Dean of the Faculty lists B. Nalebuff, in Economics, as the holder of an Arthur H. Scribner Preceptorship, under the university’s Bicentennial Preceptorships. Those preceptorships were endowed in 1950, when a bequest of Arthur H. Scribner, Class of 1881, was assigned to two positions bearing his name. Nalebuff’s curriculum vitae gives 1988–89 for a Bicentennial Preceptorship. The Yale School of Management faculty directory instead dates the preceptorship to 1989–1991.
In 1989 he moved to the School of Management as professor of economics and management, a title he held through 1995, when he became the Milton Steinbach Professor of Management, the chair he still holds. The Department of Economics at Yale University lists him as Milton Steinbach Professor of Management and Professor of Economics. His teaching there has been in negotiation, innovation, strategy, and game theory.
The vita lists a Sloan Fellowship for 1989–1991, spanning the change of universities, and a Miegunyah Fellowship at the University of Melbourne in 1998. It also records four associate editorships. He was an associate editor of World Politics from 1987 to 1989, during the Princeton appointment, and, beginning in 1989, of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (through 1996), The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization (through 2016), and the Journal of Conflict Resolution (through 2001).
The American Antitrust Institute lists his article “Exclusionary Bundling,” in The Antitrust Bulletin in 2005, among writings recognized with the Jerry S. Cohen Award for Antitrust Scholarship. The Institute hosts that award, which Cohen Milstein administers and which is given for antitrust writing from the prior year. Nalebuff’s vita dates the Jerry S. Cohen Memorial Fund Writing Award for the article to 2006; the School of Management directory lists 2005. In 2014 he and Ian Ayres received a Bernstein Fabozzi/Jacobs Levy award for an outstanding article in The Journal of Portfolio Management, for “Diversification Across Time,” published in the Winter 2013 issue.
On October 11, 2024, the Econometric Society announced that Nalebuff was one of 42 newly elected Fellows, with his affiliation given as the Yale School of Management. Founded in 1930 to advance economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics, the Society publishes Econometrica, Quantitative Economics, and Theoretical Economics. Candidates are nominated by members, Fellows, and a Fellows Nominating Committee, then elected by active Fellows. President Eliana La Ferrara said that election recognizes important contributions to economics and that the Fellows represent the Society’s highest authority. The class raised the number of Fellows elected since 1931 from 1,187 to 1,229. The Society’s current roster lists Nalebuff under Yale University, elected in 2024.
Nalebuff’s research in game theory and industrial organization concerns incentives when information is imperfect, aggregation of preferences, and bundling. Strategy books with Avinash Dixit and Adam Brandenburger, and the negotiation book Split the Pie, are treated in other sections.
His 1982 D.Phil. thesis at Nuffield College, Oxford, “Prizes and Incentives,” was supervised by James Mirrlees and received the George Webb-Medley Thesis Prize. It underlies the article with Joseph Stiglitz, “Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition” (Bell Journal of Economics 14, no. 1 (1983): 21–43). When effort is hard to observe and output is noisy, rank-order pay—contests and tournaments—adjusts automatically to a shock common to every contestant. Such schemes can beat piece rates when that uncertainty is large, and can approach the full-information outcome as the field grows.
With Christopher Bliss, he models when a private person supplies a public good: free-riding is less severe as more people might volunteer (Journal of Public Economics 25 (1984): 1–12). With John Riley, “Asymmetric Equilibria in the War of Attrition” (Journal of Theoretical Biology 113 (1985): 517–527) shows that if values are private, a payoff-irrelevant difference between players supports a continuum of asymmetric equilibria, one class aggressive and the other passive. “Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation” (Conflict Management and Peace Science 9, no. 2 (Spring 1986): 19–30) formalizes Thomas Schelling’s threat that leaves something to chance. In that equilibrium, the risk of inadvertent nuclear war does not depend on the rules of escalation, because the parties adjust when they concede. The deterrence papers continue with “Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World” (World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313–335).
