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Thomas M. Franck

Thomas M. Franck

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Thomas Martin Franck (14 July 1931 – 27 May 2009) was a German-born scholar and practitioner of international law who taught for more than four decades…

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Thomas Martin Franck (14 July 1931 – 27 May 2009) was a German-born scholar and practitioner of international law who taught for more than four decades at the New York University School of Law. He was born in Berlin, the only child of Hugo and Ilse Franck. At the age of seven he left Germany with his family just before the November 1938 Kristallnacht pogrom; after the United States refused them visas, they spent six months in Switzerland and emigrated to Vancouver, Canada.

He received a bachelor's degree in 1952 and a law degree in 1953 from the University of British Columbia, and in those two years he served as a lieutenant in the Canadian Army. He then earned a master of laws in 1954 and a doctorate of juridical science in 1959 from Harvard Law School. In 1954 he began as an assistant professor at the University of Nebraska. He joined the NYU law faculty in 1960, founded and directed its Center for International Studies from 1965 until he retired in 2002, and from 1988 held the Murry and Ida Becker Professorship of Law.

Franck's scholarship ranged across the United Nations and the use of force, what he called the "compliance pull" of international norms, a proposed human right to democratic governance, and the place of foreign affairs under the United States Constitution. He was the author or co-author of 31 books, among them The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990), Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995), and Recourse to Force (2002), with his published work running from Race and Nationalism (1960) to The Law and Practice of the United Nations (2008). He edited the American Journal of International Law from 1984 to 1993 and was president of the American Society of International Law from 1998 to 2000. David Kennedy, then of Brown University, described him as the leading American scholar of international law of his generation.

In the era of decolonization he worked on constitutions for Tanganyika and Zanzibar, later joined as Tanzania, for Rhodesia, later Zimbabwe, and for Sierra Leone, and he later advised the governments of Kenya, Mauritius, the Solomon Islands, El Salvador, and Chad. From 1995 to 2007 he was counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina before the International Court of Justice in its case against Serbia over the 1995 killings at Srebrenica, and he also sat as a judge ad hoc. He died of prostate cancer on 27 May 2009 at his home in Manhattan, survived by his partner, Martin Daly, whom he had married in California in 2008.

Early life and education

Berlin and emigration

Thomas Martin Franck was born in Berlin on July 14, 1931, the only child of Hugo and Ilse Franck. His parents were German-Jewish, and Hugo Franck had been a judge in Germany. Daniel Stoffman, whose family knew the Francks in Vancouver, later suggested that the son's drive to make his mark in law may have been an effort to make up for that interrupted judicial career.

The family remained in Berlin through his early childhood and left only in 1938. In November of that year, when Thomas was seven, the family left Nazi Germany for Switzerland a few days before Kristallnacht, the anti-Jewish pogrom of November 9–10. A Vancouver family friend wrote that Hugo Franck made that departure while it was still possible for Jews to escape. Their application for visas to the United States was denied. After six months in Switzerland they obtained visas for Canada and settled in Vancouver, British Columbia. A memorial text prepared at New York University School of Law described the Swiss interval as a brief stay before the move to Vancouver.

Burrard Street in Vancouver looking toward the Marine Building, 1930.

He arrived speaking German, rapidly became proficient in English, and completed his schooling in Vancouver. Hugo Franck sold insurance in the city. Vancouver friends knew the son as Tommy. One episode they later recalled was a dinner for which his parents asked him to write place cards: instead of names, he composed rhymes that contained clues to each guest. The parents stayed in Vancouver after he left the university. On visits home he came from New York, Tanzania, or The Hague, often bringing a newly published book. The New York Times later described his advocacy of international justice as rooted in that childhood as a refugee from Nazi Germany.

University of British Columbia and military service

Franck studied at the University of British Columbia. He received a B.A. in 1952 and an LL.B. from its Faculty of Law in 1953. In 1952 and 1953, the years those degrees were awarded, he served as a lieutenant in the Canadian Army.

Harvard Law School

From British Columbia he went to Harvard Law School. He studied there with Louis B. Sohn, receiving an LL.M. in 1954 and, in 1959, an S.J.D., the doctorate of juridical science. The two degrees were separated by his first teaching post. In 1954 he became an assistant professor at the University of Nebraska College of Law and taught there through 1956, with the doctorate awarded only after that appointment. In the American Journal of International Law, Rosalyn Higgins noted that although Franck had studied with Sohn, his interest did not lie in institutional blueprints or models.

