2025 Moroccan Gen Z protests

Summary
The 2025 Moroccan Gen Z protests, also known as the GenZ 212 protests, were a series of youth-led demonstrations that began on 27 September 2025 across Morocco.
Expert article
The 2025 Moroccan Gen Z protests, also known as the GenZ 212 protests, were a series of youth-led demonstrations that began on 27 September 2025 across Morocco. Human Rights Watch recorded gatherings that day in at least eleven cities and towns, including Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, Salé, Agadir and Marrakesh, and described the opening night as largely peaceful. Al Jazeera called the rallies some of the country’s largest antigovernment demonstrations in years. A leaderless network calling itself GenZ 212 — Generation Z joined to Morocco’s +212 international dialling code — summoned people through Discord, TikTok, Instagram and Facebook, with no formal leadership and no affiliation to a political party or union.
The deaths of eight women over several days in mid-September 2025, in a maternity ward at a public hospital in Agadir, were the immediate spark. Demonstrators demanded higher public spending on health care and education, jobs for young people, and an end to corruption, and they criticised the cost of stadiums and related works as Morocco prepared to host the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations and to co-host the 2030 FIFA World Cup. The BBC reported chants of “No World Cup, health comes first” and “We want hospitals not football stadiums,” and a reported cost of about US$5 billion for football infrastructure, including a stadium planned for 115,000 spectators. Human Rights Watch cited reported spending of about US$5 billion on stadiums, sports complexes, transport and accommodation, and noted that public health expenditure was 2.3 percent of GDP in 2022. Al Jazeera, citing official figures, put national unemployment at 12.8 percent and youth unemployment at 35.8 percent.
Police broke up rallies and made arrests from the first weekend; Al Jazeera reported a police figure of nearly 200 arrests by 29 September. On the night of 1 October the Royal Gendarmerie used lethal force outside a post in Lqliâa, near Agadir, and three men were killed. An interior ministry spokesperson said officers fired in self-defence after protesters threw stones, allegedly used knives, and tried to force the post, and that tear gas had been used first; Human Rights Watch, which geolocated video of rock-throwing, a broken gate and fires, said it could not confirm that tear gas preceded the gunfire. Amnesty International asked for an independent investigation, citing credible reports of at least three deaths, dozens of injuries and more than 400 arrests, and said it had reviewed footage of security vehicles driven into protesters in Oujda. The interior ministry said the unrest on 1 October left 354 people injured, 326 of them security personnel, and damaged 271 security vehicles and 175 private vehicles. By mid-October Human Rights Watch reported nearly 1,000 arrests and criminal cases against at least 270 people, including 39 children.
Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch said on 2 October that he was open to dialogue. On 10 October, King Mohammed VI told parliament that creating jobs for young people and improving education and health were priorities, and that flagship national projects and social programmes could advance together. Human Rights Watch and Al Jazeera both reported that the speech did not address the protests directly. GenZ 212 had sent the king a public letter asking that the government be dismissed, detainees released, and corruption examined in a national forum. Government spokesperson Mustapha Baitas said the message had been received and that health projects were being accelerated.
Background
Public services and the labour market
Morocco’s economy was growing when the protests began, but the labour market facing young people was not. The Haut-Commissariat au Plan reported 193,000 net jobs created between 2024 and 2025, almost all urban, while national unemployment only eased from 13.3 percent to 13 percent. For ages 15 to 24 the rate rose from 36.7 percent to 37.2 percent. Graduate unemployment moved from 19.6 percent to 19.1 percent, and the rate for women rose from 19.4 percent to 20.5 percent. A World Bank Group review in April 2026 put 2025 growth at 4.7 percent, lifted by infrastructure spending and an agricultural recovery, with participation at 43.5 percent and female participation at 19 percent—among the lowest in the world, it said—and many young people still unable to find work matching their schooling.
The 2024 census counted 36,828,330 people, with the share under 15 down to 26.5 percent from 28.2 percent in 2014, and the share aged 60 and over up to 13.8 percent. The binding constraint was weak absorption of young people into stable jobs, not a shortage of working-age adults.
In the World Health Organization’s Eastern Mediterranean table, from national accounts accessed in September 2024, Morocco had 7.3 physicians, 12.8 nurses and 1.8 midwives per 10,000 people, below Tunisia, Jordan and several Gulf states on physicians. The deaths of eight women in a maternity ward at a public hospital in Agadir in September 2025 became the case through which that shortage was discussed; reports linked them to staffing, equipment and care. A 2026 UNESCO note found large gains in access—the out-of-school rate from 2000 to 2023 fell from 42 percent to 6 percent for lower-secondary-age adolescents and from 63 percent to 23 percent for upper-secondary-age youth—but repetition in lower secondary reached 23 percent by 2019. Organizers of the 2025 protests listed free, quality education, accessible public health care and jobs among their demands.
