Pierre-André Chiappori

Pierre-André Chiappori (born 5 August 1955 in Monaco) is a French and Monegasque economist. He is the E. Rowan and Barbara Steinschneider Professor of Economics at Columbia University, a chair he has held since 2005. His research concerns household behavior, risk, insurance and contract theory, general equilibrium, and mathematical economics.

In “Rational Household Labor Supply” (Econometrica, 1988), he replaced the representation of the household as the maximizer of a single utility function with a two-member collectivity that takes Pareto-efficient decisions, and derived restrictions on observed labor supply that can be tested. A 1992 article in the Journal of Political Economy, “Collective Labor Supply and Welfare,” developed the welfare content of that approach, including a sharing rule for the division of resources inside the household. With Martin Browning and Yoram Weiss he published Economics of the Family (Cambridge University Press, 2014). Matching with Transfers (Princeton University Press, 2017), in the Gorman Lectures series, sets out equilibrium tools for matching when partners can make transfers.

Admitted in 1974 to both the École polytechnique and the École normale supérieure, he entered the latter. He received a master’s degree in mathematics from the University of Paris 7 in 1975, a graduate diploma in statistics from the University of Paris 6 in 1976, passed the agrégation in mathematics (probability option) in 1977, and received a doctorate in economics from Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne in 1981. He taught at Paris 1, became a maître de conférences at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales in 1985, and from 1988 to 1997 was a researcher and then research director at the French National Centre for Scientific Research, while also teaching at the École polytechnique (1989–1997) and at ENSAE (1992–1997). The University of Chicago appointed him professor in 1997, and he took the Columbia chair in 2005. He was co-editor of the Journal of Political Economy from 2001 to 2005.

He has been a fellow of the Econometric Society since 1995, of the European Economic Association since 2004, and of the Society of Labor Economists since 2009. The Académie des sciences morales et politiques elected him on 26 June 2017 to the section for political economy, statistics and finance, in the seat left vacant by the death of Pierre Bauchet, and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences elected him in 2020. Prince Albert II appointed him Counsellor of Government–Minister of Finance and the Economy of Monaco; he took office on 18 March 2024, succeeding Marco Piccinini, who had held the post on an interim basis after Jean Castellini stepped down. Frédéric Cottalorda succeeded him on 1 April 2026.

Early life and education

Birth and citizenship

Pierre-André Chiappori was born on 5 August 1955 in Monaco. He holds French and Monegasque citizenship, a dual nationality recorded both by the Académie des sciences morales et politiques and on his own curriculum vitae.

Speaking at Chiappori’s reception under the dome of the Institut de France, and in a text later printed in the Journal de Monaco, Prince Albert II described the family as long rooted in the principality and close to his own. He said Chiappori came from four generations of architects, and from sailors, and that Chiappori’s father had been architect of the Prince's Palace of Monaco for nearly forty years, building a new wing of the palace at the request of Prince Rainier III. The prince also recalled a childhood spent in the same sporting circles in Monaco: both had practiced judo at the club there, and both had had the footballer and manager Michel Hidalgo as a coach.

Albert II identified Chiappori’s wife as Kristina Orfali, whom he described as having entered the École normale supérieure after Chiappori and as a professor of bioethics. Chiappori’s curriculum vitae states that he is married and has one child; it does not name his spouse or the child.

Mathematical training

Before the entrance examinations, Chiappori followed the classes préparatoires aux grandes écoles at the Lycée Masséna in Nice. In 1974 he was admitted both to the École normale supérieure and to the École polytechnique, and he chose the École normale supérieure. He was a student there from 1974 to 1979. In the 2019 address, Prince Albert II called him the first Monegasque admitted to the school.

The university diplomas of those years were in mathematics and statistics. In 1975 he received a maîtrise in mathematics from the University of Paris VII, which his curriculum vitae lists as a master’s degree. In 1976 he completed a diplôme d’études approfondies (DEA), the postgraduate research diploma that then preceded a French doctorate, in statistics at the University of Paris VI. In 1977 he passed the agrégation in mathematics, in the probability option, the national competitive examination for professeurs agrégés.

Doctorate in economics

The shift from mathematics to economics came while he was still at the École normale supérieure. In 1978, a year after the agrégation and a year before the end of his time as an ENS student, he took a second DEA, this one in economics, at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

In 1981 he received the doctorat de sciences économiques from the same university. His curriculum vitae gives the degree as a doctorate in economic sciences and equates it with a PhD in economics. The academy’s biographical notice uses the same outline and no further detail: success in the 1974 concours, the choice of the École normale supérieure, the 1977 agrégation in mathematics, and the 1981 doctorate at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. Neither that notice nor the curriculum vitae records the title of the thesis or the name of its supervisor.