Academic appointments

Nebraska and New York University

Franck's first teaching post was as an assistant professor at the University of Nebraska College of Law from 1954 to 1956. He joined the faculty of New York University School of Law in 1960, became a tenured professor in 1962, and in 1988 was appointed the Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law. In the fall of 2002, forty-two years after that appointment, he became Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law Emeritus, but he kept a teaching load close to the one he had carried before and continued to publish. From the 1970s he worked with Andreas Lowenfeld and Theodor Meron in the school's international law group.

Center for International Studies

In 1965 he founded the Center for International Studies and directed it until his retirement in 2002, with Shelley Fenchel as his assistant throughout. It opened on the top two floors of a brownstone at 6 Washington Square North, beside Washington Square Park, staffed by Franck, Fenchel, and one secretary. Dean Richard Revesz later wrote that the law school was not then known for strength in international law.

It soon added an associate director, an assistant director, and a board of advisers, and senior fellows drawn from the university and from outside supervised funded junior fellows in economics, politics, law, sociology, anthropology, government, and international relations. Projects and round tables ran from social change and Cold War politics to African, Near Eastern, and Ibero-American studies; in 1974, as outside funding receded, the center moved to the law school on the south side of the square and thereafter awarded fellowships mainly to second- and third-year law students.

Colloquiums put student work before outside commentators and regularly included the United Nations secretary-general, the UN legal counsel, ambassadors, national legal advisers, and judges. Mohamed ElBaradei, later director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, was a fellow from 1971 to 1974 and co-authored studies with Franck. When Franck became emeritus, the Institute for International Law and Justice, directed by Benedict Kingsbury, was organized on the center's model and succeeded it.

Visiting posts and external institutes

From 1963 to 1966 Franck was a visiting professor at the University of East Africa in Dar es Salaam. Rosalyn Higgins later treated those years at its law school as formative for his view that law should serve practical improvement, and as the period in which he began advising Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Kenya on their constitutions.

He stayed on the NYU faculty while directing the international law program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace from 1973 to 1979. A March 1976 article also identified him as professor of law at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University. From 1980 to 1982 he was director of research at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, and he placed NYU students on UNITAR projects for law-school credit.

In 1993 he gave the general course at The Hague Academy of International Law, published in that year's Collected Courses as Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System. He was a visiting fellow at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1996–97, where he delivered the Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, later published as Recourse to Force. In 2001 he was Carnegie Centenary Visiting Professor at the University of Glasgow. After leaving full-time teaching at NYU he held visiting professorships at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law (2004), the Georgetown University Law Center (2006), and the American University Washington College of Law (2008).

Legitimacy and fairness

The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations

In "Legitimacy in the International System" (American Journal of International Law, October 1988), Thomas M. Franck asked why states obey international law in a voluntarist system with little coercive authority. He treated day-to-day compliance, sometimes against short-term self-interest, as the fact to be explained, and as a possible guide to strengthening world order.

Oxford University Press published the book-length argument, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, in 1990. It asks why powerful nations obey powerless rules. An early-1988 Persian Gulf episode supplies the illustration Franck called "compliance pull": United States officials let a ship carrying Chinese-made Silkworm missiles pass toward Iran, rather than intercept it, because a high-seas seizure was judged incompatible with the rules of neutrality. Legitimacy, in his usage, is a property of a rule or rule-making institution that draws addressees toward compliance because they believe it has come into being and operates by generally accepted principles of right process. The pull is distinguished both from coercion—John Austin's picture of a sovereign command backed by sanctions, which Franck says cannot explain international obedience—and from conduct explained only by immediate self-interest. The postlude, "Why Not Justice?," brackets substantive justice rather than answering it.