Stadiums and the development model
The spending demonstrators set against those services had been agreed two years earlier. On 20 October 2023 the government and the Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion signed a financing pact, at a ceremony chaired by the head of government, for six stadiums—in Tangier, Casablanca, Rabat, Agadir, Marrakech and Fez—and a new ground at Benslimane, for the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations and the 2030 FIFA World Cup, which Morocco was to co-host with Spain and Portugal. The published envelopes were about 9.5 billion dirhams to bring the six stadiums to Confederation of African Football standards over 2023–2025, 4.5 to 6 billion dirhams more for a later phase to FIFA standards in 2025–2028, and about 5 billion dirhams for Benslimane. The head of government called the tournaments recognition of a development drive associated with Mohammed VI.
By autumn 2025 marchers were chanting “We want hospitals not football stadiums” and “No World Cup, health comes first.” The BBC described a planned 115,000-seat stadium and the wider football build as a reported $5 billion—well above the 2023 dirham envelopes, which covered stadium works rather than every associated project. Other reporting quoted “Stadiums are here, but where are the hospitals?” and noted officials denying that World Cup spending came ahead of public infrastructure, and attributing health problems to earlier governments. The World Bank credited the infrastructure push with supporting demand while noting its limited effect on jobs.
Earlier protest movements
Coverage of the 2025 protests set them against youth-led movements in 2011 and 2016.
On 20 February 2011, during the Arab Spring, thousands marched for reform in Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Agadir and the Rif. Human Rights Watch described the day as largely peaceful, unlike several other countries that winter; in Rabat it counted about 2,000 people calling for constitutional change, an independent judiciary and a new cabinet. The youth-led February 20 Movement continued into the spring, with some marches above 10,000. Police tolerated some and beat protesters at others; Kamal Ammari, 30, beaten in Safi on 29 May, died on 2 June. Amendments the king proposed in June, and voters approved in July, made Amazigh an official language and added rights guarantees but, Human Rights Watch judged, placed few significant limits on his powers. The BBC’s account of what still stood in 2025 was that the king had enlarged the head of government’s formal role while remaining head of state and of military and religious affairs, able to appoint and remove ministers.
The Hirak Rif Movement began from a death rather than a constitutional text. On 28 October 2016 Mouhcine Fikri, a fish vendor, was crushed in a garbage compressor in Al Hoceima after climbing in to recover confiscated fish; protests started there and spread, demanding an end to regional marginalization and better services. From May 2017 security forces arrested hundreds, including children and journalists. In June 2018 a Casablanca court sentenced Nasser Zefzafi, Nabil Ahamjik and two others to 20 years, with other terms from one to 15 years. Amnesty International called the trials unfair, citing confessions defendants said were taken under torture and charges that, in its view, criminalized peaceful protest. In 2019 an appeals court upheld sentences of up to 20 years; Human Rights Watch said it had not dealt with evidence of torture and forced confessions.
Organizers of the 2025 actions, set by reporters beside both episodes, told the BBC they were not a political movement and had no leader.
Origins and organization
The Agadir hospital crisis
The protests grew out of Hassan II Regional Hospital in Agadir, a public complex opened in 1967 that also serves as a provincial, regional and teaching hospital for Morocco’s Souss-Massa region. Regional officials said the building could no longer absorb patients from the city and the rural south.
A cluster of maternal deaths made that overload a national argument. On 15 September local reports still spoke of at least six women who had died after caesarean sections; within a day, other outlets were describing eight deaths, most after caesareans, over about ten days or less than a month. Residents called the facility the “hospital of death.” Fatima Tamni, a Federation of the Democratic Left MP, wrote to the health minister about missing drugs, gloves and anaesthetics, patients buying supplies, and stray cats in the wards.
On 14 September, the second gathering in a week, hundreds stood outside the gates asking for staff, equipment, an inquiry, and the opening of Agadir’s university hospital, still unfinished after a promised 2023 inauguration. Security forces dispersed them. Chants — “Health first, we don’t want the World Cup” and “a cemetery or a hospital?” — tied the ward to stadiums for the Africa Cup of Nations and the 2030 FIFA World Cup, and to Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch, also mayor of Agadir, who had just spoken of a transformation of public hospitals. The Moroccan Organization for Human Rights and the Fight against Corruption called the conditions catastrophic and demanded a judicial investigation.
On 16 September, after a visit, Health and Social Protection Minister Amine Tahraoui dismissed the hospital director and officials in the regional and provincial administrations, citing dysfunctions, unjustified absences and shortages. He ended outsourced cleaning, reception and security contracts and said inspectors would send findings to the public prosecutor. In early October the ministry said the inquiry into the eight deaths was finished and the file had gone to prosecutors, with the staff concerned suspended. Union sources later counted 17 people suspended, including anaesthesiologists, obstetricians, nurses and midwives; in December, six who had been seconded there were returned to Agadir’s Mohammed VI University Hospital.
On 7 October a further woman died at Hassan II after a caesarean at Mokhtar Soussi Hospital in Biougra and an emergency transfer. The regional directorate opened another inquiry, said the newborn was under observation, and denied claims that Biougra lacked obstetricians.
