
Central Epidemic Command Center
The Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC; Chinese: 中央流行疫情指揮中心) is a temporary command that the Ministry of Health and Welfare of Taiwan may establish…
Expert article
The Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC; Chinese: 中央流行疫情指揮中心) is a temporary command that the Ministry of Health and Welfare of Taiwan may establish, with the approval of the Executive Yuan, when a communicable-disease outbreak requires personnel, facilities and supplies to be placed under a single authority. Article 17 of the Communicable Disease Control Act authorizes the ministry to appoint a commander to direct government agencies at every level, state enterprises, reserve-service organizations and civic groups, and, when necessary, to coordinate support from the armed forces. The same article leaves the rules on the center's organization, training, assistance and procedures to the ministry. In practice the center operates through the National Health Command Center, a standing facility of the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control that also houses commands for biological-pathogen disasters, counter-bioterrorism and medical emergencies.
That facility was built after the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). The disease-control bureau's own account of the opening says a temporary command post was set up in the bureau's basement during SARS, and that the limits of an ad hoc post prompted a request for a permanent center; the Executive Yuan approved the project on 16 August 2004, and the National Health Command Center opened on 18 January 2005. The statutory epidemic center was activated on 28 April 2009, after the World Health Organization raised its influenza pandemic alert to phase 4. Health Minister Yeh Ching-chuan chaired the first meeting, which concentrated on border quarantine and medical supplies in an effort to keep the virus of the 2009 swine flu pandemic from taking hold in Taiwan.
For COVID-19, the Executive Yuan on 20 January 2020 approved a level-3 center led by CDC Director-General Chou Jih-haw. The center was raised to level 2 on 23 January 2020 and to level 1, the highest tier, on 27 February 2020. Premier Su Tseng-chang kept Minister of Health and Welfare Chen Shih-chung, already the center's head, in command, and deputy ministers of other agencies were required to attend its meetings. At that promotion the Cabinet ordered health monitoring for people returning from affected places and approved more mask production lines, while Chen said hospitals would add isolation wards and raise daily screening capacity. A surge of local infections in May 2021 led the center to restrict gatherings, including crowds at sporting events. The next month a poll commissioned by the Taiwan People's Party found that 62 percent of respondents disapproved of the pace of the center's COVID-19 vaccine purchases. In July 2022 Chen handed the command to Deputy Health Minister Victor Wang (Wang Pi-sheng).
On 25 April 2023 the center announced that the Executive Yuan had approved its dissolution on 1 May 2023, the same day COVID-19 was to be reclassified from a Category 5 to a Category 4 notifiable communicable disease. From that date the ministry was to convene regular cross-agency liaison meetings, the CDC was to continue surveillance reporting in weekly press conferences, and government-funded vaccines and antiviral drugs were to remain available to eligible people. Article 17, which allows a future center to be established, remained in the Communicable Disease Control Act.
Legal basis
Communicable Disease Control Act
In Taiwan, the standing authority for a Central Epidemic Command Center is the Communicable Disease Control Act (傳染病防治法). Article 2 names the Ministry of Health and Welfare as the central competent authority. Rewritten as 75 articles and promulgated on 20 January 2004, after SARS, it was promulgated again in full on 18 July 2007. Regulations issued in December 2004 already cited Article 17, which later partial amendments through 2023 left unchanged.
Article 17 lets the ministry, with Executive Yuan approval, establish the center and name one commander when domestic or international conditions require resources, facilities, and personnel to be assembled. The commander directs governments at every level, state enterprises, reserve-service organizations, and civic groups, and may seek support from the national armed forces. Article 16 separately lets a local competent authority open its own command center, and Article 57 lets that center, with central approval, use some of the central center’s requisition powers.
The Act creates no general emergency decree. While the center is open, Article 37’s controls on schools, gatherings, traffic, and patient movement follow the commander’s instructions, and Articles 52 to 56 allow priority use of communications, adjustment of specified reporting and care rules, compensated expropriation of sites, private property, and medical goods, and use of public property outside ordinary loan limits. Article 9 requires media to correct a harmful erroneous report. Article 64-1, added on 19 June 2019, fines that failure NT$100,000 to NT$1 million, and Article 61 punishes serious hoarding of requisitioned goods with one to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to NT$5 million. A 2021 account of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 690 describes that ruling as upholding compulsory isolation, subject to limits of time, appeal, and compensation.
