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Abdel Fattah al-Burhan

Abdel Fattah al-Burhan

-100

Net harmfulFormula-derived score

The through-line is SAF civil-war command: a 25 October 2021 televised dissolution of the civilian cabinet, 17 November 2021 lethal force against anti-coup protests as recorded by Human Rights Watch, and the 15 April 2023 SAF–RSF war — not a reluctant restorer. Still in that chair at apply. The largest negative contribution to the formula-derived score is “Burhan dissolves the Sovereign Council and Hamdok cabinet on television” (2021).

SAF military presidency2021 coup against civilian transitioncivil-war command versus RSF

Impact

Biggest harms and offsets: signed contributions to the formula-derived score, ranked by size.

Biggest harms

Lowers the score
Editorial assessment (context, not the score)

The heaviest documented costs sit on three clusters, not on a personality adjective.

First, the 2021 coup. On 25 October he dissolved the Sovereign Council and Hamdok’s cabinet on television and declared a state of emergency, weeks before a scheduled civilian chair. Hamdok is unresolved.

Second, civic freeze. Human Rights Watch recorded sixteen people shot dead on 17 November 2021 during anti-coup protests, including a woman and a child. Autopsies showed head and chest wounds. He had denied army involvement in earlier killings. This page does not invent a unique integer beyond that product.

Third, SAF–RSF war. On 15 April 2023 fighting erupted in Khartoum. Reuters recorded contested first-shot claims. He told Al Jazeera the RSF should withdraw. Hemedti is unresolved and is not minted. IPC famine and the RSF siege of El Fasher are neighbouring. They are not a unique size here.

Confidence is high on the televised dissolution, the HRW 17 November product, and the 15 April outbreak, and medium where later war tallies disagree. This paragraph is an assessment of those paths, not a substitute number.

Indicators affected

Sorted by the size of this person’s signed contribution. The observed state is the indicator’s own reading, not this person’s doing.

Accountability & contradictions

Claims against the record, the type of responsibility, and what is disputed.

What could change this assessment

  • Lifetime coverage has not been assessed: the record reflects stored facts only (2021–2023).

Causal path

Person → Fact → Driver → Indicator. Select a path to inspect its factors; the full network opens on demand.

  1. PersonAbdel Fattah al-Burhan
  2. FactBurhan dissolves the Sovereign Council and Hamdok cabinet on television
  3. DriverBurhan SAF civil war
  4. IndicatorHaving a say in government
−200 pts

Contribution size 1 · Responsibility 0.5 · Fact impact 1 · Driver weight 1 · Driver → indicator −0.8 · Indicator importance 0.8 · Deviation factor −3 · Confidence 1

  1. PersonAbdel Fattah al-Burhan
  2. FactSecurity forces shoot anti-coup protesters dead in Khartoum, Human Rights Watch records
  3. DriverBurhan SAF civil war
  4. IndicatorHaving a say in government
−146 pts

Contribution size 1 · Responsibility 0.5 · Fact impact 1 · Driver weight 1 · Driver → indicator −0.8 · Indicator importance 0.8 · Deviation factor −3 · Confidence 1

Timeline

The most relevant dated facts, newest first.

  1. −146 pts
  2. 25 October 2021 · Electoral Integrity and Competitiveness

    Burhan dissolves the Sovereign Council and Hamdok cabinet on television
    −200 pts

Evidence & methodology

How the record is sourced and how the score is derived.

3 of 3 linked facts verified, drawing on 3 distinct sources (2021–2023).

Sources include Reuters.

The score is formula-derived (Factrail formula v1, version 1.0.0), not an editorial verdict. Read the methodology.

By the Factrail desk · Method: how we source and score · Last reviewed · Sources: 3

Expert analysis

An excerpt; the full analysis opens on request.

Identity and office

Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has been de facto leader of Sudan since 12 April 2019 and chairman of the reconstituted Sovereignty Council since 11 November 2021. He remains SAF commander-in-chief. He does not write an IPC note. Omar al-Bashir is named in prose as the predecessor ousted in 2019. He is not minted.

The coup file is dated. On 25 October 2021 he announced on television that he was dissolving the Sovereign Council and the Hamdok cabinet and declaring a state of emergency (Reuters (opens in a new tab); Al Jazeera (opens in a new tab)). The move came weeks before he was due to hand the council chair to a civilian. Hamdok was detained. Hamdok is unresolved.

The civic-freeze file is an HRW product. On 17 November 2021 sixteen people were shot dead during anti-coup protests in and around Khartoum, including a woman and a child; forensic reports seen by Human Rights Watch showed head, neck, and chest wounds (HRW (opens in a new tab)). He had denied army involvement on 7 November. This page does not invent a unique integer beyond that product.

The war file is dated. On 15 April 2023 fighting erupted between SAF and RSF in Khartoum (Reuters (opens in a new tab); BBC (opens in a new tab)). Mediators told Reuters they could not establish who fired first. He told Al Jazeera the RSF should withdraw. Hemedti called him a criminal. Hemedti is unresolved. This run does not mint him. IPC famine classifications and the RSF siege of El Fasher, which fell in late October 2025, are neighbouring. They are Hemedti’s later owned-driver material where the siege is RSF-imposed.

The 3 June 2019 sit-in dispersal, in which HRW identified RSF as leading the lethal attack while Burhan chaired the TMC, stays neighbouring. It is not stored as this unique Fact so that Hemedti’s later page can own the RSF-led file.

Documented benefits

The offsets that a commissioned-positive portrait would lead with are real only where dated, and they are not this assignment’s through-line. Recapture of the presidential palace in Khartoum in 2025 is neighbouring. It is not a unique KIA rebate of 25 October 2021.

Contributions and limits of responsibility

He announced the 2021 dissolution. He remained commander when HRW recorded 17 November 2021 lethal force. He commanded SAF on 15 April 2023. Sharing 2019 TMC membership with Hemedti is not a reason to drop 25 October 2021.

Causal chain through facts

The 2021 coup strengthens the owned SAF-civil-war driver and weakens electoral integrity, civic space, and transfer capacity. The November 2021 lethal-force product weakens civic space. The 15 April 2023 outbreak strengthens the owned driver. They do not hang on ukraine-war, nagorno-karabakh-war, eastern-drc-m23-rdf, territorial-revisionism, or Soviet state-repression.

What the score does not say

This page does not promise an exact war census or a completed extra-judicial-execution conviction. Direction on this chain is negative: the documented instruments dissolve a civilian cabinet, answer anti-coup crowds with live fire, and command SAF in a capital war. A later genuine civilian contest would be a different fact with a different date.

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