With Andrew Caplin, aggregation results are applied to social choice and pricing. “On 64%-Majority Rule” (Econometrica 56, no. 4 (July 1988): 787–814) assumes Euclidean preferences and a concave density of ideal points. Some proposal is then unbeatable under a 64 percent rule, and cycles are ruled out. In n dimensions the critical majority is (1-(n/(n+1))^n), which rises toward (1-1/e). “Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem” (Econometrica 59, no. 1 (January 1991): 1–23), using theorems of Prékopa and Borell, extends Duncan Black’s median voter theorem: in several dimensions the mean voter’s ideal cannot be beaten at that supermajority. “Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the Existence of Equilibrium” (pp. 25–59) proves a pure-strategy price equilibrium for any number of firms and differentiated products, including multi-attribute goods, location models, and probabilistic choice.
“Bundling as an Entry Barrier” (Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 1 (February 2004): 159–187) treats bundling as a strategy against a one-product rival, not only as price discrimination. The example is a suite such as Microsoft Office. With independent valuations uniform on [0, 1], bundling raises monopoly profit only from 0.50 to about 0.544, but cuts a one-product entrant’s prospective profit by about 60 percent. Deterring entry more than doubles the incumbent’s profit; even if entry occurs, post-entry profit is more than 50 percent higher with the bundle. Discrimination works best when values are negatively correlated; deterrence works best when they are positively correlated. Because bundling also cushions the incumbent if a rival appears, the paper argues that it need not be sustained by commitment. He contrasts that effect with Chicago School doubts, in the line of Aaron Director and Edward Levi, that monopoly in one good can be leveraged into another.
Figure III from Nalebuff’s model plotting monopoly and entrant profits against bundle price.
“Exclusionary Bundling” (The Antitrust Bulletin 50, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 321–370) prices an A–B bundle so that an equally efficient rival selling only B cannot compete. Unlike predation, the firm need not sell below cost: it threatens a higher standalone price for A, which is not carried out if customers buy the bundle. Nalebuff calls this a horizontal price squeeze and rereads SmithKline v. Eli Lilly, Ortho v. Abbott, and LePage’s v. 3M in that light. It received the Jerry S. Cohen Award for Antitrust Scholarship. On November 29, 2006, he was a morning panelist at the joint Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission hearing on loyalty discounts under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act; the Division’s 2008 report cites his submission “Loyalty Rebates.”
Critics have argued that the models are context-specific. Timothy J. Brennan’s 2005 AEI-Brookings paper finds that, in the equilibria he calculates—including monopoly pricing after the second firm exits—both consumer welfare and total welfare rise, because the bundle introduces competition into the second market. He concludes that this does not justify generic opposition to bundling. Bruce H. Kobayashi’s survey (Journal of Competition Law & Economics 1, no. 4 (December 2005): 707–746) reports that most bundling models assume monopoly and restricted rivalry, omit ordinary efficiency reasons for the practice, and lack robustness checks or empirical tests. They can show harm, he writes, but not when harm outweighs benefits, and so are not yet a basis for antitrust standards—the position he identifies with the Solicitor General in 3M v. LePage’s.
With Einer Elhauge, “The Welfare Effects of Metering Ties” (Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 33, no. 1 (2017): 68–104) proves that ties which meter use lower consumer and total welfare unless they raise output of the capital good. With lognormal use independent of value per use, consumers lose even if output rises. Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and Lawrence Sullivan argued as amici in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. (2006) that a requirements tie can evidence market power. The Supreme Court noted the point but refused to presume market power from a patent, alone or together with such a tie.
With the economist Avinash Dixit, Nalebuff wrote two popular introductions that carried game theory beyond specialist journals. Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life, issued by W. W. Norton & Company in 1991, replaced proofs with examples from business, politics, sports, and ordinary life. They opened with a definition of strategic thinking as “the art of outdoing an adversary, knowing that the adversary is trying to do the same to you.”
The Art of Strategy: A Game Theorist’s Guide to Success in Business and Life (Norton, 2008) began as a revision and became a new book. In a preface dated October 2007, Dixit and Nalebuff wrote that they had intended only to update the 1991 text, then found that “most of the book is entirely new”—new applications, newer theory, and a different perspective—and that a new title was warranted. The shift they emphasized was from what they called a “zeitgeist” of self-centered competition toward the claim that “good strategy must appropriately mix competition and cooperation,” including lessons from behavioral game theory. They still refused an “airport book” of “seven steps for sure strategic success.” By then, they reported, Thinking Strategically had sold 250,000 copies, with Japanese and Hebrew translations among the bestsellers. They quoted Andrew St. George of the Financial Times, who in December 1991 had called the earlier book “a trip to the gym for the reasoning facilities.” Nalebuff’s Yale School of Management faculty page states that the two titles together have over 400,000 copies in print.