Enforcement regulations
The Enforcement Regulations Governing the Central Epidemics Command Center (中央流行疫情指揮中心實施辦法) were issued by the Department of Health of the Executive Yuan on 20 December 2004 and reduced, on 28 January 2008, from 37 articles to the 15 still in force. They implement paragraph 2 of Article 17. Article 2 requires the ministry to judge severity—a major epidemic, a biological-agent attack, or another condition requiring mobilization—and to ask the Executive Yuan to approve both the center and its commander.
The commander has unified authority, may appoint one to three deputies, and may direct requisitions under Articles 52 through 56. The center handles surveillance, response policy, and coordination of news, borders, quarantine, and ports, and may issue documents in its own name or the commander’s. The commander may ask the Executive Yuan to dissolve it; records then return to the ministry, and local command centers may use the same rules. The center is temporary, and the regulations set no alert levels.
Special legislation during COVID-19
For COVID-19, termed severe pneumonia with novel pathogens, the Legislative Yuan enacted the Special Act for Prevention, Relief and Revitalization Measures for Severe Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens (嚴重特殊傳染性肺炎防治及紓困振興特別條例). Promulgated on 25 February 2020, it originally ran from 15 January 2020 to 30 June 2021 and could be extended by the legislature. Amendments promulgated on 31 May 2021 raised the funding ceiling from NT$420 billion to NT$840 billion and extended the Act through 30 June 2022. A Legislative Yuan reply of 7 June 2022 extended it through 30 June 2023. The ministry announced on 3 July 2023 that the Act had expired on 30 June 2023 and was abrogated by its own terms.
Article 7 was the main addition to the commander’s authority: the commander “may, for disease prevention and control requirements, implement necessary response actions or measures.” Wen-Chen Chang and Chun-Yuan Lin, writing in April 2021, called it an expansive necessity power, seldom cited except for a travel restriction on medical personnel. Tsung-Ling Lee read it as restating the delegation in Interpretation No. 690. Article 16 fines a violation NT$50,000 to NT$1 million.
Article 8 allowed recording and publication of personal data on quarantine violations and confirmed cases, notwithstanding the confidentiality rules in Articles 10 and 11 of the Communicable Disease Control Act, with post-epidemic handling under personal-data rules. Article 5 let the commander direct expropriation of equipment and materials for supplies under Article 54 of that Act, and Article 14 made damaging epidemic rumors a crime punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine of up to NT$3 million. Article 3 provided compensation and job protection for isolation, quarantine, and family care, while Article 11 capped spending at NT$840 billion and Article 18 required reports to the legislature.
Organization and command
Place in the health system
The Central Epidemic Command Center (中央流行疫情指揮中心) is a temporary body, not a standing agency of Taiwan. Under enforcement regulations issued pursuant to the Communicable Disease Control Act, the Ministry of Health and Welfare recommends establishment when it judges that a major communicable-disease epidemic, an attack with biological pathogens, or a comparable emergency requires mobilization. The Executive Yuan approves the center and appoints the commanding officer, who may name one to three deputies. That officer has unified authority over government bodies, public enterprises, reservist organizations, and nongovernmental groups, may coordinate military support, and may direct requisitions of resources, facilities, and personnel. Deputy heads of relevant agencies may sit as members, and local epidemic command centers may use the same rules.
For an infectious-disease event the center is one of four command arrangements that can use the National Health Command Center at the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control in Taipei. The others are the Biological Pathogen Disaster Command Center, the Counter-Bioterrorism Command Center, and the Central Medical Emergency Operations Center. The Taiwan CDC dates the facility to 2004, after SARS; a 2017 review describes it as built in 2005. The CDC says it can hold about 100 people and that an Emergency Operation Center added in 2016 supports video conferences and displays fed by surveillance, National Health Insurance, and stockpile data, including International Health Regulations exchanges. In a wider disaster it connects to the Executive Yuan’s Central Emergency Operation Center, which handles cross-government command.
