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Italy’s €12bn Financial-Sector Levy Tests the State

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The Intesa Sanpaolo skyscraper in Turin, Italy, photographed on 15 September 2019.

TL;DR

Italy's 2027 budget targets banks and insurers with higher IRES, tighter IRAP deductions and deferred tax relief, raising legal and credit-supply risks. Italy's 2027 budget has turned the financial sector into one of the government's main sources of new revenue.

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Verdict

Italy's 2027 budget has turned the financial sector into one of the government's main sources of new revenue. Reuters reported a plan to collect €5.9 billion from banks, insurers and the wider financial sector in 2027, rising to €12 billion through 2029. The Italian Banking Association estimates that banks alone face about €7 billion of additional state revenue over the three-year period, including both permanent tax changes and deferred deductions. Those figures describe different scopes and accounting treatments, not one interchangeable bill. The legal design matters: a three-point IRES surcharge applies for 2027 and 2028, the deductible share of selected costs for IRAP falls from 90 to 30 per cent, and other provisions bring tax receipts forward rather than permanently increasing them. Giorgia Meloni calls the contribution a matter of justice. Intesa Sanpaolo chief Carlo Messina warns that shareholders will challenge its constitutionality. The real test is whether the state can collect the money without making credit, insurance and investment less predictable.

The headline is not a single bank tax

The first distinction is between the government's public headline and the individual provisions in the bill. Meloni said the financial sector should contribute because banks and insurers had done well in recent years, helped by higher interest rates and public support for lending. She described the higher taxation as a matter of justice in an economy where households are still facing high living costs and borrowing costs. Her argument is political as well as fiscal: banks have benefited from a period of higher rates, and the government wants some of that capacity to help finance tax reductions and spending.

But the package is not a simple levy on a single year's profits. Article 18 of the budget bill raises the existing additional IRES rate for financial intermediaries by three percentage points for the 2027 and 2028 tax periods. The additional rate for banks rises from 3.5 to 6.5 per cent. With the ordinary 24 per cent IRES rate, the Italian Banking Association says the effective rate for banks reaches 30.5 per cent. The same article introduces a three-point additional IRES charge for insurance companies, subject to a €200,000 deduction for each company. The measure is time-limited; it should not be described as a permanent new tax rate.

Article 19 changes the tax treatment of costs. For banks and insurance companies, the share of other administrative expenses and depreciation that can be deducted for IRAP falls from 90 to 30 per cent, with a €90,000 allowance against the additional tax. The Court of Auditors estimates that this measure produces €1.329 billion in extra revenue in 2027, €1.545 billion in 2028 and €1.192 billion in 2029. It identifies the change as the only structural measure in this group, with a long-run annual yield of about €1.15 billion. That matters because it changes the recurring tax base rather than merely moving a payment from one year to another.

The bill also doubles the financial transaction tax rates on share transfers, from 0.4 to 0.8 per cent, and on high-frequency transactions, from 0.04 to 0.08 per cent. The Parliamentary Budget Office says the government expects around €1.4 billion a year from this measure, but warns that estimates for the financial transaction tax and other permanent revenue measures carry uncertainty. Higher rates can change trading behaviour, reduce volumes or move transactions to other instruments and venues. A tax forecast is not guaranteed revenue until investors and intermediaries respond.

A further part of the package affects the timing of deductions linked to deferred tax assets. The Parliamentary Budget Office describes a further suspension in 2027 of deductions associated with the stock of deferred tax assets, worth about €2 billion in the official estimate, with recovery in equal instalments over the following two tax periods. The Court of Auditors likewise describes the deferral of deductions as an advance of revenue, not a permanent reduction in the amount banks can eventually deduct. The difference between a permanent tax and a payment brought forward is crucial for measuring the long-term cost to banks.

Why the headline numbers do not line up neatly

The different public estimates should not be added together or treated as if they measure the same thing. Reuters reported the government's financial-sector headline of €5.9 billion in 2027 and €12 billion through 2029. The ABI's estimate of roughly €7 billion is a bank-only calculation over three years: it divides the impact into about €4.8 billion of permanent taxes, including the higher IRES and tighter IRAP deductions, and €2.1 billion of deferred deductions and compensations. The ABI is the banks' representative body, so its figure is an industry estimate and an argument in a policy dispute, not a neutral government forecast.

The Court of Auditors scores Articles 18 to 21, which cover financial and energy-sector measures, at around €5.2 billion in 2027, €3.4 billion in 2028 and €1.7 billion in 2029 in net-borrowing terms. The Parliamentary Budget Office uses a wider perimeter when it describes all tax measures directed at companies: that package yields €5.2 billion in 2027, €4.7 billion in 2028 and €4.4 billion in 2029. These are different perimeters and different accounting treatments. They do not provide a simple reconciliation of the €12 billion political headline.

That gap is itself an accountability issue. Parliament should be able to see a table that separates banks from insurers, financial firms from energy companies, permanent taxes from temporary prepayments, and gross cash receipts from the net effect on borrowing. Without that breakdown, the public debate risks treating every euro as a permanent contribution from bank profits. Some measures change the tax burden permanently; others accelerate receipts and create lower payments later. The state may still need the cash in 2027, but it should not claim that a timing shift is the same as a permanent structural saving.