Academic career

Appointments in France

Chiappori’s first faculty post was at Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University, where he was an assistant professor from 1980 to 1984. The Académie des sciences morales et politiques records that this teaching at Paris 1 came before his appointment, in 1985, as maître de conférences at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), a post he held through 1988.

He then joined the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS). He was a chargé de recherche from 1988 to 1991 and, from 1991 to 1997, directeur de recherches (senior researcher) at DELTA, the Département et laboratoire d’économie théorique et appliquée; the Académie describes the CNRS appointment, first as chargé and then as directeur de recherches, as running from 1988 to 1997. DELTA was a joint unit of the CNRS, the École normale supérieure, and EHESS, formed in 1988 by the merger of the Centre d’économie quantitative et comparatrice and the Laboratoire d’économie politique, and on 1 January 2005 it was absorbed into Paris-Jourdan Sciences Économiques.

The research posts overlapped with teaching at two grandes écoles. From 1989 to 1997 he was maître de conférences at the École polytechnique. From 1992 to 1997 he was professor of economics at ENSAE (École nationale de la statistique et de l’administration économique) and holder of the Chaire d’économie de l’assurance, a chair in the economics of insurance associated with the Fédération française des sociétés d’assurances (FFSA).

University of Chicago

In 1997 he left those French appointments for a professorship in the economics department of the University of Chicago, which he held until 2005. The biographical note issued when Université Laval later awarded him an honorary doctorate states that the Chicago appointment came at the invitation of Nobel laureate Gary Becker. In a 2010 interview, Chiappori said Becker telephoned after hearing a keynote Chiappori delivered at a European conference in 1992, told him it would be an honor to have him at Chicago, and that the offer included a position for his wife, the medical ethicist Kristina Orfali.

During the Chicago professorship he was co-editor of the Journal of Political Economy from 2001 to 2005. Shorter visits in those years included March 2003 as Martha and Jonathan Cohen Distinguished Visitor at the Penn Institute for Economic Research, and, in May 2005, a Lansdowne scholarship at the University of Victoria and a Woodard summer visit at the University of British Columbia.

He remained connected to Chicago institutions after leaving the department. In February 2009 he was the first visiting fellow of the Milton Friedman Institute. Since 2011 his curriculum vitae has listed him as a distinguished fellow of the Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics; the institute also describes him as a Thornber Fellow and records visits on 19–25 October 2015, 27–31 October 2016, 29 April–6 May 2018, and 3–10 June 2018. The Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Global Working Group lists him as network leader of its Family Inequality network, and his CV states that since 2010 he has had charge of that group’s program on household decision-making.

Columbia University

He was a visiting professor in Columbia’s economics department in 2004–2005 and, from 2005, the E. Rowan and Barbara Steinschneider Professor of Economics at Columbia University. The department’s faculty page lists him in that chair. The Becker Friedman Institute and the HCEO directory date his Columbia faculty membership from 2004, the start of the visiting year rather than of the named professorship. A September 2005 New York magazine profile of the department’s hires that year described him as coming from Chicago, reported that his frequent coauthor Bernard Salanié had expected him to accept a Columbia offer, and said that Orfali, a bioethicist, had also been appointed at Columbia.

Later visits, while he was based at Columbia, include June and July 2010 as a visiting professor in the department of mathematics and the Laboratoire Dieudonné at Université Nice-Sophia-Antipolis, and March 2017 as a visiting professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. His January 2019 CV listed a visiting professorship at the Toulouse School of Economics from that year; the appointment is not on the March 2022 CV.

Separately from the chair, the December 2022 NBER Reporter listed him among directors by university appointment at the National Bureau of Economic Research, for Columbia; his CV dates that role from 2015.

Collective models of the household

The unitary model and collective rationality

Empirical work long treated the multi-person household as one decision maker with a single utility function. In that unitary representation, associated with Paul Samuelson's household welfare index and with Gary Becker's analysis of the family, members pool income, so only total resources enter demands, and the household Slutsky matrix is symmetric and negative semidefinite. Samuelson's index assumes weights independent of prices and incomes, and Becker's rotten-kid theorem requires restrictive conditions such as transferable utility. A late-1970s reform in the United Kingdom that moved a child allowance toward mothers was followed by higher spending on women's and children's clothing relative to men's, which is inconsistent with pooling.