Activation levels
The ministry’s biological-pathogen disaster plan (eighth edition, approved March 2025) treats the center as the central biological-pathogen response center and has the commander set the opening tier (開設層級). Level 3, the lowest, applies when only the health ministry needs to start. Level 2 brings in some other ministries. Level 1, the highest, applies when area, escalation, or duration is judged beyond Level 2, and listed agencies send senior officials, with others added at the commander’s discretion. The tier can be raised after opening; the commander asks the Executive Yuan to dissolve the center when unified command is no longer required. Many local plans mirror the grades, with the health bureau often leading a lower tier and the mayor or magistrate the highest. The regulations do not tie a tier to a fixed post.
The COVID-19 activation is the documented case of all three tiers in sequence. A Level 3 center was approved on 20 January 2020 with Taiwan CDC Director-General Chou Jih-haw (Chou Chih-haw, 周志浩) in command. Premier Su Tseng-chang raised it to Level 2 on 23 January, with Minister of Health and Welfare Chen Shih-chung as commander, and to Level 1 on 27 February, reappointing Chen rather than taking the post. Deputy ministers of the agencies concerned were to stand by for regular meetings. A ministry preparedness table reproduced in a 2020 review used a different, four-step numbering, under which community spread inside Taiwan would have made the premier chief commander. That table was not the 開設 scale that was announced: Level 1 remained under the health minister.
The opening tiers are also distinct from the epidemic-alert levels (疫情警戒) used to set public restrictions. In May 2021, with the center already at its highest opening tier, it raised a nationwide COVID-19 warning to “level 3,” requiring masks away from home and limiting social gatherings to five people indoors and ten outdoors, excluding workplaces, schools, and co-resident family members.
Internal structure
The 2008 regulations do not freeze departments: the commander appoints directors and may change task groups, staffing, and stationing as the outbreak requires. A 2017 review described three groups—surveillance, response, and logistics—and counted eight activations by then, for dengue fever, enterovirus, novel influenza A (including pandemic H1N1 and H7N9), rabies, and Zika virus.
Ministry of Health and Welfare diagram of the Level 1 COVID-19 Central Epidemic Command Center, with ten groups under intelligence, operations, and logistics. The chart names Pi-sheng Wang as commander.
The Level 1 COVID-19 chart sorted ten execution groups into intelligence, operations, and logistics. The commander sat at the first layer and deputy commanders at the second; an expert consultation meeting stood beside that line, not among the ten groups. Intelligence was epidemic surveillance. Operations were border quarantine, community epidemic prevention, and medical response. Logistics were materials, administration, research and development, news and publicity, information, and legal affairs. The plan’s appendix lists the same ten with partner agencies rather than the three banners: surveillance and World Health Organization liaison; borders with interior, transportation, and foreign affairs; community follow-up of isolation and quarantine; and hospital capacity, laboratories, and the communicable-disease medical network. Logistics covers supplies, research with Academia Sinica and the National Health Research Institutes, information systems, briefings and the 1922 line, and legal affairs, including false-information cases.
History through 2019
SARS and the National Health Command Center
Taiwan’s 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome response used temporary bodies, not the later statutory Central Epidemic Command Center. The Executive Yuan appointed former Department of Health director-general Lee Ming-liang as overall commander and opened a command post in the basement of the Centers for Disease Control building in Taipei. The World Health Organization later said a lapse of infection control in one hospital let an outbreak that had been contained escalate. The last reported probable case was isolated on 15 June 2003. On 5 July WHO removed Taiwan from the list of areas with recent local transmission—the last such area—when its running tally was 674 cases and 84 deaths. Later review left 346 officially confirmed cases. An analysis using WHO figures recorded 37 deaths attributed directly to SARS and 36 further SARS-related deaths, and more than 150,000 people in home quarantine—close contacts from 18 March, travelers from 28 April. WHO’s final table of probable cases through 31 July 2003 likewise lists 346 cases and 37 deaths.
In November 2003 the Department of Health’s director visited the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services command center and told the CDC to form a working group. Under the Communicable Disease Control Act clause that lets the central health authority, with Executive Yuan consent, establish a command center and name a commander, the CDC applied on 10 May 2004 and was approved on 16 August 2004; construction finished at the end of December. At 10 a.m. on 18 January 2005 the National Health Command Center opened on the seventh floor of the CDC building, joining the Central Epidemic Command Center with centers for biological-pathogen disasters, counter-bioterrorism, and medical emergencies. The layout includes a coordination center, situation room, commander’s office, and media watch room, and the facility can hold about 100 people.
