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Nicolás Maduro

Nicolás Maduro

-100

Net harmfulFormula-derived score

As of August 2026 he remains in Miraflores. The largest negative contribution to the formula-derived score is “CNE announces a Maduro win in the 28 July 2024 presidential election without precinct-level results” (2024). The largest positive offset is “2022 closes with dollarization-from-below and a sharp inflation deceleration from the 2018 IMF-estimate peak” (2022).

Sources: [1][2][3][4][5]+17

Top harm

CNE announces a Maduro win in the 28 July 2024 presidential election without precinct-level results

−108 pts

Top offset

2022 closes with dollarization-from-below and a sharp inflation deceleration from the 2018 IMF-estimate peak

+10 pts

PSUV Chavista socialismmilitary-civilian civic unionanti-imperial oil nationalism treated as compatible with a disputed 2024 tenure and dollarized markets

Impact

Biggest harms and offsets: signed contributions to the formula-derived score, ranked by size.

Biggest harms

Lowers the score

19 more ranked below in Timeline and Related.

Biggest offsets

Raises the score
Editorial assessment (context, not the score)

The file after 2013 is not a civic saint and not a single sanctions footnote. The heaviest documented costs are the 2017 National Constituent Assembly and protest repression — later described by the UN FFM on “reasonable grounds,” which is not a conviction — the 2018 and 2024 contested presidential contests, IMF hyperinflation estimates, PDVSA’s collapse with a 2016 GDP leak before oil-sector sanctions, the 2019 recognition crisis, a UNHCR-scale exodus, Machado’s 2024 disqualification, a CNE announcement without precinct results, the Carter Center’s 30 July 2024 finding, post-election detention, and an ICC investigation that remains an investigation. Those rest on CNE and TSJ acts, UN and ICC texts, IMF tables, and wires. The live composite is formula output from those paths plus Barbados, CLAP, vaccine imports, 2021 regional contests, Chevron-licensed barrels, and later inflation deceleration; this paragraph is not the score.

The offsets are also dated: CLAP boxes, Oslo and Mexico talks, Barbados 17 October 2023, EU-observed 2021 regionals, vaccine imports, a 2022 growth print after collapse, and dollarization-from-below. PSUV, TSJ, CNE, FANB, PDVSA, OFAC, and the ICC share several files.

He does not sit as an OFAC officer and he does not write an ICC Pre-Trial decision. Confidence is high on CNE announcements, Carter’s published finding, ICC docket dates, and IMF tables labelled as estimates, and medium where later CPI, poverty, and barrel series sit between a signature and a welfare indicator.

Indicators affected

Sorted by the size of this person’s signed contribution. The observed state is the indicator’s own reading, not this person’s doing.

Accountability & contradictions

Claims against the record, the type of responsibility, and what is disputed.

Responsibility

What could change this assessment

  • Lifetime coverage has not been assessed: the record reflects stored facts only (2013–2024).

Causal path

Person → Fact → Driver → Indicator. Select a path to inspect its factors; the full network opens on demand.

  1. PersonNicolás Maduro
  2. FactCNE announces a Maduro win in the 28 July 2024 presidential election without precinct-level results
  3. DriverDemocratic Resilience
  4. IndicatorHaving a say in government
−108 pts

Contribution size 0.9 · Responsibility 0.85 · Fact impact −0.9 · Driver weight 0.55 · Driver → indicator 0.7 · Indicator importance 0.8 · Deviation factor −3 · Confidence 1

  1. PersonNicolás Maduro
  2. FactThe TSJ upholds María Corina Machado’s disqualification from seeking the presidency
  3. DriverDemocratic Resilience
  4. IndicatorHaving a say in government
−93 pts

Contribution size 0.8 · Responsibility 0.8 · Fact impact −0.8 · Driver weight 0.55 · Driver → indicator 0.7 · Indicator importance 0.8 · Deviation factor −3 · Confidence 1

  1. PersonNicolás Maduro
  2. Fact2022 closes with dollarization-from-below and a sharp inflation deceleration from the 2018 IMF-estimate peak
  3. DriverInflationary Pressure
  4. IndicatorGlobal Consumer Price Inflation (annual %)
+10 pts

Contribution size 0.5 · Responsibility 0.45 · Fact impact −0.6 · Driver weight 0.92 · Driver → indicator −0.8 · Indicator importance 0.9 · Deviation factor 3 · Confidence 1

Timeline

The most relevant dated facts, newest first.

