Narendra Modi’s Russia Hedge Is Becoming Harder to Call Strategic Autonomy

India’s foreign-policy argument is that strategic autonomy gives New Delhi room to work with competing powers without becoming subordinate to any of them. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s latest defence of the Russia relationship shows both the attraction of that strategy and its growing moral cost.

Jaishankar argued that Russia has been a long-standing partner for India and described the relationship in terms of accumulated defence, diplomatic and economic cooperation. He also portrayed the United States as a power that had deliberately made itself more isolated in the international system. At the same time, he presented India as having moved beyond rhetorical calls for peace toward engagement with both Moscow and Kyiv. Business Standard (opens in a new tab)

That is the strongest version of India’s case. Narendra Modi (opens in a new tab) does not have to make Indian policy an extension of Washington’s. A country with its own security needs can maintain historical ties with Vladimir Putin (opens in a new tab), buy energy where it judges prices advantageous and still talk to Ukraine.

But autonomy does not eliminate consequences. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine (opens in a new tab) remains the central causal fact behind the continuing Ukraine war (opens in a new tab). Every major commercial and diplomatic relationship with Moscow therefore exists inside a war economy and a sanctions environment, not outside them.

Jaishankar himself highlighted the global effects of conflict-driven disruptions: food, fuel, fertiliser, jobs and national budgets. That logic cuts both ways. If India says the war imposes material costs on developing societies, it cannot analyse its Russia policy solely as a bilateral benefit. Purchases, defence ties and diplomatic positioning also affect the incentives and resources surrounding the belligerent state.

This does not make India responsible for Russian strikes. The responsibility for Russia’s military campaign remains with Russian decision-makers. It does mean India holds a secondary lever: how much economic and diplomatic insulation Moscow receives from a major non-Western power.

The United States under Donald Trump (opens in a new tab) creates its own incentives for hedging. If Washington behaves unpredictably, uses tariffs coercively or treats alliances transactionally, Indian policymakers gain reasons not to concentrate dependence in the American relationship. Jaishankar’s criticism of a “lonelier” United States should therefore be read partly as an assessment of American choices, not simply as apologetics for Russia.

The accountability standard should be symmetrical. Washington owns the consequences of policies that make partnership less attractive. Moscow owns the invasion and its continuing violence. Modi’s government owns the decision to preserve and defend a privileged Russia relationship despite those costs.

Strategic autonomy is a legitimate doctrine. But “autonomy” describes freedom of choice, not freedom from responsibility for the choices made.