2009 influenza pandemic
The statutory center’s first nationwide influenza activation was the 2009 swine flu pandemic. After WHO raised its alert to phase 4, the Executive Yuan established the Central Epidemic Command Center under Article 17, and Health Minister Ching-Chuan Yeh convened the first meeting on 28 April 2009. With no case yet reported in Taiwan, the meeting raised travel warnings, strengthened border quarantine, and turned to cross-agency preparation and medical supplies. The first patient in Taiwan was identified on 20 May 2009.
Monovalent vaccination began on 1 November 2009. By 31 March 2010, 5.67 million doses were provided for a population of about 23 million; more than 22.4 percent received at least one dose, and 71.7 percent of students aged 7 to 18 did.
From 1 July 2009 through 30 June 2010, hospitals reported 1,297 influenza cases with severe complications, 937 of them (72.2 percent) pandemic A(H1N1). The pandemic virus caused 44 confirmed deaths, 1.9 per million. A letter dated 25 February 2010, published the next day, said the center had run 305 days and held 43 meetings and that Premier Wu had agreed to disband it. Surveillance, vaccination, care, stockpiles, and education would continue routinely, with reactivation if a third wave appeared.
Later outbreaks
On 3 April 2013, as human influenza A (H7N9) infections rose in China, the Department of Health listed the virus as a Category 5 notifiable disease, raised the quarantine alert, and at 6 p.m. activated a national command center. Premier Jiang Yi-huah presided, and CDC Director-General Chang Feng-yee was named chief.
For dengue, the center’s 15th meeting, on 8 January 2016, deactivated the command arrangement as transmission slowed and left routine coordination to the health and environment agencies. As of 7 January the CDC reported 43,414 indigenous cases since the summer—22,760 in Tainan and 19,720 in Kaohsiung—and 218 deaths, 87.6 percent of them in people aged 60 or older.
COVID-19 activation
Opening and upgrades
On 20 January 2020, with a novel coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan already producing imported infections abroad, the Executive Yuan approved a Level 3 center—the lowest tier used for this outbreak—and the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control named its director-general, Chou Jih-haw (周志浩), as commander. Reporting the same day described the center as opened before the Lunar New Year travel peak and before Taiwan had announced a confirmed case. The Ministry of Health and Welfare was the central authority the new body was built to support.
The center moved to Level 2 on 23 January, after further growth in 2019-nCoV infections and Wuhan’s suspension of public transport from 10 a.m. that day. Minister of Health and Welfare Chen Shih-chung (陳時中) became commander. Premier Su Tseng-chang and Chen Chi-mai attended and directed agencies to treat prevention as an urgent cross-government task. The ministry then counted one confirmed case in Taiwan, announced on 21 January, among 65 reports under investigation.
On 27 February 2020 Su raised the center from Level 2 to Level 1, the highest tier, and kept Chen as commander, with deputy ministers of relevant agencies on standby so decisions could move faster as cases rose abroad. He described the step as preemptive while domestic spread was still characterized as limited and mostly within households. That organizational level was not raised again. The “Level 3” decisions of May 2021 were a separate public COVID-19 alert for restrictions in daily life; later official accounts still listed the command center itself as Level 1 from 27 February 2020.
Commanders
Chou’s tenure as commander lasted from 20 to 23 January 2020. He stayed inside the center and, by July 2022, still CDC director-general, headed its disease-surveillance division.
Chen commanded from 23 January 2020 until 18 July 2022, for almost all of that time as health minister and as the official who fronted the center’s regular briefings. The main domestic break with early containment under his command came in May 2021. On 15 May, after 180 locally transmitted infections were confirmed, the center raised the COVID-19 alert to Level 3 for Taipei and New Taipei City until 28 May, leaving other jurisdictions at a Level 2 alert. On 19 May it extended the Level 3 alert nationwide while reporting 267 new local infections. Interior Deputy Minister Chen Tsung-yen (陳宗彥), the deputy commander, briefed reporters on 20 May after the center’s first daily meeting with city and county governments on testing, patient placement, and contact tracing.