The ABI says the new measures come on top of nearly €15 billion in additional bank taxes introduced in the 2024 and 2025 budgets. That cumulative number is also the association's presentation of the sector's burden. Its wider warning is that the new package affects profitability, liquidity and, in some cases, regulatory capital ratios. The government has a legitimate interest in checking whether financial institutions can contribute more. The association has a legitimate interest in explaining how the measures affect the ability to lend. Neither claim should be accepted without the underlying numbers.

The constitutional argument is real but not automatic

Carlo Messina, chief executive of Intesa Sanpaolo, told a parliamentary committee that the measures were in part contrary to the Italian Constitution and that shareholders would raise the issue of constitutionality. He described the government's approach to parts of the budget as “South American”. That was a sharp political criticism, but the important point is the legal one: shareholders may challenge a sector-specific tax if they believe the state has not justified why the burden falls on their sector or how it relates to ability to pay.

The precedent most likely to be cited is the Constitutional Court's 2015 ruling on the so-called Robin Hood Tax. That measure imposed an additional IRES charge on certain energy, petroleum and gas operators. The Court found the design incompatible with Articles 3 and 53 of the Constitution, which protect equality and the principle of ability to pay. But the judgment did not say that every tax targeted at a sector is unconstitutional. It explicitly recognised that tax treatment can differ between sectors, provided the difference has adequate justification. Without that justification, a sector-specific regime can become arbitrary discrimination.

That distinction gives both sides an argument. Banks and insurers can say that repeated sector-specific measures are being used mainly to close a budget gap rather than to tax exceptional profits. The government can respond that the 2027 provisions are designed around the profitability, tax treatment and public support of financial institutions, and that the IRES surcharge is time-limited. A court would examine the actual legal text, the evidence supporting the distinction and the proportionality of the burden. The 2015 case is a warning, not an automatic verdict on the 2027 budget. Messina's statement is a signal of possible litigation; it is not proof that a lawsuit has already been filed.

The Parliamentary Budget Office adds a different warning. It says the additional sectoral burden is not calibrated to exceptional profits and that repeated targeted levies increase complexity and uncertainty, with possible effects on investment decisions. The Bank of Italy also warned that the planned tax changes would increase uncertainty and affect investment decisions. That is an economic concern even if every provision survives a constitutional challenge. A tax can be legally valid and still make the investment climate less predictable.

The ECB question is related, but not the same tax

Reuters reported that the European Central Bank was preparing a legal opinion on the budget. That opinion is expected to be critical, according to people familiar with the matter, but it is not a legislative veto over Italy's budget. It is a formal supervisory and consultative input. Its importance is that banks operate inside a common European prudential framework, and national tax measures can interact with capital, deferred-tax assets and banks' holdings of government debt.

Messina's most pointed ECB warning concerned a separate provision: the budget spreads over ten years more than €20 billion in tax breaks that taxpayers and businesses would otherwise be able to use in 2027. These credits are linked to home-renovation incentives granted in 2023. Messina argued that the deferral could be viewed by the ECB as a form of forbearance and warned that supervisors might then tell Italian banks to reduce their exposure to government bonds. The Bank of Italy also warned that the provision could have a significant effect on banks' 2026 earnings.

That argument must not be confused with the bank levy itself. The €20 billion in home-renovation credits is a separate budget mechanism from the three-point IRES surcharge and the IRAP deduction change. It may still matter to the same institutions because it affects their tax assets and balance sheets, but it is not the same tax. The ECB's legal opinion, the supervisory treatment of tax credits and the constitutionality of the bank levy are three related but distinct questions. Treating them as one issue would make the risk harder to understand, not easier.

The pension fund is another coalition choice

The budget also establishes a fund for support in leaving the labour market, with €850 million for each of 2027, 2028 and 2029. That is €2.55 billion over the three years. Article 52 does not itself create a new pension entitlement or set a minimum age and contribution record. It says that the money is for measures to be established by a subsequent law.

The Lega wants to use the fund for a new “Quota 64” route: retirement at 64 with 36 years of contributions, including workers who paid into the mixed pension system before 1996, in exchange for recalculating the pension entirely under the contributory method. That recalculation can reduce the eventual pension. The proposal is not yet law, and no one can apply for it under Article 52 alone. The parliamentary amendments deadline reported for this stage of the budget process is 18:00 on 17 November.

This matters because the fund is a political choice about who receives early-exit support. The Lega wants a broad route that could include tens of thousands of workers. Other governing-party voices prefer to reserve money for people in arduous jobs or other social measures. The same budget that asks banks and insurers for more money is also deciding which workers may leave employment early and what level of pension they receive. Those choices compete for fiscal space, and they should be evaluated together rather than as unrelated announcements.

Giorgetti's “Habsburg minister” remark belongs to the wider fiscal argument. In the recorded comment reported on 13 November, he framed himself as a minister who had absorbed the legacy of roughly €140 billion in Superbonus costs accumulated over 2023–26. That is a political explanation of the government's insistence on fiscal discipline. It is not an accounting link that makes the banks responsible for the Superbonus bill, and it does not establish that the financial sector owes the full €12 billion. The levy still has to stand on its own legal and economic rationale.