Chiappori's "Rational Household Labor Supply" (Econometrica, 1988) kept individual preferences and replaced the household utility function with Pareto efficiency alone, without a bargaining protocol. In a three-good problem in which only aggregate consumption and each member's labor supply are observed, efficiency restricts those labor supplies. For egoistic agents, who care only about own leisure and consumption, the restrictions are parametric and nonparametric; with altruism, nonparametric restrictions remain and resemble conditions on aggregate demand. Unlike Nash bargaining models that specify a threat point, the restriction is efficiency alone.

Martin Browning and Chiappori carried the same idea to commodity demand. For a couple, the pseudo-Slutsky matrix equals a symmetric negative-semidefinite matrix plus a matrix of rank at most one: the symmetric part is the price effect at a fixed Pareto weight, and the rank-one part is the movement of that weight along the Pareto frontier. Unitary symmetry is the case in which the weight does not vary, and the rank condition is locally sufficient for a collective representation when no distribution factors are present. Those factors—variables that shift power but enter neither preferences nor the budget—must move all demands proportionally. On expenditure data for childless couples in Canada, symmetry was rejected while the rank-one restriction was not; symmetry was not rejected for people living alone.

Labor supply and the sharing rule

In "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare" (Journal of Political Economy, 1992), efficiency has an equivalent two-stage form: members divide nonlabor income by a sharing rule, then each chooses own labor supply and private consumption. With private consumption and egoistic preferences, one person's labor supply depends on the other's wage only through that person's share. Labor supplies then recover preferences and the sharing rule up to an additive constant, and distribution factors are not required for that result.

With arbitrary public goods and externalities, the decision process is not identified from household demands. When all goods are private, three demands and at least one distribution factor identify the sharing rule up to a price function homogeneous of degree one, and so up to a constant if prices do not vary. Exclusive goods, consumed by only one person, identify the slopes from fewer demands: leisure does so in the labor-supply model, and men's and women's clothing can be treated as exclusive or as one assignable good. The level is not recovered, and with public goods the rule ceases to be a satisfactory measure of power.

Browning, François Bourguignon, Chiappori, and Valérie Lechene applied the framework to childless Canadian couples, using clothing as the exclusive goods. Relative incomes mattered for couples' clothing demands but not, in the same way, for singles, and the sharing rule depended on the income gap, the age gap, and total expenditure. The level was normalized so that the wife's share is one-half at the mean. Moving her share of gross income from one-quarter to three-quarters raised her expenditure share by about 2.3 percentage points, while a 60 percent rise in total expenditure raised it by about 12 points; predicted shares lay between about 40 and 60 percent.

Tests, extensions and criticism

Harold Alderman, Chiappori, Lawrence Haddad, John Hoddinott, and Ravi Kanbur wrote in the 1995 World Bank Research Observer that unitary evaluations can miss responses inside the household, including food shifted away from a child who receives a supplement and crop choices that follow who controls the proceeds. They suggested treating collective models as the default and the unitary model as a special case, while noting that the contrary evidence still needed reinforcement. Bernard Fortin and Guy Lacroix generally rejected income pooling and cross-wage symmetry on Canadian census data, but did not reject the collective restrictions for couples without preschool children.

Christopher Udry notes that standard household models assume Pareto-efficient allocations and, with plot data from Burkina Faso, rejects that assumption: women's plots were farmed less intensively than similar plots controlled by men in the same household, implying an output loss of about 6 percent. Esther Duflo and Udry, using rainfall shocks in rural Côte d'Ivoire, rejected the restriction that plot income should affect spending only through total outlay; the rejections lined up with separate accounts rather than one Pareto program.

Household production further limits what market hours identify. Patricia Apps and Ray Rees argued in 1997 that counting nonmarket time as leisure omits domestic output and weakens the 1992 recovery of the sharing rule. Chiappori's companion paper shows that, once production is included, recovery generally needs further restrictions on preferences and technology. If domestic time is observed and the domestic good is tradable, preferences and the rule can still be recovered; if it is not tradable, the shadow price is household-specific and identification is incomplete.

Noncooperative models abandon efficiency. Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak take the threat point to be a noncooperative equilibrium inside marriage, divided into separate spheres, so the recipient of a transfer can matter even if divorce is not the outside option. In a voluntary-contributions Nash equilibrium, members typically finance different public goods, or at most one in common; when both contribute to the same good, demands are locally independent of the income split, and the resulting system need not satisfy the collective rank restriction.

Matching and the economics of the family

Equilibrium matching with transfers

Chiappori treats the marriage market as frictionless. A matching is stable when nobody prefers to remain single and no unmatched pair could both gain by matching, possibly after a transfer. Under transferable utility the surplus from a match splits at a constant rate, so the Pareto frontier is a straight line of slope minus one. Stability is then equivalent to maximization of aggregate surplus—an optimal transport problem—and the division of surplus is an equilibrium outcome rather than a primitive. If utility is only imperfectly transferable, that exchange rate depends on the environment and surplus maximization no longer characterizes stability.