On 14 July 2022 Chen said he would resign as minister and as CECC head to campaign as the Democratic Progressive Party candidate for Taipei mayor, staying until successors were named. The next day the Executive Yuan appointed Deputy Health Minister Hsueh Jui-yuan (薛瑞元) as health minister and Wang Pi-sheng (王必勝; Victor Wang in some English reports), director of the Hospital and Social Welfare Organizations Administration Commission, as a deputy health minister and CECC commander, effective 18 July. Chang Shan-chwen (張上淳), convener of the center’s specialist advisory panel, became the Cabinet’s chief pandemic adviser, a new post. At the 18 July briefing Chen handed Wang the commander’s vest. Wang said Chen Tsung-yen had also left the deputy post and that a replacement would follow Executive Yuan approval.
From containment to endemic management
Through early 2022 the center’s stance remained suppression of imported infection and small clusters. On 7 April 2022 the health ministry launched a “new Taiwanese model,” authorized by Su that day and reported as a departure from a “zero COVID-19” policy. CDC Deputy Director-General Chuang Jen-hsiang (莊人祥) said the strategy would no longer aim at total suppression, citing the usually mild course of the Omicron variant and the aim of limiting harm while keeping medical care and ordinary life going. Su said the model was not the same as “living with COVID-19,” because spread would not be left unchecked. The center that day reported 382 domestic and 149 imported cases, its highest local daily count of the year to that point.
Wang took command during that shift. At his first briefing he warned that the Omicron BA.4 and BA.5 subvariants could drive another local wave the next month or in September, and he said the center’s main goal was a return to normal life alongside continued prevention, including border and quarantine rules, boosters, and protection of higher-risk groups. The briefing recorded 17,549 local cases, 454 imported cases, and 48 deaths.
By spring 2023 the emergency body was being closed. From 20 March, mild infections were no longer subject to mandatory notification and isolation. On 25 April the CECC said severity had fallen, domestic transmission was low, and other countries were lowering COVID-19’s emergency status. Effective 1 May, it announced, the disease would move from a Category 5 to a Category 4 notifiable disease, and the Executive Yuan had approved dissolving the center that day, with the health ministry holding regular cross-agency meetings for continued preparation and response. The center was disbanded on 1 May 2023.
Disease-control measures
During its COVID-19 activation the Central Epidemic Command Center set border, quarantine, testing, supply, vaccination, and gathering rules for Taiwan.
Borders, quarantine and testing
Within one day the health-insurance database was linked to immigration records, so recent travel appeared when a National Health Insurance card was used. Visitors who scanned a QR health declaration and were classed as lower risk received a text used as a clearance pass. Airline crews were later placed on a shorter rule: from 15 April 2021, long-haul crews had three days of isolation and 11 of self-monitoring after a negative test, the “3+11” arrangement.
On 13 October 2022 arrival quarantine ended (“0+7”): seven days of self-initiated prevention, no electronic fence, and four rapid-test kits for people aged two and older, with a negative test required within two days of going out. Visa-exempt entry and tour groups resumed under a trial cap of 150,000 arrivals a week.
In May 2021 the center paid for community stations aimed at contacts and people who had been in hotspots, preferably outside advanced emergency hospitals: NT$200,000 in equipment per station and NT$500 per person tested. From 26 May 2022 a positive rapid antigen test, if a doctor confirmed it or a health worker performed it, could define a case for anyone, not only people already isolated, people 65 and older, or residents of indigenous areas and outlying islands.
Masks and medical supplies
On 24 January 2020 the Customs Administration banned exports of surgical masks and N95 respirators through 23 February. In late January the government requisitioned domestic surgical-mask output, on top of a pre-outbreak stockpile reported as 44 million surgical masks and 1.93 million N95 respirators, and fixed prices.
A worker displays mask material beside rolls and finished surgical masks.
Name-based sales began on 6 February, after convenience stores stopped selling requisitioned masks on 4 February. Buyers used an insurance card at 6,505 contracted pharmacies, or a public health center in rural areas: two masks every seven days at NT$5, on days set by the last digit of the identification number, with Sunday open to all. One other person’s card could be used; a child’s mask required the card of someone 12 or under. The child quota became four a week when classes resumed on 21 February, and by 9 April the allowance was nine masks every 14 days.
Output was about 1.8 million masks a day before the outbreak. After NT$180 million for new lines, announced on 31 January, a “National Mask Team” reached about 10 million a day in March and 20 million in May. Early April was also reported at 13 million a day. Pharmacists split bulk shipments into the ration, and a government website was added to thin pharmacy queues.
