Reproducible unweighted mean of every non-missing country-year v2xjucon observation in the official V-Dem Country-Year Core v15 dataset. Higher values indicate stronger judicial constraints; this is not a population-weighted welfare score.
How to read it
Readings above the normal line are better than normal; readings below it are worse.
Reproducible unweighted mean of every non-missing country-year v2x_jucon observation in the official V-Dem Country-Year Core v15 dataset. Higher values indicate stronger judicial constraints; this is not a population-weighted welfare score. Historical extension (added 2026-10): V-Dem v15, 1900–2023, transform none.
This indicator’s slice of Factrail’s verified causal web — the people, facts, drivers and welfare indicators it connects to. Select any node to trace a path.
By the Factrail desk · Method: how we source and score · Last reviewed
Measured value over time. Its norm (0.80 index score (0-1)) is far off this scale, marked at the top edge, so the series stays worse than normal throughout — the deviation badge shows the gap.
Each driver linked to this indicator, strongest pull first, on the same timeline above. Markers are the facts that moved that driver. These are modelled influences — treat them as correlational unless a documented causal edge is shown.
Higher executive concentration lowers judicial-constraint value. Strength basis: Constitutional concentration in a family co-presidency directly weakens horizontal constraints where oversight is subordinated. Strength 0.57 is a qualitative pathway class from the pack, not an empirical coefficient; it creates no historical indicator observations.
Murillo co-rulership: lowers welfare, impact strength 57%, 0 linked facts on the timeline.Greater concentration is expected to reduce the indicator value where judicial checks are weakened. Strength basis: Concentration directly reduces the practical ability of independent institutions to constrain executive or command authority. Strength 0.56 is a qualitative pathway class from the pack, not an empirical coefficient; it creates no historical indicator observations.
Executive-Power Concentration: lowers welfare, impact strength 56%, 0 linked facts on the timeline.External enforcement pressure (penalties, conditionality, judgments) can restore executive compliance with courts, raising judicial constraints, with a substantial lag.
Supranational rule-of-law accountability pressure: raises welfare, impact strength 55%, 0 linked facts on the timeline.The official report confirms Zardari’s assent to the 26th Amendment. In indicator-value terms, weaker judicial constraints are adverse, encoded weakening / -1; the edge concerns institutional risk and does not assign the entire amendment to the president. Strength basis: Constitutional redesign of judicial arrangements creates a direct institutional channel, but realized constraint changes require subsequent practice. Strength 0.52 is a qualitative pathway class from the pack, not an empirical coefficient; it creates no historical indicator observations.
Zardari patronage presidency (Pakistan): lowers welfare, impact strength 52%, 0 linked facts on the timeline.Credible adjudication and enforceable legal limits strengthen judicial constraints; impunity and exceptional justice weaken them. Strength basis: Judicial constraint is a central but not exclusive component of rule of law. Strength 0.5 is a qualitative pathway class from the pack, not an empirical coefficient; it creates no historical indicator observations.
Rule of Law: raises welfare, impact strength 50%, 0 linked facts on the timeline.Cardinal-law rewriting of judicial self-government lowers V-Dem judicial constraints.
Illiberal state capture in Hungary: lowers welfare, impact strength 45%, 0 linked facts on the timeline.