If transfers are impossible, payoffs are fixed and one partner cannot bid by giving up some of their own gain. A stable matching can then be found by the Gale–Shapley algorithm, and the preference of everyone for a higher-type spouse is enough for perfectly positive sorting. With transfers, sorting depends on how the extra willingness to bid varies with one's own type: supermodularity of the surplus favors positive sorting, and the opposite curvature can produce negative sorting. Reallocating private consumption, time, or household public goods changes the distribution of utility inside a couple, so Chiappori treats a ban on transfers as a poor description of marriage.

Matching with Transfers: The Economics of Love and Marriage (Princeton University Press, 2017), in the Gorman Lectures in Economics series, sets out this one-to-one theory with family formation as the main application. The lectures were given at University College London in May 2013. With Yeon-Koo Che and Bernard Salanié, Chiappori edited the Handbook of the Economics of Matching for Elsevier. A curriculum vitae of March 2022 still listed it as forthcoming. Volume 1, on matching with transfers, was published on 5 December 2024 and includes a chapter by Chiappori and Corinne Low on frictionless one-to-one theory; Volume 2, on matching without transfers, appeared in 2025. A 2016 survey with Salanié in the Journal of Economic Literature notes that partners' observed characteristics alone do not identify the surplus.

Assortative matching and inequality

The 2017 book starts from two United States trends: rising income inequality, linked in part—but not mainly—to single-parent households and stronger assortative matching, and a gender reversal in higher education. Following Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, women in the United States from cohorts born around 1970 have had higher college graduation rates than men, while postgraduate attainment rose sharply for women and not for men. A larger share of similarly educated couples need not mean that the gain from sorting rose, because education distributions changed, and equivalence scales miss inequality inside the couple.

With Monica Costa Dias, Costas Meghir, and Hanzhe Zhang, Chiappori compares indices that separate those mechanical effects from changes in match surplus. In the Journal of Political Economy (2025), different indices can rank the same shift in opposite directions. Under their axioms the two-type odds ratio is independent of the type distributions, and in the separable transferable-utility model of Eugene Choo and Aloysius Siow it estimates the average gain per couple from assortative relative to non-assortative matching. On the March Current Population Survey, for married and cohabiting people aged 35–44, indices satisfying those axioms show that educational assortativeness rose between the 1950s and 1970s birth cohorts at the top of the distribution but fell between college graduates and postgraduates. For the United Kingdom, a Fiscal Studies paper with Costa Dias, Sam Crossman, and Meghir (2020) uses the Labour Force Survey and finds no clear change in assortativeness between the 1945–54 and 1965–74 cohorts. Sorting pushed household earnings inequality up slightly; rising attainment worked to reduce it.

Related papers tie sorting to investment. With Bernard Salanié and Yoram Weiss, in the American Economic Review (2017), children's human capital is a public good produced with parental time and the parents' own human capital. Higher returns lead high-income couples to spend more time with children, reinforcing assortative matching. In a Choo–Siow framework estimated on U.S. marriages for people born in 1943–72, the preference for a same-education partner rose among white people, especially the highly educated, but not among black people, and the marital college-or-more premium rose for women but not for men. With Murat Iyigun and Weiss (2009), schooling also has a marriage-market return, its effect on the share of surplus one can extract; differences by gender in wages or household roles can produce mixed matches and, as home-production time falls, more schooling by women than by men. With Sonia Oreffice and Climent Quintana-Domeque the same approach recovers trade-offs between body mass and education (2012) and between education and smoking (2018). The market determines the sharing rule from outside options, which a collective model of an already formed household takes as given.

Economics of the Family

Economics of the Family (Cambridge University Press, 2014), by Martin Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss, is a graduate survey in the Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature series. Partners may differ in their objectives over consumption, work, and fertility. The first half develops household models, centered on the collective model of Pareto-efficient outcomes and its testable restrictions. The second half covers who marries whom, matching with and without frictions, within-family transfers, and the implications for marriage, divorce, fertility, schooling, and children. Under transferable utility the spouse and the division of surplus are determined together, and that division is what the collective model represents by the partners' Pareto weights.

Insurance and contract theory

Testing asymmetric information

With Bernard Salanié, Chiappori treated insurance as a setting for contract theory in which coverage, premiums, and claims are recorded in standardized files. Under competition, they argued, relevant private information implies a positive correlation between coverage and ex post risk once every priced characteristic is held fixed. The correlation can come from adverse selection or from moral hazard, and it does not require the full separating menu of the Rothschild–Stiglitz model, in which Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz showed that competition rations low-risk buyers.

"Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets" (Journal of Political Economy 108, no. 1, 2000, pp. 56–78) applies the test to French automobile insurance. On about 6,000 beginning drivers, with bivariate probits and nonparametric checks inside cells defined by observables, Chiappori and Salanié found no residual correlation between the contract and an accident. Later automobile studies mostly agree, and a correlation can be spurious if the insurer's classification is omitted.

With Bruno Jullien, Bernard Salanié, and François Salanié, "Asymmetric Information in Insurance: General Testable Implications" (The RAND Journal of Economics 37, no. 4, 2006, pp. 783–798) replaces that correlation with a broader inequality. Under weak conditions on preferences, and if profits do not rise with coverage, more coverage should bring higher expected indemnities. Applying it to claim sizes, and to how profits moved with coverage, they later reported clear departures from perfect competition; market power, or risk aversion that is private and negatively related to risk, can remove the simple correlation.

Cohen and Siegelman conclude that a coverage–risk correlation appears in some markets and policy pools and not in others, so the French automobile result does not generalize. In United Kingdom annuities, Amy Finkelstein and James Poterba find that buyers of a payment to the estate after an early death tended to die sooner, and that longer-lived buyers were more likely to choose back-loaded policies, rather than simply buying larger annuities. In health insurance, Cohen and Siegelman report that Cutler and Zeckhauser found adverse selection across many plan-choice studies. The sign is not uniform. In U.S. long-term care insurance, Finkelstein and Kathleen McGarry find offsetting private information: buyers who know they are high risk, and buyers with a strong taste for insurance who turn out lower risk, so that more coverage is not, in aggregate, higher risk. Fang, Keane, and Silverman report a negative correlation in Medigap.

Risk sharing and repeated moral hazard

A cross-section correlation does not separate selection from behavior. With Jaap Abbring, James Heckman, and Jean Pinquet, Chiappori used experience rating: under moral hazard a claim that raises future premiums should lower later claim intensity (negative occurrence dependence), while a fixed hidden type should not. The point is made in "Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?" (Journal of the European Economic Association 1, nos. 2–3, 2003, pp. 512–521) and in "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data" (1, no. 4, 2003, pp. 767–820). On French automobile contracts, Abbring, Chiappori, and Pinquet found no evidence of moral hazard.

"Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets," with Inés Macho, Patrick Rey, and Salanié (European Economic Review 38, no. 8, 1994, pp. 1527–1553), asks when spot contracts can implement the optimal long-term contract. That requires a renegotiation-proof long-term optimum and spot contracts that smooth consumption; access to credit affects both. If repetition creates hidden information at recontracting, the renegotiation-proof contract implements only minimum effort unless savings are randomized.

With Franck Durand and Pierre-Yves Geoffard, Chiappori used a 1993 French change after which some complementary health insurers raised deductibles and others did not. General-practitioner home visits fell where coverage changed and not where it stayed the same ("Moral hazard and the demand for physician services," European Economic Review 42, 1998, pp. 499–511).

Insurance volumes and policy implications

Risque et assurance (Flammarion, 1997) is listed in Chiappori's curriculum vitae, and in the notice of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques, as the recipient of the 1997 CHEA award for the best book on insurance.

With Christian Gollier he edited Competitive Failures in Insurance Markets: Theory and Policy Implications (MIT Press, 2006), a CESifo volume that his bibliographies also list as Insurance: Theoretical Analysis and Policy Implications. The publisher's summary treats adverse selection and moral hazard as reasons diversifiable risks stay uninsured and as a case, made in the book, for public intervention; chapters cover health and other lines in Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States, and Chiappori's "The Welfare Effects of Predictive Medicine" is on pages 55–78. The Académie notice and the curriculum vitae record the 2008 Kulp-Wright Book Award of the American Risk and Insurance Association.

Their chapter in Georges Dionne's Handbook of Insurance (Springer, 2013) surveys these tests for static and dynamic data and for exclusive and non-exclusive contracts.

General equilibrium and mathematical economics

Aggregation and demand

The law of demand need not hold for one consumer, because income effects can outweigh substitution, so monotonicity of market demand can be a product of aggregation. In "Distribution of Income and the 'Law of Demand'" (Econometrica 53, 1985, pp. 109–127), Chiappori gave sufficient conditions for decreasing aggregate demand curves when consumers are identical, restricting the form of Engel curves and the distribution of expenditures. Most empirical Engel-curve specifications fall in that class, and he tested the distributional conditions.