Vaccination
On 19 July 2021 regulators authorized Medigen’s MVC-COV1901 for ages 20 and older. Neutralizing-antibody levels were reported at 3.4 times those in AstraZeneca recipients, and the seroresponse rate at 95.5 percent, above the agency’s thresholds; the immunization committee still had to clear national-program use. A state purchase of the Pfizer–BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine did not go through Shanghai Fosun, distributor for Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, and Macau, after officials refused that route over concern the doses might be made in China. In late June the government authorized TSMC and Hon Hai (Foxconn) to buy up to 10 million doses for shipment from Germany. The firms capped spending at US$175 million, US$105 million, and US$70 million respectively, the last through Hon Hai’s Yonglin Foundation.
Social restrictions and digital tools
Epidemic alerts were separate from the center’s activation level. On 15 May 2021 it set a Level 3 alert for Taipei and New Taipei City, and on 19 May extended that alert nationwide, requiring masks away from home and limiting gatherings to five people indoors and ten outdoors, with exceptions that included co-resident families. Schools, including kindergartens, and cram schools stopped in-person classes from 19 to 28 May. Parents of a child under 12 could take disease-prevention childcare leave.
A “digital fence” run with five telecom firms located a quarantined phone from cell towers and alerted the authorities if the phone was off or left the set place. About 55,000 people were covered as of 1 April 2020. Fencing of arrivals ended on 13 October 2022. From 19 May 2021 a venue QR code prepared a free text to the 1922 hotline with a location code, a step described as taking about five seconds. Carriers kept the time and contents and, under agreements with the center, deleted them after 28 days.
Public communication
Press briefings
During the COVID-19 response, the Central Epidemic Command Center’s main public channel in Taiwan was a news conference. Tsai Ing-wen later described a shared habit of watching a 2 p.m. briefing. Central News Agency, citing the center’s closing tally, reported 159 command meetings, 960 press conferences and 2,199 releases over 1,194 days. The 960th and last was on 27 April 2023, before dissolution on 1 May. Commander Wang Pi-sheng chaired it, with former commander Chen Shih-chung and advisory-panel convener Chang Shan-chwen present.
The rhythm then slowed. From 28 November 2022, unless conditions changed, conferences were limited to Mondays and Thursdays, and daily case counts went out as releases. On 16 February 2023 Wang said the twice-weekly conferences would become weekly, with details the next week. From 29 March, daily case and death announcements stopped; weekly totals and five monitoring indicators were given at the Thursday afternoon conference. After the center closed, COVID-19 updates moved into routine CDC briefings.
While the center operates, Article 9 of the Communicable Disease Control Act requires a media outlet, once notified by the competent authority, to correct at once an erroneous report on the outbreak or on control measures that could seriously affect disease control. In February 2020, Line messages claiming toilet-paper pulp was being diverted into masks set off hoarding; officials said the materials differed and supply was normal, and investigators examined three women over the messages. In late May 2021, during a large local outbreak, Kuomintang caucus convener Alex Fai said the daily conferences should end because they praised the center and skipped vaccine purchases, added beds and test turnaround.
Stated confidence moved with the epidemic. A Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation survey by Focus Survey Research—1,072 telephone interviews in the week before a 23 June 2021 release, margin of error 2.99 points—found 62.9 percent approval of Chen’s pandemic performance; about 67 percent scored him at least 60 out of 100. Chairman Michael You called that an 18-month low, coinciding with local infections since early May. The scores record satisfaction, not effectiveness.
Expert advice and the 1922 system
Chang told the Asahi Shimbun, in an account carried by Central News Agency, that then CDC director-general Chou Jih-haw asked him on 2 January 2020 to form an expert group. Six or seven infectious-disease specialists met on 5 January, before the first confirmed case. He said the commander decided policy, but advice on 14-day arrival quarantine and compulsory masks on public transport was adopted, and that daily conferences through June 2020 supported compliance. He was still the panel’s convener at the 2023 closing conference.
On 19 May 2021 the Executive Yuan began a separate free text check-in for shops, restaurants and transport. Audrey Tang, the minister without portfolio who led the project, said a venue QR code produced a message to 1922 carrying a venue code; carriers kept it and, under agreements with the center, deleted it after 28 days. That system was a venue check-in for contact tracing.