Legitimacy is a matter of degree, organized around four indicators. Determinacy is textual clarity, qualified by a sophist-rule/idiot-rule paradox in which both opacity and rigid clarity can weaken compliance. Symbolic validation covers ritual, pedigree, and other cues that mark a rule as part of the social order rather than an ad hoc command. Coherence requires like cases to be treated alike and distinctions to rest on principles used across the system. Adherence connects a primary rule to secondary rules about how rules are made, interpreted, and applied. Drawing on H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin, Franck argued that pacta sunt servanda is not itself a product of a particular consent, and that the compliance pull is stronger when obligation rests on community membership than when it rests on contract.

Fairness in International Law and Institutions

Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 1995) grew out of Franck's 1993 general course at The Hague Academy of International Law, published in the Recueil des cours. He argued that international law had entered a "post-ontological era": the question was no longer whether it is really law, but whether it is effective, enforceable, understood, and, above all, fair.

Fairness has two independent vectors. Legitimacy, carried over from the earlier work, is procedural and associated with order; the same four indicators measure whether rules are made and applied by what participants regard as right process. Distributive justice is substantive and associated with change: whether rules allocate burdens and benefits justifiably. The vectors can coincide or conflict, and fairness is the discourse by which that tension is managed, not a formula discovered in advance. Franck treated moderate scarcity, and a community of continuing interaction and conscious reciprocity, as conditions of the discourse. Two "gatekeepers" limit it: a no-trumping rule against non-negotiable claims, and a maximin principle, borrowed from John Rawls, under which inequality is justifiable only if it narrows, or does not widen, existing inequality.

Later chapters apply the scheme to equity in allocation and then to persons and peoples, institutions, the use of force, the environment, and trade and investment. The discussions of a democratic entitlement, self-determination, and just and unjust war are taken up elsewhere; here they are instances of the same balance of process and distribution. A closing section calls equality of states, when only governments speak, an "unfair equality," and proposes a two-chamber United Nations General Assembly, one chamber as at present and one elected by universal suffrage.

Critical responses

Martti Koskenniemi's 1992 American Journal of International Law review treated "legitimacy" as a late, imprecise term in liberal theory, unused by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Marx. Its vagueness, he wrote, let critics avoid both formal validity, which he called too abstract, and justice, which he called too controversial, and so seem to escape "arid formalism or Utopian moralism." In "Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law" (2009), he extended the charge. Invoking Immanuel Kant's label, in Perpetual Peace, for Hugo Grotius and other natural lawyers, he argued that writing on legitimacy and compliance as governance offered a legal vocabulary in the service of power rather than binding cosmopolitan law. Quoting Franck's question of what can be said about the justice of rules when belief systems contend, he called "legitimacy" and procedural "fairness" mediate words, useful only while they stay unpinned to either formal rules or moral principles.

Other readers split. Ruth Lapidoth, in the European Journal of International Law (1997), called Fairness a modern classic for joining theory to examples and for separating existing law from reform proposals, while correcting details such as the 1951 Fisheries case and the 1992 minorities declaration. A 2002 symposium in the same journal was sharper. John Tasioulas read the book as an attempt to leave Koskenniemi's apology/utopia oscillation for something like Rawls's realistic utopia, but argued that fairness might be culture-specific, insufficient as a value for international law, and less apt internationally than The Law of Peoples. Iain Scobbie argued that the open equitable standards Franck welcomed reduce determinacy and can favor the party better able to wait out a settlement, and that the book's narrative of steady improvement was idealist. José E. Alvarez's 1991 essay "The Quest for Legitimacy" had already examined the 1990 book at article length.

Use of force and the United Nations

Charter rules and institutional practice

Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations requires members to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The stated exceptions are individual or collective self-defence “if an armed attack occurs” (Article 51) and measures the Security Council may take under Chapter VII after finding a threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.

In the American Journal of International Law in 1970, “Who Killed Article 2(4)?” argued that practice had “so severely shattered the mutual confidence” required for the prohibition to operate that, “as with Ozymandias, only the words remain.” Louis Henkin replied in 1971 that reports of the article’s death were “greatly exaggerated,” because a catalogue of violations obscured a wider pattern of compliance. A 1992 editorial on the International Court of Justice’s Lockerbie provisional-measures orders compared the Court to the Marshall Court in Marbury v. Madison: the judges refused to restrain Council sanctions, while opinions including Judge Shahabuddeen’s question—whether there were “any limits to the Council’s powers of appreciation”—left open review if the Council exceeded its delegated powers.