  1. 29 July 2024 · Humanitarian Access

    Post-election protests meet a detention wave documented by OHCHR, the UN FFM, and PROVEA
    −46 pts

  2. 28 July 2024 · Democratic Resilience

    CNE announces a Maduro win in the 28 July 2024 presidential election without precinct-level results
    −108 pts

  3. 26 January 2024 · Democratic Resilience

    The TSJ upholds María Corina Machado’s disqualification from seeking the presidency
    −93 pts

  4. 17 October 2023 · Democratic Resilience

    Government and Unitary Platform sign the Barbados partial agreement on electoral guarantees
    −49 pts

  5. 13 February 2021 · Vaccine Accessibility

    Venezuela begins COVID-19 vaccine imports with Sputnik V, later adding COVAX batches
    −89 pts

  6. 4 July 2019 · Judicial Independence

    OHCHR, after Bachelet’s visit, documents widespread arbitrary detention and TSJ-era due-process collapse
    −47 pts

Evidence & methodology

How the record is sourced and how the score is derived.

34 of 34 linked facts verified, drawing on 22 distinct sources (2013–2024).

Sources include The Carter Center, OHCHR / Human Rights Council, CNE, OHCHR, TSJ, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, International Court of Justice, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Sources (showing 8 of 22)

  1. 1.Consejo Nacional Electoral — 14 April 2013 presidential result announcementCNE
  2. 2.Government of Venezuela — CLAP local supply-and-production committees as a food-access instrumentMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela
  3. 3.Government of Norway — facilitation of the Venezuela dialogue and negotiation processNorwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
  4. 4.Tribunal Supremo de Justicia — March 2017 rulings on the National Assembly’s contempt and powersTSJ
  5. 5.Banco Central de Venezuela — 2022 inflation and exchange publications after the hyperinflation yearsBanco Central de Venezuela
  6. 6.The Carter Center — Statement on Venezuela Election, 30 July 2024The Carter Center
  7. 7.UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission — A/HRC/57/57 and CRP.5 on post-electoral repressionOHCHR / Human Rights Council
  8. 8.OHCHR — spokesperson comment on Venezuela’s order that the technical office suspend work and staff leaveOHCHR

The score is formula-derived (Factrail formula v1, version 1.0.0), not an editorial verdict. Read the methodology.

By the Factrail desk · Method: how we source and score · Last reviewed · Sources: 22

Expert analysis

An excerpt; the full analysis opens on request.

The power he actually held

Nicolás Maduro has been president of Venezuela since 19 April 2013. TSJ interprets. FANB and PDVSA share the coercive and oil files. He is the political principal, not every precinct printer and not OFAC.

As of August 2026 he remains in Miraflores after a 10 January 2025 oath that several states do not treat as a completed democratic mandate.

What went wrong, and what is proven

The succession file is 14 April 2013: a completed CNE announcement of a narrow win.

29 March 2017 the TSJ assumed National Assembly powers. 30 July 2017 a National Constituent Assembly was elected and seated over the 2015 Assembly. April–July 2017 protests are a completed repression wave; OHCHR recorded the weeks; the UN FFM later used “reasonable grounds” language. That is an international finding, not a conviction.

20 May 2018 is a completed presidential contest the opposition largely boycotted and that the EU and US did not treat as a completed democratic mandate. IMF WEO, 9 October 2018 printed hyperinflation estimates after BCV stopped a public CPI. 2016 GDP leak of about −18.6 percent sits before PDVSA oil-sector sanctions.