Reviewers treated the 2008 volume as a readable successor, not a technical treatise. Pat Gibbons, in The Irish Times, contrasted it with management books that sell fixed rules. He described three blocks of argument—the prisoner’s dilemma and the Nash equilibrium; credible commitments, threats, and promises; and topics such as voting, incentives, and bargaining—introduced through ten vignettes, from penalty shoot-outs to diplomacy. A Times Higher Education review the same year praised the illustrations and the light mathematics, then argued that rational optimization underplays habit, trust, power, emotion, and incomplete information, and that a subtitle promising a “guide to success” sits awkwardly beside the authors’ own disclaimer. The 1991 book has remained a course text. A 2025 Sungkyunkwan University short course, taught by a Loyola University Chicago professor, required the 1993 Norton paperback. In the later preface Dixit and Nalebuff also pointed readers to Thomas Schelling and to Michael Porter’s Competitive Strategy as earlier uses of game-theoretic ideas in conflict and business.
The cooperation theme became a separate book with Adam Brandenburger, then a professor at Harvard Business School. Their July–August 1995 article in the Harvard Business Review, “The Right Game: Use Game Theory to Shape Strategy,” argued that firms often gain more by changing the game than by playing a given contest more skillfully. It placed the firm in a “value net” of customers, suppliers, substitutors, and complementors—players whose products make one another’s more valuable, as hardware and software do. Five levers, labeled PARTS, were offered as ways to alter the game: players, added value, rules, tactics, and scope. Added value was the total created with a player in the game minus the total created without that player; in unrestricted bargaining, the claim was that no one can take more than they add. Co-opetition (Currency/Doubleday, 1996; 290 pages) gave each element of PARTS its own chapter and pressed the same double move: enlarge the pie, then bargain over shares, rather than treat business as a zero-sum sport.
Reviewers divided on novelty and evidence. Barbara Presley Noble, in strategy+business (1996), found the cases engaging, including a liquid-soap maker’s purchase of dispenser pumps to block copycats, but wrote that the authors never showed “what distinguishes game theory from good business sense,” and that “readers looking for science are likely to be disappointed.” J. Scott Armstrong, in the Journal of Marketing (April 1997), called the book important and already recommended it to students. He treated the named category of complementors as new and PARTS as a useful checklist, while judging much of the pricing and negotiation advice “old wine” next to earlier work such as Thomas Nagle’s The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing (1987). He also found the support largely anecdotal, doubted that real conflicts map cleanly onto formal games, and cited studies in which role-playing simulations forecast outcomes more accurately than thinking through the other side’s moves. “Games,” he concluded, “are not exactly like businesses.”
“The Rules of Co-opetition” (Harvard Business Review, January–February 2021) returned to deals between rivals. Brandenburger and Nalebuff wrote that such cooperation had been relatively rare in 1996 and had since become ordinary, citing Apple and Samsung, DHL and UPS, Ford and GM, and Google and Yahoo. The article asks whether a rival will take a refused deal, whether a distinctive capability is given away, how to set scope, control, and the division of gains—with antitrust risk if customers are not better off—and how to abandon a zero-sum mindset inside the firm. It restates the 1996 framework as a checklist and does not answer Armstrong on evidence or prediction.
Nalebuff’s writing on negotiation argues that parties usually divide the wrong amount. In Split the Pie: A Radical New Way to Negotiate (Harper Business, an imprint of HarperCollins, 8 March 2022), he defines the “negotiation pie” as the surplus created by agreement over each side’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement, or BATNA, the term from Roger Fisher and William Ury. His claim—a proposed fairness rule, not a description of how people bargain—is that both parties are necessary to create that surplus, so each should keep its BATNA and add half the pie.