Assessment and controversy
Early international reception
Early outside commentary treated Taiwan’s low COVID-19 count as evidence that preparation could slow spread without a lockdown. In a March 2020 JAMA viewpoint, C. Jason Wang, Chun Y. Ng and Robert H. Brook wrote that travel with China had led analysts to expect a heavy early outbreak, yet only 30 cases were confirmed by 24 February. They cited linked health-insurance and immigration data, QR-code declarations, phone checks on quarantine and retesting of severe respiratory illness, and credited the Central Epidemic Command Center’s public communication.
On 7 June 2021, with a domestic wave underway, The Guardian reported about 250 days without a recorded local case, a record Taiwan had cited in its World Health Organization bid. Specialists said authorities had lagged on evidence about transmissible strains, aerosols and mass testing. Former health minister Chen Chien-jen said tracing and “precision” testing were overwhelmed by the SARS-CoV-2 Alpha variant after a 9 May superspreader event. The center said it had consulted outside experts but conceded “room for improvement in domestic prevention efforts.”
The 2021 outbreak and vaccines
Reporting first centered on China Airlines crew and Novotel hotel staff at Taoyuan airport. On 7 May 2021 the center said sequencing of 29 infections showed three introductions of a United Kingdom-associated variant. Commander Chen Shih-chung said the hotel would be fined for taking ordinary guests and the airline NT$1 million for quarantine failures. On 15 April crew rules had been cut to three days’ isolation plus 11 of self-monitoring after a negative test (“3+11”). On 19 May, with 267 new local infections—87 recent visitors to Taipei’s Wanhua District and 73 linked to its teahouses—Chen made a Level 3 alert nationwide. It ran until 27 July. By 7 June The Guardian counted more than 11,000 cases and 260 deaths, over 90 percent since mid-May, and a backlog of tests as hospitals were mobilized. The center said tighter rules were not always better once compliance and social harm were weighed.
In August Chen said a three-month inquiry found no link between that cluster, which he traced to a pilot who tested positive in Australia, and community spread: “There was no three-plus-11 loophole.” The Kuomintang caucus called the denial “beyond shameless,” and said it would sue and petition the Control Yuan, amid criticism over about 800 deaths since May.
Vaccination lagged. On 26 May President Tsai Ing-wen said AstraZeneca and Moderna orders, nearly 30 million doses, were booked “smoothly,” but a BioNTech deal failed “because of China’s intervention.” Reuters reported slightly more than 700,000 doses delivered and about 1 percent vaccinated. Fosun Pharma, holding rights to the Pfizer–BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine for mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, offered supply; Beijing denied a blockade. On 4 June Japan delivered 1.24 million AstraZeneca doses, more than doubling a stock of about 860,000 against orders above 20 million. Spokesman Wang Wenbin said Taipei had “lied” for “selfish political gains.” On 19 June the United States shipped 2.5 million Moderna doses, more than triple a 750,000 pledge; a U.S. official called Chinese blocking “reprehensible.”
The government then let TSMC and Foxconn negotiate. Fosun announced a deal on 11 July. A template Reuters reviewed would have let Fosun audit vaccination and collect recipient data; sources said the Hong Kong draft was dropped after alarming negotiators. On 19 July regulators authorized Medigen’s MVC-COV1901 for adults on immunobridging: antibody levels 3.4 times an AstraZeneca group and a 95.5 percent seroresponse, with 18 votes to approve on a 21-member panel, plus later safety and effectiveness reporting. Brian Hioe wrote that the Democratic Progressive Party government cast this as a shortage fix, while the Kuomintang called it opaque, spoke of “lab rats,” and alleged officials’ financial interests. Tsai received a dose on 23 August.
Rights, privacy and migrant workers
On 24 February 2022 Control Yuan members said the “digital fence”—phone locations tied to insurance numbers for home isolation—exceeded the Communicable Disease Control Act. It started on 5 February 2020, before the March preview and contract. From 15 May 2021 Wanhua insurance cards were flagged in secret and disclosed only on 28 May, after hospital refusals. The members cited gaps against United Nations and EU standards and sought a statutory privacy fix.
After a judge wrote that a warrant file showed police using 1922 check-in texts to track a suspect, the National Communications Commission said only the center could request that set and that police had not, but interception warrants could still capture the texts. The center told stations to exclude them, and carriers were to delete messages after 28 days.