Who benefits and who bears the cost

The immediate beneficiary is the Treasury. The government can use the expected revenue to finance tax reductions and spending commitments without relying entirely on additional borrowing. Meloni can also present the package as a fairness measure at a time when households are paying more for credit and essential goods. If the revenue is collected as forecast and the money supports effective tax relief or public services, taxpayers may benefit indirectly.

The first direct cost falls on banks and insurers through higher taxes and lower deductions. Shareholders may receive lower returns if institutions absorb the cost. But banks can also try to protect profitability by changing lending rates, deposit rates, fees, capital allocation or the amount of credit offered. If more of the burden is passed to borrowers, small businesses and households with mortgages may pay through higher borrowing costs or tighter access to finance. That is a risk, not a proven result. The actual pass-through will depend on competition, demand for loans, interest rates, capital buffers and the final shape of the law.

Insurance companies may face a similar choice. They can absorb the IRES surcharge through lower returns, reduce costs or attempt to recover some of the burden through premiums. Policyholders would then pay indirectly, although a premium increase cannot be attributed to this tax without evidence from company pricing decisions. The government should monitor lending and insurance prices after the measure takes effect rather than assuming that the burden stays with shareholders.

The broader risk is that repeated and unpredictable sectoral taxes discourage investment. Banks finance households and companies; insurers provide risk cover for businesses and infrastructure. If institutions respond by holding more capital, cutting lending or delaying investment, the tax can reduce economic activity and weaken the very tax base the government hopes to strengthen. Foreign investors may also ask whether Italy will keep changing the rules for one sector whenever the budget becomes difficult. That does not mean the government should never tax high profits. It means the tax needs a clear design, a predictable duration and a transparent estimate of who ultimately pays.

What to watch next

The first deadline is the parliamentary amendment process, including the 17 November deadline for the pension proposals. The final text will show whether the IRES surcharge remains limited to 2027 and 2028, whether the IRAP deduction change is retained and how the €850 million annual fund is allocated. The second signal is the ECB's opinion and any response from the Bank of Italy or European supervisors. The third is whether shareholders file constitutional challenges or merely use the threat to seek amendments.

The economic test begins with bank lending volumes, loan spreads, deposit rates and credit access for small businesses. For insurers, it is premium growth and changes in coverage terms. For the government, it is the difference between forecast and realised revenue, especially for the financial transaction tax where trading behaviour can change. The Fiscal-Policy Sustainability (opens in a new tab) driver captures the central budget question: whether recurring revenue is genuinely structural or partly brought forward from later years. The Cost-of-Living Pressure (opens in a new tab) driver is relevant because higher credit costs and insurance premiums can reach households and firms. The Global Consumer Price Inflation (opens in a new tab) indicator is useful macro context, but it is not a direct measure of the effect of Italy's bank tax.

The reasoned conclusion is that Meloni has a credible political case for asking a profitable sector to contribute, but the €12 billion headline is not a sufficient explanation. The government must distinguish permanent taxes from temporary prepayments, banks from insurers, and the bank levy from the separate Superbonus-credit provisions. ABI's €7 billion estimate should be treated as an industry claim, while the Court of Auditors and Parliamentary Budget Office provide different official scoring frameworks. If the final law is transparent and proportionate, the state may collect additional revenue without destabilising credit. If it relies on repeated, opaque and unpredictable sectoral measures, the cost may return through investment, lending and legal disputes.

Evidence boundaries

Established: Reuters reported the €5.9 billion 2027 and €12 billion through-2029 financial-sector headline; the bill contains a temporary IRES surcharge, an IRAP deduction reduction and other timing measures; the Court of Auditors and UPB publish separate revenue estimates. Strong indication: repeated sectoral levies can increase uncertainty and affect investment. Not established: that the full €12 billion is a permanent bank tax, that customers will certainly face higher loan rates, that shareholders have already filed a case, or that the ECB will require banks to reduce sovereign-bond holdings because of the levy.

Sources

Evidence

The sources this article cites, claim-bearing material first.

  1. reuters.com · reuters.com/business/finance/intesa-criticises-italy-bank-levies-2027-budget-says-ecb-may-intervene-2026-11-12
  2. documenti.camera.it · Camera dei Deputati — Draft 2027 Budget Law, A.C. 3174-bis, Articles 18, 19 and 52, presented 30 October 2026
  3. upbilancio.it · upbilancio.it/it/audizione-nellambito-dellesame-del-ddl-di-bilancio-per-il-2027
  4. abi.it · Italian Banking Association — ABI hearing on the 2027 Budget Bill, 10 November 2026
  5. cortecostituzionale.it · Italian Constitutional Court — Judgment No. 10/2015 on the Robin Hood Tax
  6. lamiafinanza.it · LaMiaFinanza — Pension at 64 in 2027 and the €850 million fund, 13 November 2026
  7. ilfoglio.it · Il Foglio — Giorgetti, the Habsburg minister who agrees with the banker, video, 13 November 2026
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