GenZ 212 and online coordination
The anonymous collective that took the Agadir anger nationwide called itself GenZ 212, joining Generation Z to Morocco’s +212 dialling code. It appeared on 18 September 2025 through calls on Discord and other platforms, described itself as a discussion space on health, education and corruption, and named no founders. It said it was non-violent and later expressed regret at violence during the protests.
Public apps and a closed server did different work. TikTok, Instagram and YouTube spread footage of hospital conditions, while Discord, divided into regional forums, was where gatherings were planned. Membership went from fewer than 1,000 to more than 120,000 in three days, Middle East Eye reported; Carnegie later described a server of more than 200,000 and then of more than 250,000. Yasmine Zarhloule wrote that Facebook and Instagram, central in 2011, were now thick with bots, so pseudonyms, voice rooms and virtual private networks made Discord harder to monitor. Evening talks with journalists on the server were later posted on YouTube.
Its published demands stayed inside state institutions: “Freedom, dignity and social justice,” “the people want the fall of corruption,” and a call to rank education, health, jobs and anti-corruption first. It disclaimed any party or union tie, unlike the 2011 February 20 Movement, and objected when Nabila Mounib, a former secretary-general of the Unified Socialist Party, spoke at a Casablanca sit-in held in its name. A Discord message said: “We are not against the monarchy, nor against His Majesty King Mohammed VI.” Mohammed Masbah, of the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis, said anonymity made the group hard to negotiate with or co-opt. Political scientist Aziz Chahir called it a fluid online movement held together by shared outrage.
Calls on those platforms produced demonstrations in ten cities from 27 September, with participants insisting there was no leader. After arrests that weekend, some assemblies moved from city centers into working-class neighborhoods. When violence later broke out, including killings in Lqliâa, members used the server to compare accounts and to repeat that they wanted the protests to stay peaceful.
Course of the demonstrations
Late September
Street protest in Agadir began before the nationwide calls. On the Sunday before 16 September 2025, residents gathered outside Hassan II Regional Hospital over conditions there; on 16 September the health minister, Amine Tahraoui, visited and dismissed the Souss-Massa regional health director and Agadir’s provincial health delegate.
The anonymous collective GenZ 212, organizing largely through Discord, called demonstrations from 27 September. Human Rights Watch described largely peaceful protests that day in at least 11 places, including Rabat, Casablanca, Tangier, Salé, Agadir, Marrakesh, Sidi Eltaibi and Inezgane, and said some protesters damaged property. The BBC reported actions across 10 cities from that Saturday, with chants such as “We want hospitals not football stadiums,” aimed at spending for the Africa Cup of Nations and the 2030 FIFA World Cup.
Police broke up gatherings over the weekend. Al Jazeera, citing the authorities, reported nearly 200 arrests since Saturday as marches continued in Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakesh and Agadir; footage shared by the collective appeared to show officers charging crowds, and on 28 September protesters faced police in Rabat. Hakim Sikouk of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights told AFP that force had been used against young people demonstrating peacefully. By 29 September the rallies were being described as some of the largest anti-government demonstrations in Morocco in years, still without named leaders.
Early October escalation
Officials said the night of 30 September was when the protests turned sharply more violent. The Interior Ministry said young men that night carried knives and threw stones and Molotov cocktails. It reported 409 people taken into custody, 263 security personnel and 23 civilians injured, and 142 security vehicles and 20 private cars set on fire. It said buildings, banks and shops were looted or vandalized in Ait Amira, Inezgane, Agadir, Tiznit and Oujda. Human Rights Watch geolocated video of security vans driving into protesters in Oujda; news reports said at least two people were hurt, including a 19-year-old whose family said a leg was later amputated.
On the night of 1 October, security forces opened fire in Lqliâa, near Agadir. State media first reported two deaths and said officers fired in self-defence after a group tried to storm a post; Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch later put the toll at three and called the deaths regrettable. Al Jazeera reported that the ministry’s account of an attempt to seize weapons was not corroborated by witnesses, while Human Rights Watch said video showed rocks, a broken gate and fires before a uniformed man fired, and that it could not confirm tear gas was used first. The same night, witnesses in Salé described stone-throwing, looting and fires at shops, a bank and police vehicles; an AFP journalist saw two police cars and a bank branch alight, and the commune headquarters in nearby Sidi Bibi was also reported burned. The ministry later said the 1 October protests injured 354 people, 326 of them security personnel, and damaged 271 security vehicles and 175 private vehicles.
GenZ 212 said it rejected the violence and called a sixth night of peaceful protest for 2 October. That day Akhannouch said the government was ready to talk. An AFP journalist described a flag-carrying rally in Rabat, chanting for “health and not just stadiums,” that ended without violence, with further rallies reported in Casablanca, Marrakesh and Agadir. Human Rights Watch separately reported clashes in Marrakesh on 2 October that damaged three bank branches. The Moroccan Association for Human Rights said about 1,000 people had been apprehended. On 3 October the collective demanded the government’s dismissal and the release of peaceful protesters. Al Jazeera called the week the most violent street unrest since the 2016–17 protests in the Rif. Demonstrations were still being reported nightly on 4 October.
