Identity and office
José Raúl Mulino has been president of Panama since 1 July 2024. As of September 2026 he remains in office. Laurentino Cortizo and Ricardo Martinelli are named as unresolved person candidates. This run does not mint pages for them.
He is not a security-minister saint. Critics in 2024 called him Martinelli’s stand-in after the former president’s disqualification and Nicaraguan-embassy neighbourhood. Store that ticket.
On 1 July 2024, hours after the oath, Panama and the United States signed a memorandum under which Washington would fund repatriations of people who entered through Darién (AP (opens in a new tab)). He said he would not allow Panama to be an open path. EFE later recorded his first-year claim that “for practical purposes, Darién is closed” (EFE, 1 July 2025 (opens in a new tab)). Store the MoU and the claim.
In December 2024 Donald Trump criticised Canal rates and Chinese influence and floated recovering US control. Mulino refused. On 2 January 2026 he declared the crisis over and said the Canal remained Panamanian. Donald Trump is live. Territorial-revisionism is not the driver for that sovereignty sentence.
CK Hutchison/PPC court rows and April 2025 Hegseth joint language on Belt and Road exit sit as neighbouring commercial and US instruments (US Department of Defense, 8 April 2025 (opens in a new tab)). They do not replace the 1 July oath.
Documented benefits
The offsets that a commissioned-positive portrait would lead with are real where dated. The 5 May 2024 contest produced a Realizing Goals win and a 1 July oath. SENAFRONT later printed a collapse versus 2023. They do not rebate the Martinelli neighbourhood or convert a MoU into a unique later miracle.
Contributions and limits of responsibility
He took the oath and signed the US memorandum. He refused Canal-recovery language. Cortizo left. Martinelli remains unresolved. Sharing a Realizing Goals brand with Martinelli is not a reason to drop Mulino-dated rows. Sharing a Darién table with Petro is not a reason to hang Colombian statutes as his.
Causal chain through facts
1 July 2024 strengthens transfer as a completed oath and initiates Canal–Darién as a MoU day. April 2025 Hegseth language and the 2 January 2026 declaration strengthen polarisation on the Canal file. None hang on territorial-revisionism, ukraine-war, or Soviet-scope rows.
What the score does not say
This page does not promise an exact number. Direction on the 2024 oath is plus on transfer. Direction on Canal-pressure polarisation is mixed. Laurentino Cortizo and Ricardo Martinelli remain names on this file, not invented biographies.
ACP drought cuts and a later port-concession award sit as neighbouring commercial weather. They are not stored here as a unique later integer. Sharing a Trump photograph is not a reason to hang US statutes as his. The 1 July 2024 MoU is the Darién instrument. The 2 January 2026 sentence is the Canal instrument. Keep those dates.
Migration enforcement became an early signature policy
José Raúl Mulino took office as president of Panama on 1 July 2024 and immediately linked his administration to a tougher policy on migration through the Darién Gap. His government cooperated with the United States on returning migrants and increased controls intended to reduce northbound crossings. By 1 July 2025, EFE (opens in a new tab) reported Mulino presenting the Darién route as effectively “closed,” contrasting sharply with the record flows of previous years. The policy produced a measurable fall in crossings but also tied Panamanian migration control more closely to U.S. enforcement objectives. The issue is not merely border management: the Darién had become a humanitarian corridor involving migrants from multiple continents, criminal groups, dangerous terrain and pressure on local communities. Mulino's first year therefore converted a campaign promise into a state strategy built around deterrence, deportation cooperation and route suppression. EFE's anniversary report specifically treated the collapse in northbound traffic as an outcome Mulino claimed for his administration, making the one-year mark a concrete checkpoint for the policy rather than a campaign slogan.
The canal dispute tested sovereignty against U.S. pressure
Mulino also faced a direct sovereignty dispute over the Panama Canal. U.S. political pressure intensified in 2025 amid claims about Chinese influence around canal infrastructure, and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth visited Panama as the two governments negotiated security arrangements. Mulino publicly rejected any suggestion that Panama would surrender control of the canal, while still accepting expanded security cooperation. By 2 January 2026 he said the crisis with the United States was over. The Tico Times (opens in a new tab) reported his assessment that tensions had eased after months of confrontation. The sequence shows the dual pressure on his government: preserve the 1999 post-handover principle of Panamanian canal sovereignty while maintaining the security and economic relationship with Washington. Mulino's record thus combines harder alignment with U.S. migration priorities and firmer resistance when the same partner's demands touched the canal, the country's central strategic asset.