“What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq” (2003) returned to the 1970 essay after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In the 2006 centennial essay “The Power of Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Power,” he asked whether the American Society of International Law’s project of ordering relations by law and justice remained compelling “in the era of U.S. superpower-dom,” and set the pull of legitimate rules, including the Charter limit on force, against the claim that preponderant power justifies itself.

Recourse to Force

Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks (Cambridge University Press, 2002; xii + 205 pages) grew out of the Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, given in November 2000 at the Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge.

The front matter states the premise that the drafters “clearly were more concerned about peace than about justice,” prohibiting force except after an armed attack or with Council authorization. That design, the book argues, did not anticipate the Cold War veto, clandestine subversion, “instantaneous nuclear threats,” or the later weight of human-rights claims; because amendment was difficult, the text was interpreted through the practice of the principal political organs, which a heading calls adaptation of a “quasi-constitutional instrument.” Fabrizio Marella, reviewing the book in the Revue internationale de droit comparé (2004), quoted Franck’s statement (p. 5) that the drafters wanted a treaty different from others and described the method as evolutionary gap-filling.

On institutional force, Franck treats the uncoupling of Article 42 from the Article 43 agreements that were never concluded, the General Assembly’s Uniting for Peace resolution, the invention of “Chapter 6½,” and a wider notion of threat to the peace. On state recourse, chapters cover self-defence against terrorists, subversion, and attacks on nationals; anticipatory self-defence (the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1967 Arab–Israeli war, and Israel’s 1981 strike on an Iraqi reactor); countermeasures; and “purely humanitarian” intervention, from India and Tanzania through Vietnam in Kampuchea, ECOMOG in West Africa, and NATO in the Kosovo War.

The closing chapter is “What, eat the cabin boy? Uses of force that are illegal but justifiable.” In a 1999 Foreign Affairs reply to Michael J. Glennon, he wrote that Kosovo was not the first time “illegal steps have been taken to prevent something palpably worse”; one could plead mitigation where breach was the “least-unacceptable possible outcome,” but it would be “no advance” to dismantle the rule, and the proper course was “the most expiating explanation of the special circumstances,” not a rewritten Charter. Michael Byers reviewed the book in the American Journal of International Law (2003).

Earlier writing on the United Nations

Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It (Oxford University Press, 1985; viii + 334 pages) surveys the Organization’s first forty years of dispute settlement and peacekeeping. John C. Campbell, in Foreign Affairs, called the examination informed and the record disappointing, and described American reactions as running “from exaggerated hopes in the beginning to exaggerated disillusionment now,” and found it especially clear on how the office of Secretary-General developed with circumstances and incumbents.

Law and Practice of the United Nations: Documents and Commentary (Oxford University Press, 22 January 2008; 672 pages), with Simon Chesterman and David M. Malone, places UN documents beside commentary on the interaction of law and practice. Chesterman wrote that it came from Franck’s New York University School of Law seminar “UN Constitutional Law,” taught for half a century and co-taught with Chesterman and Malone, and that it was the last of Franck’s thirty-one books.

Self-determination and democratic governance

Nationalism and decolonization

Franck’s early books treated nationalism as a problem of decolonization, not as a completed international right. Race and Nationalism: The Struggle for Power in Rhodesia-Nyasaland (1960), published by Fordham University Press and by George Allen & Unwin, with a foreword by James Callaghan, examined the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Foreign Affairs called it an able study of a tense political and racial situation in a territory of some 7 million Africans and 250,000 whites.

East African Unity Through Law (Yale University Press, 1964; 184 pages) was reviewed with studies of East African federation and pan-African integration. International Journal described it as an account of East Africa’s legal and administrative machinery and of attempts to make that machinery a federation of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda.

In “The Stealing of the Sahara” (1976), in the American Journal of International Law, Franck applied self-determination to United Nations practice. He wrote that the organization had “monumentally mishandled” the disposition of Spanish Sahara, a territory of about 75,000 people, and had created “a precedent with a potential for future mischief out of all proportion to the importance of the territory.”

The emerging right to democratic governance

“The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,” American Journal of International Law 86 (1992): 46–91, argued that consent of the governed was moving from moral prescription toward international law. Drawing on the United States Declaration of Independence, he joined consent of the governed to recognition by other states. The claim was not yet “fully word made law,” he wrote, but democracy was “on the way to becoming a global entitlement,” promoted by collective processes.