Pause, resumption and decline
On the evening of 9 October, GenZ 212 held anticorruption protests in Tangier, Casablanca and Rabat.
Youth protesters in Rabat on 9 October 2025, the evening before King Mohammed VI addressed parliament.
Government spokesman Mustapha Baitas said “the message has been received” and that health projects in particular were being accelerated. The collective had written to the king asking him to dismiss the government, free detainees and open a forum on corruption. On 8 October it said no demonstration or strike would be held on 10 October, calling that a mark of respect for the speech opening parliament, not a retreat.
In the address the king urged faster youth employment, progress in education and health, and more attention to mountain and oasis regions. He said flagship projects and social programmes should not be treated as rivals, and he did not mention the protests. Street actions then thinned. On 14 October the Guardian reported that organizers, whose Discord channel it said had passed 200,000 subscribers, had called fresh demonstrations for 18 October despite, on a lawyers’ count it cited, more than 500 arrests in the first six days, 272 of them still detained, including 36 minors.
On 18 October, after what the Associated Press described as an eight-day pause, hundreds returned in cities including Casablanca and Tangier, in smaller numbers than at the peak, again demanding Akhannouch’s removal, reforms and releases. Some urged a boycott of matches at new or renovated stadiums, including during the Africa Cup of Nations. Morocco World News reported about 100 people at a peaceful sit-in outside parliament in Rabat that day. By the following weekend turnout had fallen further: an Associated Press report on 27 October said only dozens appeared at a Saturday gathering in Casablanca.
Demands
Services, jobs and corruption
Demonstrators in the late-September 2025 marches in Morocco asked for functioning public hospitals and schools, jobs, and action against corruption, and they set those demands against spending on stadiums for the Africa Cup of Nations and the 2030 FIFA World Cup. In Rabat and other cities, reported chants included “Stadiums are here, but where are the hospitals?”, “We want hospitals not football stadiums”, and “No World Cup, health comes first”. Signs carried the Arabic “الكرامة قبل الملاعب” (“Dignity before stadiums”). The Carnegie Endowment recorded “The youth don’t want the World Cup! Health! Education!” and the older slogan “freedom, dignity, and social justice” (hurriyyeh, karama, adala ijtimaaiyya).
A demonstrator holds a cardboard sign reading “#الكرامة قبل الملاعب” (“Dignity before stadiums”) at a Gen Z 212 rally in Rabat.
The anonymous Generation Z collective GenZ 212, coordinating on Discord and other platforms, called itself a forum on health, education and corruption and asked the authorities to “prioritise education, health, employment and the fight against corruption”. A Discord statement said that “the right to health, education and a dignified life is not an empty slogan but a serious demand”, cited King Mohammed VI, and urged protesters to stay peaceful. A list the group shared online, reported by the BBC, also named youth jobs and, unlike the widely quoted chants, adopting English rather than French as the second language after Arabic.
The deaths of eight women in a maternity ward in Agadir were treated as the spark for a complaint about public care in general. Carnegie described the core ask as free, adequate education and healthcare for everyone, plus accountability for corruption in public office. Officials denied that World Cup spending was being placed ahead of services and said health-system problems had been inherited from earlier governments. As arrests mounted, accounts linked to the movement called for boycotts of the Africa Cup of Nations and of companies associated with Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch.
Political accountability
Other reported slogans included “the people want the fall of corruption” and, in some rallies, calls for Akhannouch’s departure. The Los Angeles Times reported crowds shouting “The people want the king to intervene”. Carnegie wrote that demonstrators in 2011 and 2025 stayed away from directly attacking the king, that the later protests focused more tightly on failed governance, and that the authorities have long treated the monarchy as a red line. GenZ 212 posted that it was “not against the monarchy, nor against His Majesty King Mohammed VI”; analysts also described pro-king banners and an effort to present the marches as citizenship rather than opposition to the throne.
In early October the collective published a letter to the king, calling the throne a guarantor of security, stability and dignity, after saying it had lost faith in the government, parliament and parties. Al Jazeera quoted it: “We, the youth of Morocco, are requesting your majesty to intervene for a profound and just reform that restores rights and punish the corrupt.” Morocco World News reported eight points tied to the Constitution of Morocco: dismissal of Akhannouch’s government under Article 47 for failing on purchasing power and social justice; impartial proceedings over corruption and misuse of public funds; dissolution under Article 7 of parties found complicit in corruption; equal access to education, healthcare and jobs without favoritism or nepotism; protection of expression and peaceful protest; release of people held after peaceful demonstrations, distinguished from those accused of violence; freedom for prisoners of conscience and participants in earlier uprisings, citing Article 23; and a public accountability session chaired by the king, and reported that the group would file a dossier of what it called “systematic corruption, abuse of power, and catastrophic mismanagement” and framed the appeal as constitutional reform rather than defiance. Al Jazeera separately reported the letter’s call to dismiss the government and parties accused of corruption, free detainees, and convene a forum on corruption.