If Alice and Bob agree, they receive a 12-slice pizza; if not, Alice gets four slices and Bob two. The agreement creates six slices. Splitting those equally gives Alice seven and Bob five. Nalebuff rejects both a split that copies the 4-to-2 fallback ratio and an even split of all twelve: the first, he argues, confuses power outside the deal with power over the surplus, and the second fails once a fallback exceeds half the pizza. He cites Nejat Anbarci and Nick Feltovich, who found an even split of the whole pizza 42 percent of the time when both fallbacks were at most six slices, and under 8 percent of the time once that split was worse than walking away. He has called a line in Getting to Yes—that relative power “depends primarily upon how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement”—a common misunderstanding, while keeping Fisher and Ury’s focus on interests rather than positions.
With Adam Brandenburger of the New York University Stern School of Business, he stated the rule in “Rethinking Negotiation” (Harvard Business Review, November–December 2021): the parties “have an equal claim on the pie, so it should be divided evenly,” whatever each can do alone. A public online course on the material is covered under Teaching.
“A Perspective-Invariant Approach to Nash Bargaining,” in Management Science (online 10 June 2020; January 2021, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 577–593), asks when Nash bargaining is unchanged if the problem is framed as gains from disagreement or as sacrifices from each ideal. On a linear frontier scaled so that disagreement is (0, 0) and each maximum gain is 1, equal gains and equal sacrifices coincide at a 50–50 split; on a nonlinear frontier the solution associated with John Nash is not invariant to the frame. Restricting independence of irrelevant alternatives to individually rational options inside each ideal, Nalebuff shows that any efficient perspective-invariant solution lies between relative utilitarianism and the equal-gain solution of Howard Raiffa and of Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky. Modified symmetry selects the first; a reciprocity axiom selects the second. In Coy’s account, Nalebuff treats Nash’s even split as applying to the surplus, not to the whole transaction.
Nalebuff has said he first used the logic in 2008, in Coca-Cola’s staged purchase of Honest Tea, which he cofounded with Seth Goldman. Coy’s column in The New York Times on 25 February 2022 quotes him that the parties agreed early “to the concept of splitting the pie,” which turned “the hard part” into “the easy part.” The price term in the book, as Theodore Kinni reports it, was a multiple of projected sales without Coca-Cola plus half that multiple on sales above the projection. The acquisition closed in 2011. The company history is under Entrepreneurship.
Michael Wheeler, on 11 April 2022, agreed that a better BATNA is not itself more power, but not that equal necessity requires an even split: on a $90 job neither teenager could get elsewhere, five hours and one hour would still pay $45 each. Walk-away options also change mid-negotiation, and relationship value is hard to price. Publishers Weekly called the book “thoughtful if uneven” and the hope that the other side will accept a principled stand “not one that’s amply supported”—“a handy addition to the negotiation toolkit rather than a universal truth.” Kinni’s objection is practical: a party that believes it is stronger may refuse the frame, as in Nalebuff’s accounts of talks with Nestlé USA and Tetley. Alexander Hoeppel, in Negotiation Journal (2022), credits the link among the BATNA, creating versus claiming value, and fairness, including for a weaker party, but doubts that an equal split is a fairness rule for every starting point when alternatives are not fully disclosed.
With Ian Ayres, of Yale University’s law school, Nalebuff wrote two books on producing ideas by set questions and on leveraged retirement saving.
Why Not? How to Use Everyday Ingenuity to Solve Problems Big and Small (Harvard Business School Press, 2003) and a “Why Not?” column in Forbes turn idea-generation into a short list of questions. His curriculum vitae lists an October 27, 2003, excerpt, “Ideas Waiting to Happen.”
In the Society for Judgment and Decision Making newsletter, Gregory Todd Jones described four tools. “What Would Croesus Do?” imagines an unlimited-money solution and then cheapens it; a Yale Alumni Magazine profile gives the case of a second, used set of textbooks kept at home. “Why Don’t You Feel My Pain?” looks for prices that internalize costs imposed on others. “Where Else Would It Work?” reuses an existing solution. “Would Flipping It Work?” inverts a practice: a reverse 900 number that pays the listener, or organ donation as the default rather than an opt-in.