The entitlement rested on three overlapping subsets. Self-determination was “the historic root”: a people’s right, in an established territory, to determine its political destiny democratically, from Woodrow Wilson at Versailles through United Nations practice in colonies and trust territories. The second was freedom of expression, drawn from human-rights instruments since the mid-1950s, and the third a right to free and open elections, defined and monitored internationally. These norms, he said, did not yet decide whether part of an existing state may secede.

His illustrations were both from 1991. The failure of the August coup in the Soviet Union suggested that democracy was becoming the test of valid governance; he credited Boris Yeltsin and Soviet citizens first, and also governments that opposed the plotters. After the September overthrow of elected Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the General Assembly demanded his restoration, application of the constitution, and respect for human rights, and the Organization of American States recommended diplomatic isolation and a suspension of economic ties. Franck read both responses as holding that only democracy validates governance, and he counted more than 110 governments as legally committed to multiparty, secret-ballot elections. Tested by pedigree, determinacy, coherence, and adherence, the norm was still uneven: monitoring remained voluntary, and he wanted established democracies to accept it and to pair that duty with a bar on unilateral intervention.

Later debate

Susan Marks’s The Riddle of All Constitutions (2000) treated the democratic-norm thesis associated with Franck as ideology: a thin electoral model presented as universal. In the European Journal of International Law (2011) she returned to Haiti and argued that practice had settled on low-intensity democracy—periodic elections and basic civil and political rights—while leaving economic inequality and popular exclusion aside.

An AJIL Unbound symposium in 2018, introduced by Tom Ginsburg, asked whether the right had crystallized and how it was enforced, after the post-Cold War “third wave” of democratization peaked around 2006 and then receded. Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth described a dual reception: the essay brought international lawyers into that debate, and it was also read as Western triumphalism. They noted that, without a single definition of democracy, later practice could be read as a minimalist electoral standard, and that Franck had not settled whether an unelected regime may still represent the state. They also recorded his limit on force: no unilateral or regional military enforcement without prior approval by the United Nations Security Council, because “the principal enemy” of the new rule was “fear of its vigilante enforcement.” Bojan Bugarič argued that an election-centered right did little against governments that kept formal votes while capturing courts and electoral administration. Khalifa A. Alfadhel observed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights state a procedural right, and that United Nations practice had stayed with electoral assistance, which could empower actors who then use an election to end democracy.

United States foreign affairs and constitutional law

Political questions and judicial review

In Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs? (Princeton University Press, 1992), Franck argued that federal courts should not treat foreign-affairs disputes as nonjusticiable political questions. Then the Murry and Ida Becker Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law, he traced judicial “abdication” to dicta in Marbury v. Madison (1803) and to a “Faustian pact” in which the early judiciary yielded review of foreign relations. Because the Constitution divides those powers, he wrote, courts may police limits on Congress and the President; deferential language in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) was dictum that lower courts had generalized too far.

He rejected objections that the facts are too hard, the standards too vague, the stakes too high, or a judgment too easy for the executive to ignore, and he noted decisions on the merits involving property, civil liberties, or a clash between Congress and the executive. Statutes limiting the act-of-state doctrine and assigning courts foreign-sovereign-immunity questions showed, he argued, that adjudication need not injure the national interest. Instead of dismissal he proposed a presumption of justiciability, drawn partly from Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court; an evidentiary rule giving executive submissions weight but not conclusive force; closed hearings for secrets; and declaratory judgments. The book received a Certificate of Merit from the American Society of International Law.

Reviews divided on the remedy. Andrew J. Pierre, in Foreign Affairs, called the challenge to judicial reticence convincing. James M. Delaplane Jr., in the Harvard Journal on Legislation, credited the history since Baker v. Carr but found the prudential answer thin: German courts were often as deferential in result as American dismissals were in form, and Franck’s own call for highly deferential review sat uneasily with his claim that the doctrine was “wholly incompatible” with American constitutional theory.