Casualties and the security response
The killings in Lqliâa
The deaths attributed to live fire during the 2025 protests in Morocco occurred on the night of 1 October in Lqliâa (also spelled Lqliaa and Leqliâa), on the outskirts of Agadir. Human Rights Watch wrote that police and the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie used lethal force while dispersing gatherings, killing three people. On 2 October the Interior Ministry said three people had died after rioters tried to overrun a gendarmerie post and seize weapons, and that gendarmes fired “in legitimate self-defense.” Morocco World News, citing the ministry, reported that a third person had died of injuries and that a child had also been hit by gunfire.
The Agadir public prosecutor’s office said more than 200 people, many of them minors with sticks, knives and stones, damaged vehicles and storefronts, then attacked the post, which it said held live ammunition. After tear gas failed, the communiqué said, attackers burned the deputy commander’s office and the entrance, seized a four-wheel-drive vehicle and five motorcycles and set them alight; eight gendarmes were injured, three seriously. The office said gendarmes fired warning shots and then live rounds, that three people were killed, and that a judicial investigation was opened. Interior Ministry spokesman Rachid El Khalfi said groups armed with knives had attacked state buildings and security premises.
Human Rights Watch said geolocated footage, including closed-circuit clips time-stamped 9:28 p.m., showed dozens of people throwing rocks, breaking the gate and setting fires, and a uniformed man inside firing toward the crowd at 9:34 p.m. It could not confirm that tear gas, visible about a minute later, preceded the live fire, or that a gravely wounded or dead man about 70 meters from the entrance, with a bloody back wound, had been shot in the back. It asked for a transparent investigation, citing United Nations standards that allow intentional lethal fire only when strictly unavoidable to protect life. Amnesty International, citing reports of at least three protesters killed, called for an immediate independent inquiry.
Those statements did not name the dead. Human Rights Watch identified Abdessamade Oubalat, a cinematography student it described as 22, and an unnamed 25-year-old man. Le Monde reported that Oubalat was 24, a cinema student in Ouarzazate shot in the head about 70 meters from the post while filming, and not among the masked youths at the entrance. The Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) and MENA Rights Group also named hairdresser Mohamed Rahali, 25, and construction worker Abdelhakim Derfidi, 35, and said all three were unarmed and away from the post: Oubalat about 120 meters off, Rahali shot in the back on a bicycle, and Derfidi on a side road. A December 2025 AMDH commission, reported by Enass, described a few dozen people rather than about 200, said about ten pulled down a light outer gate, and said fire was aimed at 100 to 500 meters rather than into the air; it spells Derfidi as Drifidi and gives his age as 36. AMDH and MENA Rights Group said the inquiry was assigned to the gendarmerie and that families were denied autopsy reports, and they asked United Nations special rapporteurs to take up the deaths.
Injuries, dispersal and damage
Security forces banned gatherings, which the Interior Ministry said were unlicensed, and dispersed crowds with tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons. Amnesty International said the protests were peaceful for several days and that violence was reported from the nights of 30 September and 1 October.
El Khalfi said that by the night of 30 September, 263 security-force members and 23 other people had been hurt, in incidents involving knives, petrol bombs and stones; Amnesty International cited the same figures. For the night of 1 October the ministry reported 354 people injured, 326 of them security personnel. The AMDH commission counted fourteen people wounded by live rounds at Lqliâa, including a 12-year-old, a child under 14 and a 13-year-old, and a young man of about 22 left paralyzed in the lower limbs, and said residents rather than ambulances moved the injured.
Human Rights Watch geolocated footage of a security van driving into protesters at a roundabout in Oujda on the night of 30 September, and of a second van, about 350 meters away, crushing a man against a wall. It cited reports of injuries to 17-year-old Wassim Eltaibi, whose mother said he needed urgent care, and to 19-year-old Amine Boussaada, whose father said his left leg had been amputated. Amnesty International said footage of vehicles driven into protesters in Oujda showed at least one serious injury and called it unlawful force against people posing no imminent threat to life.
For that Wednesday night the ministry reported damage to 271 security vehicles, 175 private vehicles, and about 80 facilities—offices, health centers, security posts, banks and shops—across 23 provinces and prefectures. Hespress reported early estimates of more than 25 million to 210 million dirhams, and noted that officials had not published a full cost. Human Rights Watch reported that clashes in Marrakesh on 2 October included damage to three bank branches.
Arrests, trials and detention
Prosecutions
On 1 October 2025 an Interior Ministry spokesperson said 409 people had been taken into police custody in Morocco after a night of knives, stones, incendiary devices and damage, as the ministry described it, in Aït Amira, Inezgane, Agadir, Tiznit and Oujda. On 3 October Amnesty International, citing official figures, said those arrests ran from 28 September and that at least 193 people faced trial, many on bail. Defendants, including minors, were charged under Article 591 of the penal code, which covers a gathering deemed violent, even when the arrest was on 28 or 29 September, before violence was reported.