With Jean-Charles Rochet, "Revealed Preferences and Differentiable Demand" (Econometrica 55, 1987, pp. 687–691) treats finite data. The strong axiom of revealed preference yields a concave rationalizing utility, but the same bundle at two prices forces a kink. If distinct prices also yield distinct bundles, there is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, infinitely differentiable utility, defined on a compact set containing the observations, that rationalizes the data.

Sunspot equilibria

David Cass and Karl Shell defined a sunspot equilibrium as a rational-expectations equilibrium driven by a random variable that does not affect preferences, endowments, or technology. Such equilibria are ruled out by complete markets with full participation, but not by an overlapping-generations model. Chiappori and Roger Guesnerie examined endogenous fluctuations under rational expectations in the European Economic Review (32, 1988, pp. 389–397).

"Rational Random Walks" (The Review of Economic Studies 60, 1993, pp. 837–864), again with Guesnerie, constructs equilibria that move like a random walk between two steady states. In a simple overlapping-generations economy, the pure sunspot case needs no backward-bending labor supply, and the equilibria persist when shocks are real.

Work with Ivar Ekeland

With Ivar Ekeland, Chiappori asked when a vector field is a sum of gradients of indirect utilities. Using exterior differential calculus in the sense of Élie Cartan, "Aggregation and Market Demand: An Exterior Differential Calculus Viewpoint" (Econometrica 67, 1999, pp. 1435–1458) shows that any analytic map on (n)-dimensional space obeying Walras's law is locally the sum of (n) utility-maximizing market demands, for any price-dependent income distribution; if incomes may be chosen, (n/2) agents suffice.

"Individual Excess Demands" (Journal of Mathematical Economics 40, 2004, pp. 41–57) shows that homogeneity, Walras's law, and a variant of the Slutsky conditions characterize one consumer's excess demand, yet one such function fits a continuum of direct utilities. The argument shortens the proof of the Sonnenschein–Mantel–Debreu theorem on aggregate excess demand in general equilibrium theory. The Economics and Mathematics of Aggregation: Formal Models of Efficient Group Behavior (Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 5, 2009, pp. 1–151) sets out the same decomposition for efficient groups and for market economies. With François Bourguignon and Patrick Rey, Chiappori also published Théorie microéconomique, tome 1: L'équilibre concurrentiel (Fayard, 1992), on the consumer, the producer, and competitive equilibrium.

Editorial work and professional service

Journal editing

The University of Chicago’s Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Global Working Group notes that Chiappori has edited journals including the Journal of Political Economy. His March 2022 curriculum vitae dates a co-editorship of that journal to 2001–2005. It also lists an associate editorship of the Review of Economics of the Household from 2002; associate editorships of the European Economic Review (1989–1996) and Ricerche Economiche (1990–1996); a co-editorship of Foundations and Trends in Economic Theory from 2004; an invited co-editorship, in 2004, of an issue the vita calls the inaugural issue of the Journal of the European Economic Association; membership of the panel of Economic Policy (1988–1990); an associate editorship of The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory from 1998; and the American Economic Review Excellence in Refereeing Award for 2009 and 2014.

That Geneva title was used until June 2005, when the journal became The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, the academic journal of the Geneva Association. Chiappori, of Columbia University, remains an associate editor. He is not on the current associate-editor list of the Review of Economics of the Household.

Conferences and scientific councils

The European Economic Association lists him on its Council from 1993 to 1997. The 2022 vita records Econometric Society program committees for the European meetings of 1987 (Copenhagen), 1994 (Maastricht), 1996 (Istanbul), and 1997 (Toulouse), the 2000 World Congress in Seattle, and the 2002 North American Congress in Los Angeles, plus European Economic Association congresses in Bologna (1988), Lisbon (1990), and Cambridge (1991) and the Society of Labor Economists’ 2010 London conference. It also calls him chair of the 2018 Walras–Bowley selection committee; director since 2010 of the Chicago group’s Household Decision Making program; head, in 2011–2018, of a household program it places at Georgia Tech’s Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk; a director by university appointment of the National Bureau of Economic Research since 2015; and chair of the scientific council of the Paris School of Economics.

The Society’s Walras–Bowley list instead records him as a member of the 2008 committee, chaired by Paul Milgrom, and names Martine Quinzii, Colin Cameron, and Andrés Carvajal for Xavier Vives’s 2018 lecture. The Chicago group lists him as a leader of its Family Inequality network. At Georgia State University, the Center for the Economic Analysis of Risk calls him program director for household decision-making from 2011 onward. The NBER reported his election to its Board of Directors, with Jack Kleinhenz, at the September 2015 meeting. Columbia’s current director by university appointment is R. Glenn Hubbard. The Paris School of Economics states that Pascaline Dupas chairs its scientific council, which reviews teaching and research; Chiappori is not among the members listed.