A Boston Globe review, as quoted in the profile, called the book engaging but said some problems were too small and that larger ideas had “the ‘economist’s luxury’ of succeeding in theory while falling short in the face of perspiration and human nature.” Jones found the tool chapters repetitive. “Principled problem solving,” also a 2004 Scientific American Mind essay, keeps only constraints a real answer must meet. Four mutually equidistant seeds form a tetrahedron, not a square; a mortgage can hold the payment fixed as rates rise by extending the term, already done in the United Kingdom. Jones called the chapter little more than a lay guide to restricting the solution space.
That year he also co-edited Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz (MIT Press, 2003) with Richard Arnott, Bruce Greenwald, and Ravi Kanbur, marking Joseph Stiglitz’s 60th birthday after the 2001 Nobel Prize for work on imperfect information.
Lifecycle Investing: A New, Safe, and Audacious Way to Improve the Performance of Your Retirement Portfolio (Basic Books, 2010), again with Ayres, argues that spreading assets still bunches stock exposure late in life, because future contributions are hard to borrow against. Following Paul Samuelson and Robert C. Merton, it recommends as much as two dollars of stock per dollar saved when young, then a smaller equity share.
“Diversification Across Time” (Journal of Portfolio Management, Winter 2013) reports that a path from 200 percent in stock down to 50 percent matched the mean wealth of a constant 75 percent allocation on U.S. returns from 1871 through 2009, with a 21 percent smaller standard deviation, independent of the equity premium. A 37 percent certainty-equivalent gain at risk aversion of 4 persisted in Monte Carlo trials with a smaller premium, and leverage stopped at 2:1 once further borrowing grew costly. In 2014 the paper received a Bernstein Fabozzi/Jacobs Levy award as an outstanding article in the journal.
Speaking at Boston University in 2008, Samuelson warned that young people who “borrow heavily and go on margin” could be “knocked out of the game,” quoting Warren Buffett’s rule that one must first survive. Ayres and Nalebuff answered that his 1969 paper had allowed borrowing against future earnings, and that losing today’s savings would not stop later contributions. Dan Bortolotti, writing as Canadian Couch Potato, argued that double stock exposure in 2008–09 could wipe savers out and keep them out, and that margin loans or index futures are too easy to mismanage. Fredrick E. Vars, in a 2011 Vermont Law Review review titled “Don’t Try This at Home,” accepted the theory of temporal diversification but said risk aversion, the equity premium, future saving, and borrowing costs were too unstable for households, and that large short-term losses become more likely even if the long-run distribution improves. He pointed to a leveraged target-date fund or an adviser instead.
Seth Goldman, a former student of Nalebuff’s at the Yale School of Management, and Nalebuff founded Honest Tea in 1998 in Bethesda, Maryland. Goldman began in his kitchen with five borrowed thermoses; Nalebuff, then the company’s chairman, had been his business-school professor. The bottled teas were organic and less sweet than mainstream iced teas. Goldman later described the premise as “bottled tea that actually tastes like tea.” The Washington Post reported that by early 2008 the company had still not turned a profit.
In February 2008 The Coca-Cola Company bought 40 percent through its Venturing and Emerging Brands unit—that unit’s first investment—and received an option to buy the rest within three years. The price was not publicly disclosed. The Post, citing a person familiar with the deal, reported a $43 million investment that valued Honest Tea at more than $100 million; Reuters later described the 2008 purchase as about $43 million. Goldman stayed chief executive, and he, Nalebuff, and Gary Hirshberg of Stonyfield Farm kept three of five board seats. BevNET put the prior year’s sales at nearly $23 million.
On March 1, 2011, Coca-Cola acquired the remaining stake for an undisclosed sum. Goldman continued to run the business as an independent unit inside Coca-Cola and, the companies said, put most of his proceeds back into the brand. Gross sales were $71 million in 2010. Goldman told Reuters that whether the company’s approach would survive full ownership was “still a risk,” while saying Coca-Cola was brewing with fair trade tea and sweetening with organic cane sugar rather than high-fructose corn syrup.
In 2013 Goldman and Nalebuff published Mission in a Bottle, a graphic-format business memoir illustrated by Sungyoon Choi. Crown Business, a unit of Random House, released it on September 3. Goldman told The New York Times that people asked whether it was a graphic novel and that he answered it was “graphic, but not a novel.” The book covers the 1998 start through the 2011 sale, including a money-losing bottling plant, moldy tea, mismatched labels, and glass shards that together cost more than $1 million, plus a failed line of tea bags.