In Miaoli, commissioner Hsu Yao-chang from 7 to 28 June 2021 confined migrant workers except for employer commutes. Taiwan Association for Human Rights secretary-general Shih Yi-hsiang called the order discriminatory because Taiwanese workers were not confined; Hsu said there was “no other choice.” In July 2022 the Control Yuan found no legal authority, urged reprimands, and noted Amnesty International’s annual report, U.S. State Department coverage, and failures on worker information and dormitories.
Political contestation
Hioe wrote that the Kuomintang blamed the ruling caucus for “3+11” and sought minutes of legislator Fan Yun’s meeting, which were withheld, while the government denied that the airline cluster seeded community spread. Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je and New Taipei City Mayor Hou You-yi sought a higher alert and later kept stricter dining rules. He also described attacks on late deliveries and on AstraZeneca, attempts by politicians and some local governments to buy vaccines, a requirement that doses come from the manufacturer, and falling approval ratings for both major parties.
On 14 July 2022 Chen, the Democratic Progressive Party’s new Taipei mayoral candidate, resigned as head of the Ministry of Health and Welfare and said he would leave the center when a successor was named. The Kuomintang called it an abandonment of unfinished work. He faced legislator Chiang Wan-an and possibly Taiwan People's Party figure Vivian Huang.
Dissolution and legacy
Downgrade and handover
On 25 April 2023 the center said that, from 1 May, COVID-19 would move from a Category 5 to a Category 4 notifiable disease and that the Executive Yuan had approved dissolving the center that day. The Ministry of Health and Welfare would hold regular cross-agency liaison meetings, and the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control would monitor variants and brief the public weekly. Designated COVID-19 wards would close. Government-funded antivirals and the herbal formula NRICM101 would stay available to eligible patients, and moderate-to-severe cases would still be hospitalized, isolated and treated at public expense. Mild cases were to keep up self-health management. Wards, government quarantine sites, mainly military bases, and name-based rationing could be brought back if supplies failed.
The center had opened on 20 January 2020. Focus Taiwan described the disbandment as coming after nearly 1,200 days. The Taipei Times reported that vaccination remained free but providers could charge a registration fee, that vaccination leave ended, and that subsidized sales of rapid tests stopped, while masks stayed mandatory in medical facilities, including pharmacies, and in ambulances at least through 30 May. Mandatory isolation for mild and asymptomatic infections had already ended on 20 March, replaced by advised “0+n” self-health management. On 23 May, after daily hospitalizations rose by about a third, the CDC kept the mask rule for hospitals, clinics, related institutes and senior welfare facilities, and from 31 May only recommended masks in ambulances and some other care settings.
Article 7 of the Special Act for Prevention, Relief and Revitalization Measures for Severe Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens let the commander “implement necessary response actions or measures.” On 27 May 2022 the Legislative Yuan extended the act and its special budget to 30 June 2023. A ministry announcement of 3 July 2023 said the period had expired on 30 June and that the act was abrogated ipso facto, so that commander discretion and the special budget lapsed after the center itself was gone. Article 17 of the Communicable Disease Control Act still allows the central competent authority, with Executive Yuan approval, to establish a command center when conditions require it.
What remained in routine practice
COVID-19 work then returned to ordinary ministry and CDC channels, including the weekly disease briefings. The National Health Command Center, which the CDC describes as the standing facility that houses an epidemic command center together with biological-pathogen, counter-bioterrorism and medical-emergency centers, was not the organization dissolved on 1 May. The power to open a national center was not used for the 2023 dengue fever outbreak. On 23 September, after a legislator cited more than 8,400 indigenous cases, Premier Chen Chien-jen told the Legislative Yuan that ministry liaison meetings and local coordination made a national command center unnecessary.
Later review treated the COVID-era center as a finished operation. A Control Yuan investigation of vaccine preparedness, case 112社調0003, found that because Taiwan’s outbreak had lagged other countries, contracts came later and covered relatively fewer doses, so Taiwan was not a priority for delivery. About 870,000 doses had arrived by the end of May 2021, and about 9.51 million by the end of July, of which about 5.86 million were donations. The report said published information had not answered public doubts, and it asked the Executive Yuan to press for fuller disclosure and a review of secrecy markings.
By the Factrail desk · Method: how we source and score · Last reviewed