23 January 2019 opened a recognition crisis he did not write as a US communique. 28 January 2019 OFAC designated PDVSA — an external instrument; his oil-sector management is not OFAC. 7 June 2019 UNHCR and IOM printed four million Venezuelans abroad. 7 March 2019 is a completed national blackout. 6 December 2020 is a completed parliamentary contest under boycott weather.

5 July 2021 Bachelet documented civic-space restrictions around the OHCHR technical presence. 3 November 2021 the ICC Prosecutor opened Venezuela I; an investigation is not a conviction. 26 January 2024 the TSJ upheld María Corina Machado’s disqualification. 15 February 2024 Caracas ordered OHCHR technical staff to leave. 1 December 2023 ICJ provisional measures in Guyana v. Venezuela; he did not sit as the Court.

28 July 2024 CNE announced a Maduro win without precinct-level results. Opposition actas are a different status. 30 July 2024 the Carter Center published its finding. Post-election repression is a completed OHCHR/UN FFM and PROVEA detention cluster. Political prisoners and TSJ is a dated arbitrary-detention file.

What improved, and how far

CLAP, 2016 is a completed household-box instrument with a capture path stored on the same row, not a poverty miracle. Oslo talks, May 2019 are a completed dialogue attempt. Sputnik and later COVAX imports are completed vaccine-access instruments. 21 November 2021 regionals are a completed partial contest with an EU election-observation mission. Chevron GL 41, 26 November 2022 is a completed US licence plus PDVSA barrels — complex. Mexico social agreement, 26 November 2022 is a completed humanitarian-funds instrument. Colombia ties, 28 August 2022 are a completed Venezuelan-side restoration, not a Colombian statute. Barbados, 17 October 2023 is a completed electoral-guarantees signing; later breach is a child. Brazil 2023 is a completed reopening. 20 December 2023 swap is a completed prisoner exchange, shared with Washington.

Shared responsibility, and what the score does not say

The score does not say that every later CPI point is a unique presidential coefficient. It does not say that a Chevron licence rebates 2017 lethal force. It does not convert a CNE announcement, an opposition acta, and a Carter Center finding into one status. It does not convert an ICC investigation into a conviction. It does not treat 2019 oil sanctions as the author of the 2016 contraction. Confidence is high on CNE announcements, Carter’s URL, ICC dates, and IMF tables labelled as estimates, and medium where PDVSA, SEBIN, and later ENCOVI series sit between a signature and a welfare indicator.

Related people are counterpart rulers and the live Machado file: Machado, Xi, Putin, Trump, Biden, Lula, Guterres, Macron, Milei, Bukele, Sheinbaum, Khamenei.

Official carriers include CNE and TSJ where those locators still resolve, otherwise UN, ICC, ICJ, IMF, and Treasury records of the same dated act, plus contemporaneous Reuters, AP, HRW, IACHR, and Carter.

A president is powerful enough to own those CNE nights and those cabinet decrees. He is not powerful enough to be the unique author of an OFAC licence or of an ICC Pre-Trial decision, and the dossier keeps that line visible. Keep 14 April 2013 off 28 July 2024. Keep Carter off a CNE percentage. Keep OFAC off 2016. If those distinctions feel pedantic, they are the alternative to a blockade film and the alternative to a cartoon.

The 2013 oath, the 2017 ANC, Barbados, and the 2024 CNE night are different dates. Treat them as texts. A 2025 oath is not a Carter sentence. He is still in Miraflores in August 2026. PSUV, TSJ, CNE, FANB, and PDVSA remain on the file so a brand cannot swallow them.

Questions

Is Nicolás Maduro under sanctions?

Yes. 26 November 2022: OFAC issues General License 41 allowing Chevron limited Venezuela production (U.S. Department of the Treasury). 28 January 2019: The United States designates PDVSA under OFAC, cutting the oil company’s US market (U.S. Department of the Treasury).

Does Nicolás Maduro face an ICC warrant or criminal charges?

29 July 2024: Post-election protests meet a detention wave documented by OHCHR, the UN FFM, and PROVEA. 3 November 2021: The ICC Prosecutor opens the Venezuela I investigation and signs a Caracas memorandum.

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