In May 2022 Coca-Cola said the Honest teas would leave its portfolio at the end of 2022. Honest Kids, which the company called quickly growing, would continue, and Coca-Cola would keep the Honest name and logo for possible licensing rather than sell the brand. Sabrina Tandon, group director for ready-to-drink tea in North America, said the cut would free investment and supply-chain capacity—the company had been unable to meet demand for Gold Peak—and that Gold Peak and Peace Tea were better placed to match what buyers wanted. For the 52 weeks ended April 17, 2022, IRI figures cited by BevNET put Honest Tea at about $40.6 million, Gold Peak above $470 million, Peace Tea near $95 million, and Honest Kids at $103 million. Goldman called the decision a “gut punch” and said his thoughts were with the organic and fair-trade farmers who had supplied the teas; readers of his post mourned the drinks.
In 2013 Nalebuff and Ariel Glazer launched Kombrewcha, a kombucha with about 2 percent alcohol, sold in five flavors and developed with a discontinued Honest Tea kombucha as a reference. BevNET reported that the two had met by chance in China, had been building the brand for about a year, and were aiming it at both beer drinkers and kombucha drinkers. In 2016 the company received investment from ZX Ventures, the innovation group of Anheuser-Busch InBev. Brewbound described the brand as Anheuser-Busch-backed; published accounts gave the year of the investment but not the terms of any outright sale. The alcohol level was later raised from 3.2 percent to 4.4 percent, packaging moved from bottles to cans, and distribution widened.
After the Honest Tea announcement, Goldman and the chef Spike Mendelsohn, who had started Eat the Change in 2020 to sell plant-based snacks, prepared another bottled tea, with Nalebuff joining the board and taking part in product development.
Just Ice Tea bottles in the six flavors sold when the line launched in September 2022.
Eat the Change raised $14.5 million and in September 2022 put Just Ice Tea on sale in 16-ounce glass bottles. Mendelsohn formulated six drinks—berry hibiscus, honey green, Moroccan mint, original green, peach oolong, and half tea and half lemonade—labeled USDA organic, from zero to 90 calories a bottle. Goldman said the line was “picking up where Honest Tea left off” on fair-trade, organic, lightly sweetened tea; Nalebuff said they did not want to leave customers “high and dry.”
Outside bottled drinks, Nalebuff developed Maker Overnight Oats, a just-add-milk breakfast mix that PepsiCo’s Quaker Oats Company agreed to market. The New Haven Independent reported that it reached stores in January 2018 and that Nalebuff’s title on the project was “chief troublemaker.”
Nalebuff’s work outside Yale University has included antitrust advice, presentations to competition agencies, and corporate directorships. In the European Commission’s review of General Electric’s proposed acquisition of Honeywell, he was an economic expert for GE–Honeywell before the Merger Task Force and assisted the companies’ analysis and responses; the bundling analysis was prepared with Patrick Rey, Carl Shapiro, Shihua Lu, and Greg Vistnes. A July 2001 Time account of the Brussels talks described him as a Yale economist who advised GE. On 3 July 2001 the Commission prohibited the acquisition, finding that it would create or strengthen dominant positions and that the remedies offered were insufficient. He later published “Bundling: GE-Honeywell (2001)” in The Antitrust Revolution (fourth edition, 2004; fifth edition, 2009).
The UK Department of Trade and Industry commissioned a monograph on bundling and tying. The case studies, written with David Majerus of Charles River Associates, appeared in February 2003 as DTI Economics Paper No. 1, Part 2. An archived Antitrust Division biography states that he has given expert testimony and seminars on antitrust matters to U.S. federal administrative agencies and to courts in Australia and Europe. On 29 November 2006 he was a morning-session panelist at a joint Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice hearing on loyalty discounts and on when single-firm conduct may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
With Ian Ayres and Lawrence Sullivan, he filed a 2005 amicus brief supporting Independent Ink in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. The Supreme Court of the United States, in its opinion of 1 March 2006, cited “Brief for Barry Nalebuff et al. as Amici Curiae” while rejecting a presumption of market power for requirements ties, and held that a patent on the tying product does not itself establish market power.
