South Africa 2024 election and Government of National Unity

South Africa's 2024 loss of one-party majority

South African voters ended the African National Congress's uninterrupted parliamentary majority in May 2024 amid frustration with unemployment, unreliable electricity, crime, corruption and declining public services. The ANC remained the largest party but won around 40.2 percent of the vote, compared with 57.5 percent in 2019. Because no party won an outright majority, government formation moved from internal ANC bargaining to formal talks with competitors. That change widened political competition while presenting a difficult challenge: parties with sharply different economic and constitutional preferences now had to share responsibility for appointments, budgets and delivery.

On 29 May 2024, South Africans voted in national and provincial elections. By 31 May, early results showed the ANC falling far below half the vote as former president Jacob Zuma's new uMkhonto weSizwe party took support in KwaZulu-Natal. On 2 June, the final announced results confirmed the ANC's first national-majority loss since the democratic transition of 1994. The governing party obtained 159 of the 400 National Assembly seats. The Democratic Alliance won 87, MK won 58 and the Economic Freedom Fighters won 39. Those totals limited every party's ability to govern alone and reduced the plausibility of a simple return to majority-party habits.

The ANC's decline reflected long-term institutional problems rather than only the campaign of 2024. During the Zuma years, allegations and investigations of state capture raised questions about procurement, public companies and party patronage; those debates are linked to state-capture pressure. Chronic power cuts from Eskom and failing municipal infrastructure weakened the credibility of claims that the governing party could deliver basic services. The relevant electricity-grid resilience problem remained technical and financial after the election: supply reliability depended on maintenance, generation, transmission and utility governance, none of which a coalition agreement could solve immediately.

On 3 June 2024, senior ANC figures debated how to respond to the loss rather than removing President Cyril Ramaphosa. On 5 June, the party publicly proposed a government of national unity, offering negotiations to a broad range of opponents. On 6 June, Ramaphosa endorsed the approach and described jobs, inclusive growth, living costs, public services and corruption as priorities. The DA, which favoured a more market-oriented economic programme, resisted governing with the EFF. Parts of the ANC objected to cooperation with the DA, arguing that it could weaken redistribution; DA leaders rejected allegations that they primarily represented white voters. These were disputes about policy and trust, not proof that any side had an unconditional mandate.

On 14 June 2024, the ANC and DA struck a parliamentary agreement, and lawmakers re-elected Ramaphosa by 283 votes to 44 over EFF leader Julius Malema. The arrangement prevented a prolonged vacuum in executive authority and demonstrated that a peaceful government reconfiguration was possible. But electoral integrity and competitiveness extends beyond a credible count: a coalition must allow lawful scrutiny, functioning opposition and consequences for failures. Later performance needs to be judged by tangible service improvements and clean public contracting, not the mere fact that rival parties signed a deal. The June outcome combined a meaningful electoral rebuke with an orderly institutional response; neither automatically guaranteed effective administration.