Honors and academy memberships

Society fellowships and prizes

Chiappori was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 1995. The European Economic Association lists him as a fellow; a curriculum vitae headed March 2022 dates that fellowship to 2004, and the Society of Labor Economists records his from 2009. He has been an Economic Theory Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory since 2015 and a Louis Bachelier Fellow of the Institut Louis Bachelier since 2016. The vita calls him a Distinguished Fellow of the Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics at the University of Chicago since 2011; the institute lists him as a Distinguished Research Fellow.

In 2008 the American Risk and Insurance Association’s Kulp-Wright Book Award, for the best book on risk and insurance, went to Insurance: Theoretical Analysis and Policy Implications, the 2006 MIT Press conference volume he edited with Christian Gollier. In 2010 the political-economy section of the Académie des sciences morales et politiques gave him the Zerilli-Marimo prize for his work as a whole. Université Laval conferred a doctorate honoris causa in the social sciences in 2013. On 14 December 2023 the Toulouse School of Economics awarded him the Jean-Jacques Laffont Prize, given annually since 2005 for work combining theory and empirical study. He lectured in Toulouse on “Human Capital and the Family,” and Mayor Jean-Luc Moudenc presented the prize.

Named lectures include the Gorman Lectures at University College London in May 2013, later published as Matching with Transfers (2017) in the Gorman Lectures series of Princeton University Press; the Hahn Lecture at the Royal Economic Society conference in Manchester in March 2015; the Tjalling Koopmans Memorial Lecture at Yale University on 3 November 2015; and the 2017 Griliches Lectures in Applied Economics at the Econometric Society’s Africa meeting.

National academies and decorations

The Académie des sciences morales et politiques elected Chiappori a corresponding member in 2015 and, on 26 June 2017, a full member of the section of political economy, statistics and finance, in seat number 3, left vacant by the death of Pierre Bauchet.

An index of the Journal officiel dates the published notice of that election, as membre titulaire in succession to Bauchet, to 2 August 2017. He was received at a séance of the Institut de France on 14 January 2019 and read a notice on Bauchet’s life and work. Albert II, Prince of Monaco, attended and presented the academician’s sword, and Denis Kessler gave the reception address. The palace described him as the third person born in Monaco to sit in the Institut, after the sculptor François-Joseph Bosio and Prince Albert I. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences lists him as a member since 2020, in social and behavioral sciences, with economics as his specialty.

His curriculum vitae records the rank of knight of the Ordre des Palmes académiques, without a date. A nomination as knight of the Ordre national du Mérite, proposed by the Ministry of Higher Education and Research and citing 42 years of service, is indexed from the Journal officiel of 24 November 2022, where he is identified as a professor of economics and a member of the academy. Sovereign Ordinance No. 9.552 of 17 November 2022, published in the Journal de Monaco on 25 November 2022, placed him in the officer rank of the Order of Saint-Charles.

Roles in Monaco

Statistical institute and university boards

In Monaco, a ministerial order of 7 April 2011 named Chiappori president of the scientific council of the Institut Monégasque de la Statistique et des Études Économiques (IMSEE). The council advises the Minister of State, who guarantees its independence, on studies to be undertaken, the state of the statistical system and the annual survey programme; its eleven members are drawn from civil society, the assemblies and the administration. He left the chair after becoming minister. At the council’s sixteenth meeting, on 2 July 2024, Minister of State Pierre Dartout noted his contribution and welcomed Pierre Dubois as successor.

He also chaired the International Advisory Board of the International University of Monaco, a private institution accredited to award bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degrees. The board advises the university’s board of directors on strategy. The palace statement issued with his ministerial appointment said he had held that chair, like the IMSEE presidency, since 2011. The university later listed him as a former president; Caroline Rougaignon-Vernin, president of Monaco’s Economic, Social and Environmental Council, succeeded him. A 2017 profile already described both chairs and a seat on the board of Monaco Asset Management.

Minister of Finance and Economy

Prince Albert II appointed Chiappori Conseiller de Gouvernement–Ministre des Finances et de l’Économie by Sovereign Ordinance No. 10.439 of 1 March 2024, published in the Journal de Monaco on 15 March and effective on 18 March. The palace announced the choice on 13 March. He succeeded Marco Piccinini, named from 15 September 2023 by an ordinance of 12 September, the day Jean Castellini left the post. The palace said Piccinini would continue as ambassador for international financial negotiations.