Human Rights Watch said on 15 October that nearly 1,000 people had been arrested and that cases were open against at least 270 protesters, including 39 children. Its later summary of 2025, citing the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), put arrests near 2,100 and judicial procedures at at least 1,400 people, 330 of them children, with about 1,000 still detained as of October.
On 28 October the public prosecutor’s office issued a higher charging total. Magistrate Hassan Farhan said 3,300 people had been released after identity checks, minors among them returned to guardians, while 2,480 were referred to prosecutors in Rabat, Casablanca, Agadir, Tangier, Oujda and other cities: 1,473 in pretrial detention and 959 at liberty. Forty-eight cases were closed. His list of offences included looting, vandalism, road blockades, aggravated theft, arson and weapon possession, and he said some detainees had already left custody after suspended sentences, acquittals or return to guardians. Agence France-Presse, at the same briefing, said more than 20 percent of the 2,480 faced “rebellion in a group,” more than 17 percent insult or violence against officers, and more than 17 percent incitement and armed gathering.
Sentences and criticism of the trials
As of 27 October, AFP said, courts had convicted 411 people, including 76 minors, to firm or suspended terms, and 61 had received one to 15 years firm, mainly for damage, looting or arson. A Maghreb Arabe Presse account of the same cutoff used another cut: criminal chambers ruled on 66 defendants (61 convicted, five acquitted) with terms of one to 15 years; first-instance courts decided 301 adult cases (208 prison terms, 66 suspended, 27 acquittals); and 162 minors were judged, 83 returned to guardians. Farhan said defendants could contact a lawyer and their families, that records were lawful and that courts weighed social circumstances and clean records. He denied forced confessions.
The longest reported terms came in riot cases. On 14 October the Agadir Court of Appeal sentenced 17 defendants to 162 years combined for burning security vehicles and damaging property in Aït Amira: three received 15 years, one 12, nine 10, and the others five, four or three. On 21 October it sentenced 33 more people to 260 years in all over Houara, Taroudant, Biougra and Aït Amira, many to 10 years and one to 15. On 29 October the Tangier Court of Appeal gave 49 people from Tangier, Larache and Ksar el-Kebir two to 10 years, 168 years in total, for vandalism and attacks on security forces. A Marrakesh appeal ruling reported on 19 February 2026 gave 48 people 106 years and six months combined, including six-year terms for criminal association, arson of public buildings and aggravated theft, and six months for 21 defendants acquitted of the gravest counts.
Shorter sentences followed in Casablanca for blocking the urban motorway in late September 2025. On 12 June 2026, 18 adults received from one year suspended to 10 months firm, and 13 were freed that day because pretrial detention covered the term. On 19 June six minors got six months. Lawyer El Hassan Essonni said four held in a juvenile centre would leave that evening after time served; whether two who appeared free would serve their terms was unclear.
Amnesty called the early arrests arbitrary, including of bystanders and people speaking to journalists, and asked that charges be dropped for peaceful assembly alone. The AMDH told AFP it wanted fair trials and alleged police statements written under constraint. In December 2025 Human Rights Watch said many people appeared detained for protesting despite some violence, and noted AMDH reports of terms up to 15 years. On 18 December The Guardian, citing Amnesty, said dozens from a non-violent demonstration had been charged with violence. It also reported AMDH criticism of hearings without lawyers, thin investigations and the lack of a presumption of innocence, and family accounts of beatings, pressure to sign papers and harassment of women detainees. Authorities said fair-trial rules had applied from arrest and that the reports were lawful.
No official count of people still imprisoned was published a year later. On 27 September 2026 a report citing the AMDH said about 650 remained in prison, serving sentences or awaiting judgment, and gave the association’s separate estimate of at least 5,700 arrests in all, as against the prosecutor’s 2,480 people charged. An Enass editorial put the AMDH and a detainees’ support committee at 650 to 750 still held, and La Croix reported that 750 young people remained detained.
Official response
Government statements
On 1 October 2025, Interior Ministry spokesman Rachid El Khalfi said protests he described as unauthorized had turned violent the previous evening: 263 security personnel and 23 civilians injured, 142 security vehicles and 20 private cars destroyed, and 409 people placed in custody after damage to banks, shops and offices, including in Agadir, Tiznit, Oujda and Inezgane. The ministry said officers had faced stones, Molotov cocktails and knives, that force had followed “legal and professional standards,” and that peaceful protest remained lawful. The next day it said events in Lqliâa, in Inezgane-Aït Melloul, had “taken on far more dangerous dimensions.” After what it called an attempt to overrun a Royal Gendarmerie post and seize weapons, forces opened fire “in legitimate self-defense,” killing three people.
At that day’s government council, Head of Government Aziz Akhannouch said the protests had “taken a dangerous turn, undermining security and public order.” He regretted the deaths and the injuries to security personnel, and said the executive was “responding to these societal demands” and “ready for dialogue and debate within institutions and public spaces,” which he called “the only way” to meet the country’s challenges.