Foreign-policy dissent and executive power

With the political scientist Edward Weisband, Franck wrote on dissent inside the executive and on Congress. Resignation in Protest: Political and Ethical Choices Between Loyalty to Team and Loyalty to Conscience in American Public Life (Grossman Publishers, 1975; also issued by Viking and Penguin) compared American and British cabinet practice after the Vietnam War and Watergate. It received a Christopher Medal, also described as the Christopher Society Literary Award.

Word Politics: Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers (Oxford University Press, 1971) treated official language as strategy. Comparing the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic with the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, they argued that American justifications for blocking another communist government in the hemisphere supplied an “echo” for the Brezhnev Doctrine. William J. Brisk, in the Cornell Law Review, accepted the warning about rhetoric but judged overstated the claim that the words mattered more than the interventions.

Foreign Policy by Congress (Oxford University Press, 1979) described Congress’s post-Watergate cutoff of funds for bombing in Indochina and later pressure on Angola, Turkey, the Panama Canal treaties, intelligence, human rights, and nuclear proliferation. The authors called the shift real but double-edged, because influence often moved to ad hoc groupings and statutory limits could freeze diplomacy; Kirkus Reviews found that thesis overdrawn, given the discretion a determined president retained. From 1986 Franck also served on the Department of State’s Advisory Committee on International Law.

Teaching materials

Franck and Michael J. Glennon also assembled the field’s course materials. United States Foreign Relations Law: Documents and Sources (1980) received an ASIL Certificate of Merit. Foreign Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials, and Simulations, in West’s American Casebook Series, appeared in 1987 and in a second edition, with Glennon, in 1993. A third edition (Thomson/West, 2008) added Sean D. Murphy; a fourth, still listing Franck with additional coauthors, appeared in 2012.

Advisory practice and international litigation

Thomas M. Franck advised governments on constitutions and took part in inter-state cases, as counsel and as a judge ad hoc, before the International Court of Justice.

Constitutional advising

From 1963 to 1966, while a visiting professor at the University of East Africa in Dar es Salaam, Franck was a counselor to the governments of Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Kenya. Rosalyn Higgins, in a memorial in the American Journal of International Law, wrote that most of this work concerned those countries' constitutions, either as independence approached or shortly afterward. Tanganyika and Zanzibar later united as Tanzania.

The New York Times obituary described him as an advocate of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s who worked on constitutions for several African nations emerging from British rule: Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and Sierra Leone. The same obituary said he later served as legal adviser to the governments of Kenya, Mauritius, the Solomon Islands, El Salvador, and Chad. Richard L. Revesz, then dean of the New York University School of Law, went further, writing that Franck helped draft those constitutions. Neither account identifies particular provisions, and Higgins confines the documented counseling of 1963–1966 to Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Kenya.

Counsel before the International Court of Justice

Franck was counsel and advocate for Chad in Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), decided on 3 February 1994. The case, brought under a 1989 framework agreement, asked the Court where the boundary with Libya ran, and with it who held the Aouzou Strip.

By 16 votes to 1, the Court found that the boundary was defined by the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness concluded on 10 August 1955 between France and the United Kingdom of Libya. It fixed the line from the intersection of the 24th meridian east with parallel 19°30' north to the intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with the 16th meridian east, and from there to the intersection of the 15th meridian east with parallel 23° north. Libya had argued that no boundary existed; Chad relied on the 1955 treaty or, alternatively, on French effectivités. Judge ad hoc Sette-Camara dissented alone, and reporting of the judgment treated the line as placing the Aouzou Strip in Chad.

He was also counsel for Bosnia and Herzegovina in its suit under the Genocide Convention against Serbia and Montenegro. The Times reported that this retainer ran from 1995 to 2007. In the judgment of 26 February 2007, the Court held that genocide had been committed at Srebrenica in July 1995; that Serbia had not committed that genocide through its own organs or through persons whose conduct was attributable to it; and that Serbia had breached the Genocide Convention by failing to prevent the Srebrenica genocide and by failing to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

At his death he was still at work on Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995, filed on 17 November 2008 by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, now North Macedonia, against Greece over Greece's objection to Macedonian admission to NATO. Already terminally ill, he joined a team meeting on 20 and 21 May 2009, having told the client he could not finish the case, and died six days later.