Prince Albert II with Pierre-André Chiappori at Chiappori's swearing-in as Minister of Finance and the Economy in 2024.

The 2005 ordinance organising the ministerial departments, as amended in 2014 and 2015, assigns the department the budget, the treasury, the economy and commerce, tourism, housing, state property, control of gaming, control of financial circuits, innovation and new technologies, and services of a commercial character.

Coverage of the appointment linked it to an expected decision on closer scrutiny of Monaco’s anti-money-laundering regime. On 28 June 2024, at its Singapore plenary, the Financial Action Task Force added Monaco to the jurisdictions under increased monitoring—the status commonly called the grey list—under which a jurisdiction commits to an action plan on strategic deficiencies. At a press conference on 1 July, Chiappori said about 80 percent of the shortcomings identified by MONEYVAL, the Council of Europe monitoring body, had been addressed before Singapore, and that the FATF had found Monaco’s assessment of money-laundering and tax-fraud risk inadequate. He said the government aimed to leave the list by January 2026, with checkpoints in May and September 2025, and that because Monaco does not borrow he expected no immediate budget effect unless the listing lasted about five years.

Sovereign Ordinance No. 11.830 of 26 March 2026 repealed the 2024 appointment from 31 March 2026 and conferred the honorary title of the office. Ordinance No. 11.831 named Frédéric Cottalorda, then a special adviser in the department, minister from 1 April 2026. A palace communiqué of 30 March recorded the prince’s thanks.

Corporate directorships

His March 2022 curriculum vitae listed him, from 2014, as a director of Monaco Asset Management and, from 2011, as a director and chair of the risk committee of SCOR Reinsurance Company and of SCOR Global Life Americas, units of the French reinsurer SCOR SE. The SCOR Corporate Foundation for Science, whose board he chairs, also names those directorships, referring to the property-and-casualty company as SCOR Re US. SCOR Global Life Americas Reinsurance Company’s 2024 annual statement says its board created a three-member risk committee of independent directors on 17 April 2015 and that Chiappori resigned as its chair and as a director on 1 March 2024.

Selected publications

Books

This section records bibliographic facts; the arguments are discussed elsewhere. In 1991 the Centre for Economic Policy Research published Monitoring European Integration: The Making of Monetary Union, by David Begg, Chiappori, Francesco Giavazzi, Colin Mayer, Damien Neven, Luigi Spaventa, Xavier Vives, and Charles Wyplosz. A March 2022 curriculum vitae titles that microeconomic part, with Mayer, Neven, and Vives, The Making of Monetary Union: The Microeconomics of Monetary Union, and still lists the handbook as forthcoming. With François Bourguignon and Patrick Rey he published Théorie micro-économique, tome 1, L’équilibre concurrentiel (Fayard, 1992). Risque et assurance (Flammarion, Dominos, 1997) is a short essay on insurance.

With Christian Gollier he edited Competitive Failures in Insurance Markets: Theory and Policy Implications (MIT Press, 2006). With Jean-Michel Lasry and Damien Fessler he edited Finance & Sustainable Development: Opposition or Partnership? (Economica, 2009). With Ivar Ekeland, The Economics and Mathematics of Aggregation: Formal Models of Efficient Group Behavior appeared in Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics (Now Publishers, 2009; vol. 5, nos. 1–2, pp. 1–151). Economics of the Family, with Martin Browning and Yoram Weiss, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2014, and Matching with Transfers: The Economics of Love and Marriage by Princeton University Press in 2017 (Gorman Lectures). With Costas Meghir he edited Household Labor Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2021), listed on the curriculum vitae as Household Labor Supply. The Handbook of the Economics of Matching, edited with Yeon-Koo Che and Bernard Salanié, was issued by Elsevier: volume 1, on matching with transfers, on 5 December 2024, and volume 2, on matching without transfers, in December 2025.

Journal articles

“Distribution of Income and the ‘Law of Demand’” appeared in Econometrica (53, no. 1, January 1985, pp. 109–127), and “Rational Household Labor Supply” in the same journal (56, no. 1, January 1988, pp. 63–90). “Collective Labor Supply and Welfare” was published in the Journal of Political Economy (100, no. 3, June 1992, pp. 437–467). With Browning, Bourguignon, and Valérie Lechene, “Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation” appeared there in December 1994 (102, no. 6, pp. 1067–1096); a 1992 working paper used “Incomes and Outcomes.” With Browning, “Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests” was published in Econometrica (66, no. 6, November 1998, pp. 1241–1278). With Bernard Salanié, “Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets” appeared in the Journal of Political Economy (108, no. 1, February 2000, pp. 56–78).