The power he actually held
Emmanuel Macron has been President of the French Republic since 14 May 2017. The Fifth Republic gives the president agenda power, the right to dissolve, and command of the armed forces. It does not give him a personal statute book. After June 2022 he governed without a majority. After 9 June 2024 he governed without even a stable minority bargain.
That limit is the first fact about his power. The second is that agenda-setting still moves welfare. A president who forces a pension-age increase, signs an immigration statute, relaunches nuclear construction, and sponsors common EU debt is not a commentator. The live score has to read those instruments as they were enacted, not as campaign adjectives.
What went wrong, and what is proven
The sharpest domestic accountability record is procedural as well as substantive. On 16 March 2023 the prime minister, acting for the president’s majority, engaged Article 49.3 on the pension bill. There was no ordinary final vote on the text. The statute was promulgated on 14 April 2023 and raises the legal age toward 64. Unions struck. The Constitutional Council later trimmed some provisions and let the age rise stand. Treating a speech about “work” as the event would be padding. The events are the 49.3 and the law.
The immigration statute of 26 January 2024 is the second official cost. Harder provisions on benefits and regularisation were added in Parliament, including with votes the Élysée had not originally sought. On 25 January the Constitutional Council struck a large share of those articles as riders. Promulgation still happened. UNHCR and French rights groups described a tighter regime. The surviving text strengthens migration-policy restrictiveness. The censure is a rights check, not a finding that the attempt never occurred.
Opacity has an official document. The Senate’s March 2022 report on consulting firms, widely called the McKinsey report, found that the state could not reconstruct some COVID-era contracts. It is an oversight finding, not a criminal judgment. It still strengthens institutional-corruption as distrust of procurement, the same family of harm as unregistered vaccine texts in Brussels.
The 9 June 2024 dissolution is a completed presidential act. The European election had gone badly for his list. He chose to reset the Assembly. The July 2024 result was a hung house, a left alliance ahead on seats in one count, the National Rally ahead on votes, and weeks of executive improvisation. Political polarization is the mechanism. A dissolution is not a coup. It is also not costless for legislative capacity.
Two 2021 security statutes sit on the same side of the ledger. The global security law restricted some images of police. The law on the principles of the Republic tightened controls on associations and religious practice. Rights groups litigated both. They are statutes, not vibes. The May 2024 New Caledonia emergency followed deadly riots over a voting-roll reform the government later suspended. Emergency powers are documented. So is the death toll.
Earlier choices still feed the score. The 2017 labour ordinances and the replacement of the wealth tax by a real-estate levy are enacted distributional turns. They can raise hiring on one reading and income inequality on another. They are not cancelled by later industrial policy.
What improved, and how far
Macron was a principal sponsor of the July 2020 European Council bargain that became the Recovery and Resilience Facility. Ursula von der Leyen administers the plans. He does not. Without the French-German push with Angela Merkel the common-debt envelope is harder to imagine. That path weakens cost-of-living pressure only through absorption.
The Climate and Resilience law of 22 August 2021, France 2030, and the Belfort nuclear speech are the industrial-climate trio. One is a statute with banned short-haul flights and advertising rules. One is an investment programme. One is a completed presidential decision to resume EPR construction and extend existing plants. Decarbonization policy and nuclear-energy deployment are the mechanisms. Construction lag is measured in years, not press conferences.
The tariff shield and the 2022 sobriety plan are crisis instruments. They weaken energy-price volatility and cost-of-living pressure at a fiscal cost. The March 2023 renewable-acceleration law shortens permitting. It does not install a single turbine by itself.
On Ukraine he was a Council member, not a commander of Ukrainian brigades. Temporary protection, candidate status, and accession talks are collective. Volodymyr Zelenskyy is the counterpart. Caesar guns and training missions are French. They do not make the Élysée the author of Ukrainian martial law.
On 22 September 2025 he declared at the United Nations that France recognizes the State of Palestine. Vie publique records the speech. Recognition is a Fifth-Republic foreign-policy act. It does not open a crossing, free hostages, or admit a UN member. The live path onto humanitarian access is a low-confidence hypothesis. The United States and Israel opposed the conference. Treating the sentence as a ceasefire would be the same error as treating a pension 49.3 as a speech about work.
Shared responsibility, and what the score does not say
Borne, Attal, Darmanin, Le Maire, and the Constitutional Council are not extras. A 49.3 is a prime minister’s act under a president’s strategy. A censured article is a court, not a president, speaking. Union regulations are co-legislated. Treating Macron as sole author of the DMA or the Climate Law would be the same error as treating him as a bystander on pensions.
The score does not say that consultants were bribed. It does not say that nuclear plants already run. It does not say that the National Rally “won France” in 2024. It does not convert the health pass into a vaccination coverage point without the immunization path beside it. Confidence is high where Legifrance and the Council publish a text, and medium where implementation, time lags, and coalition arithmetic sit between the signature and a welfare indicator.