Yale’s faculty directory describes extensive consulting for multinational firms and states that he advises the National Basketball Association in its negotiations with the National Basketball Players Association; it does not describe the scope of that advice. A Yale Center for Business and the Environment profile, which still described a Nationwide directorship in the present tense, names American Express, GE, McKinsey & Company, Google, and Rio Tinto as consulting clients; those names are that profile’s examples, not a current client list.
The directory states that he serves on the boards of The Hershey Company, Calicraft, and Eat the Change. Common and Class B stockholders, voting together, elected him a Hershey director at the annual meeting on 6 May 2025. The proxy statement dated 25 March 2026 lists him, a director since 2025, on the Audit Committee and the Finance and Risk Management Committee, and states that the board has determined he qualifies as an “audit committee financial expert” under Securities and Exchange Commission rules. It also lists Eat the Change from October 2022, Calicraft Brewing Co. from January 2016, AGP from January 2017 to December 2024, and the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute from September 2000 to July 2024.
His curriculum vitae of 12 January 2022 treated as then current the chairmanship of Make Real Foods (from 2019), together with AGP Glass (from 2017), the leadership institute (from 2000), and Calicraft (from 2016). Earlier directorships on that CV are Honest Tea (chairman and cofounder, 1998–2011), Kombrewcha (chairman and cofounder, 2013–2016), Q Drinks (2014–2019), and Nationwide Mutual, printed as “2005–2108,” with 2108 a typographical error for 2018. A 2008 Nationwide Financial Services proxy stated that he had been a director of Nationwide Mutual since 2006; he appears on the board list in the 2017 annual report and not in the 2018 report. The faculty page also records past service at Q Drinks, Trader Classified Media, and AGP Glass, without dates for Trader Classified Media. The archived Justice Department biography additionally listed Bear Stearns Financial Products, spelled there “Bear Steams Financial Products.”
Barry Nalebuff is the Milton Steinbach Professor of Management at the Yale School of Management. The school’s faculty page states that, for thirty-six years, he has taught negotiation, innovation, strategy, and game theory there. A curriculum vitae dated January 12, 2022, lists Competitive and Cooperative Strategies, Negotiation, Problem Solving, Innovation, and an undergraduate game-theory course.
The 2026–2027 bulletin of Yale University lists him on three negotiation courses. MGT 408, Introduction to Negotiation, is a one-unit spring M.B.A. core course taught with Daylian Cain. MGT 515, Strategic Negotiations, is a one-unit course in the Master of Management Studies program in public education management. MGT 882, Advanced Negotiations, is a one-unit elective, also with Cain. The faculty page describes an online version of the negotiation course, offered free on Coursera under the title “Introduction to Negotiation: A Strategic Playbook for Becoming a Principled and Persuasive Negotiator.” Yale Online, which dates the course to August 3, 2015, and lists it as nine weeks or about 31 hours, says participants negotiate case studies with other learners and discuss preparation, ultimatums, expanding the gains from an agreement, bargaining with little power, negotiation by email, and gender differences, along with further sessions from Linda Babcock, Herb Cohen, and John McCall MacBain.
Earlier accounts describe a wider set of classes. In March 2001 the Yale Daily News reported that he taught business strategy, decision analysis, and game theory at the management school and had offered an undergraduate course called “Thinking Strategically” the year before. A biographical note prepared for a Federal Communications Commission proceeding in 2002 said he also taught negotiation strategy at Yale Law School and an undergraduate course on political theory in the Ethics, Politics, and Economics program, as well as mergers and acquisitions, political-economic marketing, and decision-making at the management school. Neither the law-school course nor the Ethics, Politics, and Economics course appears on the 2022 vita or in the 2026–2027 management-school course lists. A May/June 2004 Yale Alumni Magazine profile followed him from a public talk to an evening class and described a bargaining class built around Holland Sweetener’s challenge to Monsanto’s NutraSweet business: he asked students how the entrant might have secured payment and a share of the market from buyers before spending money on a factory.
The faculty page says his book Split the Pie is based on the negotiation course at the School of Management. The same page states that the Coursera course has 600,000 active learners and the second-highest rating on the platform; those figures are Yale’s characterization, not a separate published ranking. Coursera’s course page, as retrieved in October 2026, showed 700,707 enrollments and an average rating of about 4.84 from 5,230 ratings.
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