Judge ad hoc and other tribunals

In 2001–2002 Franck sat as the judge ad hoc chosen by Indonesia in Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/Malaysia), including on the application by the Philippines to intervene. On 23 October 2001 the Court refused permission to intervene, by 14 votes to 1. Franck agreed and appended a separate opinion arguing, as a further ground, that a historic claim to North Borneo could not override the self-determination of that territory's population.

On the merits, the Court on 17 December 2002 awarded sovereignty over Ligitan and Sipadan to Malaysia by 16 votes to 1, relying on Malaysian effectivités after finding that neither party held a treaty title. Franck was the sole dissenter. He argued that the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the Netherlands should have been read as allocating the islands, south of the 4°10' north line in that convention, to the Netherlands and therefore to Indonesia, and that effectivités could not displace that conventional title.

He also sat as an arbitrator between Guyana and Suriname under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Guyana appointed him when it notified the claim on 24 February 2004, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration acted as registry. The tribunal's unanimous award of 17 September 2007 drew a single maritime boundary and held that Suriname's expulsion, on 3 June 2000, of a rig licensed by Guyana was a threat of force contrary to the Convention, the Charter of the United Nations, and general international law. It also found that both states had breached the duties in the Convention to make every effort toward provisional arrangements.

Professional leadership and honors

Journal and society offices

From 1984 to 1993 Franck was editor in chief of the American Journal of International Law. In the journal’s memorial, Rosalyn Higgins wrote that he held the office alone for those nine years, reading unsolicited manuscripts and choosing which to send to other members of the editorial board.

The American Society of International Law lists him as president for 1998–2000 and as honorary president for 2009–2010. Higgins recorded that he was made honorary president in March 2009, a dating also given by the American Branch of the International Law Association; he died on 27 May 2009. In that Branch he had served for many years as a vice president and as honorary secretary-treasurer, and in 1994 the Branch elected him an honorary vice president.

Fellowships, medals, and academies

The John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation’s list of 1973 fellows records Guggenheim Fellowships for him in 1973 and 1982, identifying him as professor of law and director of the Center for International Studies at New York University.

The Society’s Certificates of Merit recognized four books. The 1981 certificate, for high technical craftsmanship, went to United States Foreign Relations Law: Documents and Sources, two volumes published in 1980 with Michael J. Glennon. Certificates in the creative-scholarship category went in 1986 to Nation Against Nation: What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It (1985), in 1994 to Political Questions/Judicial Answers: Does the Rule of Law Apply to Foreign Affairs?, and in 1996 to Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995). In 2003 the Society gave him the Manley O. Hudson Medal, which its honors regulation describes as recognition of outstanding contributions to scholarship and achievement in international law.

In 1994 the Canadian Council on International Law awarded him its John E. Read Medal. The Council confers the medal for a distinguished or outstanding contribution to the development, understanding, or application of international law. For Resignation in Protest: Political and Ethical Choices Between Loyalty to Team and Loyalty to Conscience in American Public Life (1975), written with Edward Weisband, a tribute by Richard L. Revesz records a Christopher Medal; Weisband’s faculty profile describes the same book as receiving the Christopher Society Literary Award.

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences elected him a Fellow in 2003, listing his affiliation as the New York University School of Law, and inducted that class on 11 October 2003. At the 1993 Milan session of the Institut de Droit International he was one of seven new associates elected. Higgins also recorded an honorary LL.D. from the University of British Columbia in 1995, an honorary D.H.L. from the Monterey Institute of International Studies in 2003, and an honorary LL.D. from the University of Glasgow School of Law in 2004.

Personal life

Franck lived in a book-filled brownstone in Greenwich Village, Manhattan, which he shared with Martin Daly, his partner of many years. They married in California in 2008. An obituary in The Guardian described his openness as a gay man as unusual for his generation.

Rosalyn Higgins, writing in the American Journal of International Law, recalled drinks at Charlton Street and invitations to the couple’s home, sometimes followed by dinner in the Village. She noted his pleasure in a carefully made martini in Greenwich Village, in a gin sling at Raffles Hotel in Singapore, and in evenings at the opera or ballet. He cooked, played the harpsichord, and listened as readily to Sinéad O'Connor and R.E.M. as to Johann Sebastian Bach and George Frideric Handel. Higgins noted his bow ties and striped shirts; former students also recalled the moustache.