On 9 October, government spokesman Mustapha Baitas said the authorities had “received and understood the message,” that dialogue required both sides, and that until then the government would keep accelerating work on health, education and employment. GenZ 212 had written to the king asking him to dismiss the government, release detainees and convene a forum on corruption, rather than negotiate with the cabinet.
The royal address and the 2026 budget
On Friday 10 October 2025, King Mohammed VI opened the final legislative year of the House of Representatives in Rabat. The speech dealt with jobs, schooling, health care and territorial inequality, but the published text does not mention the demonstrations or GenZ 212. The Associated Press said he did not address the protesters directly and framed the issues as a question of governance rather than of the country’s broader development vision; Al Jazeera and Middle East Eye also reported that he did not answer calls to dismiss Akhannouch.
He said there should be “no inconsistency or competition” between “national flagship projects” and social programs. Social justice and narrower regional gaps were “not empty slogans” but “a strategic policy objective.” He asked for “a faster implementation pace and stronger impacts” from local-development programs already ordered, with priority for youth jobs and “tangible progress in the education and health sectors,” including mountainous regions, which he said cover 30 percent of the territory, and oases.
On 19 October he chaired a Council of Ministers at the Royal Palace on the 2026 finance bill. The royal cabinet said that, under his instructions, health and national education together would receive 140 billion dirhams and more than 27,000 new posts. The statement listed university hospitals in Agadir and Laayoune, completion of the Ibn Sina hospital in Rabat, continued work in Beni Mellal, Guelmim and Errachidia, renovation of 90 hospitals, and faster preschool expansion. The council also adopted a draft organic law that would ease candidacies for people under 35, cover 75 percent of their campaign costs, and reserve regional constituencies for women.
Finance Minister Nadia Fettah Alaoui later told parliament that health would receive 42.4 billion dirhams, nearly 10 billion more than in 2025, with 8,000 posts, and national education 97.1 billion, up 11.5 billion, with 19,344 posts—together more than 140 billion, an increase she put at 21 billion. Higher education was listed separately, at 17.3 billion. The government tied the bill to its “emerging economy” program and to aid for about four million households. Redouane Amimi, of Mohammed V University, called the sum a “positive political signal” whose effect would stay “limited” without governance reform; political scientist Zaynab El Bernoussi called it a reaction to the unrest. The protest collective said the money had to be matched by action against corruption.
Later political consequences
In the September 2026 elections for the House’s 395 seats, the Authenticity and Modernity Party won 97, short of the 198 needed for a majority. Akhannouch’s National Rally of Independents fell from 102 seats to 66. The Justice and Development Party rose to 54, and the Istiqlal Party placed third. Turnout was 38 percent of 15.8 million registered voters, the second-lowest since 1999 and down from about 51 percent in 2021. Al Jazeera reported that analysts linked the drop to disengagement after the protests and to deadly attempts to reach the Spanish enclave of Ceuta.
On 29 September 2026 the king appointed Fatima Ezzahra El Mansouri—a PAM coordinator, housing minister and mayor of Marrakesh—head of government under Article 47 and charged her with forming a cabinet, the first woman named to the post. She called the choice “truly historic.” The Justice and Development Party and the Federation of Democratic Left said they would stay in opposition, leaving a coalition as her first task. Al Jazeera reported that the next government would oversee investment for co-hosting the 2030 FIFA World Cup. The vote ended the RNI’s plurality without giving any party a majority of its own.
Rights groups, media and international reaction
Human rights organizations
On 3 October 2025 Amnesty International urged Morocco to halt what it called excessive force, investigate the deaths, and drop charges against people held only for peaceful assembly. It said video showed officers, sometimes in plain clothes, arresting protesters and bystanders before some demonstrators burned vehicles, and security vehicles driven into crowds in Oujda. It cited at least three people killed, dozens injured, 409 arrests since 28 September, and at least 193 facing trial, including minors under Penal Code article 591; the Interior Ministry reported 263 security personnel and 23 civilians injured. Regional director Heba Morayef said demands for social rights and against corruption should not be punished.
Human Rights Watch asked on 15 October for an inquiry into lethal force by the Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie at Lqliâa, accountability for other alleged abuses, respect for peaceful protest, and higher health and education spending. It reported three dead, dozens injured, nearly 1,000 arrested, and cases against at least 270 people, including 39 children, after GenZ 212 protests from 27 September. Researchers geolocated security vans driving into crowds in Oujda and said Lqliâa footage did not confirm that tear gas preceded gunfire the ministry called self-defense.
The Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH) reported on 24 October that 2,068 people had been arrested and prosecuted—1,088 still in custody, 596 released, and 233 sentenced, including four 15-year terms—and that more than 330 minors were prosecuted, some without a guardian. It held the state responsible for the deaths and demanded impartial investigations and releases for peaceful protest. A security source called the report biased, said detainees had legal safeguards, and cited 289 injured officers and 268 damaged vehicles. Prosecutors on 28 October reported more than 5,780 arrests, 2,480 referrals, and 1,473 detentions. In February 2026 AMDH and MENA Rights Group asked United Nations rapporteurs to investigate the Lqliâa killings of Abdelhakim Derfidi, Abdessamade Oubalat, and Mohamed Rahali, arguing they were not an imminent threat and that the case sat with the force involved.