He kept close ties to Canada, where he had grown up. Daniel Stoffman, whose family had known the Francks in Vancouver, wrote that Franck still advised the Canadian government in Ottawa, including on the international-law implications should Quebec vote to secede. Stoffman also wrote that Franck disliked having to renounce Canadian citizenship on becoming a citizen of the United States, and that he raised the point with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, who said the law would soon change; when it did, Franck became a Canadian citizen again.

Franck died of prostate cancer at his Manhattan home on May 27, 2009, at the age of 77. The New York Times attributed the cause to his cousin Judith Friedlaender. Higgins wrote that he had known for about two years that the illness would be fatal, that Daly supported him, and that he went on teaching and traveling. On May 20 and 21 he was still working with the team preparing a case for the International Court of Justice; he died six days later. He was the only child of Hugo and Ilse Franck. A tribute by former students in the New York University Law Review described him as childless, and he was survived by Daly.

Reception and influence

Teaching and institutional legacy

Colleagues and former students who wrote after Franck’s death in 2009 returned to his tenure at the New York University School of Law. Philippe Sands, in a Guardian obituary, described an exceptional teacher whose accessibility and patience, and whose habit of encouraging arguments he thought wrong-headed, mattered to “thousands of former students and young colleagues.” Sands credited more than forty years of that teaching with building the school’s standing in international law, and noted that Franck founded the Center for International Studies in 1965 and directed it until 2002, with Shelley Fenchel’s assistance.

Rosalyn Higgins, in the American Journal of International Law, wrote that Franck inspired students and colleagues by energy, warmth, and original thinking, and that the Center’s colloquia put student papers before diplomats, judges, and other specialists. As research director of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research from 1980 to 1982, he brought NYU students onto Institute projects for academic credit. After becoming emeritus in 2002 he kept a nearly full teaching load, Higgins wrote, so as not to cut ties with students and colleagues.

Dean Richard Revesz wrote in the New York University Law Review that Franck had drawn hundreds of students toward senior work in international law and, with Andreas Lowenfeld and Theodor Meron, had helped form what Revesz called a formidable faculty in the field. He identified Benedict Kingsbury’s Institute for International Law and Justice as modeled on the Center and as its successor, and recorded that Franck endowed the Thomas M. Franck Fellowship in International Law. In the New York Times, David Kennedy, then at Brown University, called Franck “the leading American scholar of international law” and “a powerful voice in just about every discussion of important international law over the last four decades,” an “enthusiast for new ideas to make the world a more ordered and humane place.” Sands also noted his presidency of the American Society of International Law and his years as editor in chief of its journal.

Later scholarship treated that body of work as widely read and contested. Reviewing The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990), Martti Koskenniemi called “legitimacy” an “intermediate concept,” introduced late in liberal theory, whose imprecision let critics of institutions avoid both “the formal (but too abstract) idea of legal validity” and “the substantive (but too controversial) notion of justness.” The review, in the American Journal of International Law, thus set Franck’s use of legitimacy to explain compliance with unenforced rules on a middle ground between formalism and justice, rather than as a choice between them.

A longer debate followed “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” (1992). A 2018 AJIL Unbound symposium, introduced by Tom Ginsburg, reread the article against democratic recession after the post–Cold War spread of electoral government. Ginsburg reported that Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth gave the piece a double reception: a central text in international lawyers’ debates on democratization, and a document of post–Cold War triumphalism. They defended Franck against the charge that it justified intervention on behalf of democracy, while calling his account of democracy relatively underdeveloped.

Roberto Gargarella welcomed the return of attention to democracy but objected to a conception he called “reducible to regular elections, for the most part,” and to descriptive claims he found imprecise. He quoted Susan Marks’s argument that some theorists require more than the vote and associated liberties: direct participation in decisions, links through civil society, or the further rights that make equal participation possible. Ginsburg wrote that the contributors agreed the conception was underspecified, and that the election monitoring Franck emphasized was unlikely to answer later populism and backsliding, even as his question—whether only democracy and the rule of law could validate governance—remained open.

Evidence & methodology

How the record is sourced and how the score is derived.

The score is formula-derived (Factrail formula v1, version 1.0.0), not an editorial verdict. Read the methodology.

By the · Method: how we source and score · Last reviewed

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