Coverage and public debate
International outlets framed the marches as a leaderless online campaign over public services, not a challenge to the monarchy. BBC News described crowds contrasting stadium spending with hospitals and schools, quoted protesters who still wanted the World Cup but not “while hiding behind a façade,” and reported mass arrests, organizers distancing themselves from rioting, and Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch’s offer of dialogue.
Reporters Without Borders later found that journalists were blocked in Tissa and Rabat, and that on 28 September the phone of Yasser Al Makhtoum of Al-Yaoum 24 was taken during a live report. From 3 October some public broadcasters opened debate, after which journalists including 2M’s Sanaa Rahimi were harassed online and outlets such as Chouf TV accused independent reporters of fueling unrest or serving foreign interests.
False footage spread with the reporting. On 17 October Reuters found that a clip shared as Moroccan protests, and tied to a claim that King Mohammed VI had fled, was reversed video of 25 June 2025 clashes in Juja, Kenya. The king appeared at the opening of parliament on 10 October.
Sports bodies
On 6 October in Kinshasa, Confederation of African Football president Patrice Motsepe said the protests would not alter the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations. “Morocco is plan A, Morocco is plan B, and Morocco is plan C,” he said, adding that CAF was “absolutely confident” of delivering “the most successful” edition of the competition.
Human Rights Watch wrote to FIFA president Gianni Infantino on 16 October and to Motsepe on 23 October about that tournament and the 2030 FIFA World Cup, asking about due diligence on force, detention, and assembly, about costs and tax exemptions versus health and education, and about protections for workers and journalists. It sought replies by 30 October and 7 November. In a 13 December commentary in Le Monde, HRW’s Vincent Sima Olé wrote that neither body had replied, and urged them to press for releases of peaceful protesters, updates on abuse investigations, and events that do not undercut health and education.
Aftermath
A year on
By late September 2026 the street phase of the protests in Morocco had largely ended. The Discord server that had peaked near 250,000 members was below 180,000 by early 2026, and live audiences had fallen from about 10,000 to fewer than 300, Hespress reported, citing Abderrafie Zaanoun. A 10 December 2025 call to rally for detainees drew what he called very weak turnout. La Croix still counted about 174,000 members a year on, but said calls to demonstrate had gone quiet.
Custody was what still drew a gathering. The Moroccan Association for Human Rights said roughly 5,700 people had been arrested around the unrest and about 650 were still imprisoned in September 2026, its figure rather than an official tally. Hakim Sikouk, of a support committee, put those still held at nearly 750, including minors and people not yet finally judged. On 26 September about thirty mothers stood outside Parliament in Rabat and asked King Mohammed VI for releases.
The spending pledges had not yet changed hospital delivery on the published timetable. Health and education received 140 billion dirhams (about $15 billion) in the 2026 budget, with promises of 8,000 health jobs, 19,000 education jobs and renovation of 90 hospitals. The Washington Institute found that only the 2026 slice of 3.3 billion dirhams for hospital works was programmed, and that Casablanca-Settat, the only region with a public calendar, had no renovation due before polling day. Regional health groups had not started, and a youth activist told Al Jazeera that promises on care, schools and jobs were unmet. That report cited 2025 unemployment of 37.2 percent for ages 15 to 24.
Turnout on 23 September 2026 was 38 percent, down from 50 percent in 2021 and the lowest since 2007. Voters aged 18 to 24 were about 3 to 4 percent of the roll, and those under 35 about 18 percent. Only two independent lists registered, out of more than 1,850, and neither won a seat. Sociologist Mehdi Alioua said the grievances had barely changed.
Place among other youth protests
Commentators placed the protests with other 2025 youth movements rather than with the Arab Spring. Carnegie analysts wrote that they resembled demonstrations in Nepal and Madagascar: separate triggers, a focus on corruption, inequality and weak services, and anonymous organizing on Discord. Morocco’s monarchy, they added, could blame ministers and leave the king insulated.
The Council on Foreign Relations grouped Morocco with Indonesia, Madagascar, Nepal and Peru, and treated Kenya’s 2024 tax protests as an earlier case. Sparks differed: a housing allowance in Indonesia, posts by politicians’ children in Nepal, and eight deaths in childbirth in Morocco alongside anger that World Cup spending had come before hospitals and calls for Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch to resign. CFR described governments in Nepal and Madagascar as dissolved; Indonesia cancelled a lawmaker pay rise without removing its leaders; officials resigned in Peru; and Kenya’s president withdrew a finance bill. In Nepal, Discord users voted on an interim prime minister. Morocco’s 2026 election brought the lowest turnout since 2007 rather than a Generation Z bloc in parliament.
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Cite this page
Factrail. (2026). 2025 Moroccan Gen Z protests. Factrail. https://factrail.ai/facts/2025-moroccan-gen-z-protests
https://factrail.ai/facts/2025-moroccan-gen-z-protests
Accessed 19 November 2026.
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