Sudan civil war (SAF↔RSF 2023+)

What this driver is

Sudan civil war (SAF↔RSF 2023+) is one continuing internal war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, opened in Khartoum and Merowe on 15 April 2023 and then fought across Darfur, Kordofan, and later recovered and lost cities, through siege, famine classification, and the October 2025 assault on El Fasher. It is a mechanism, not a brochure and not a 1918–45 territorial-revisionism row. It is not the Ukraine war.

The driver is not “two generals’ feud” as a mood and not a single massacre as a substitute name. Neighbouring mechanisms — hemedti-rsf-war and burhan-saf-civil-war — are person-command files already live on this site. They attach to this war; they do not replace it. Humanitarian-access is a neighbour when a convoy is blocked. This node is the SAF–RSF war: organised killing, ethnically patterned attacks in Darfur, siege, and famine as a consequence of the fighting.

It applies to Sudan from 15 April 2023 through Security Council resolution 2736 (13 June 2024), IPC famine classifications in 2024–25, and the RSF’s 24–30 October 2025 El Fasher offensive as documented by the UN. It is not the 2003–08 Darfur war as a duplicate name, and it is not South Sudan’s 2013 war.

The legal neighbourhood is S/RES/2736 (2024) demanding that the RSF end the siege of El Fasher, the Human Rights Council independent Fact-Finding Mission, the ICC’s Darfur situation under the 2005 Council referral, and A/HRC/RES/S-38/1 after El Fasher. A television adjective that calls a city capture “liberation” does not change the mechanism. An FFM finding is not a trial judgment.

Mechanism

The war moves welfare through named channels.

First, the 15 April 2023 opening. SAF units under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF units under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) opened fire in the capital and at Merowe. Both men are live counterparts on Person pages and on their own command drivers. They are not minted here.

Second, Darfur expansion and ethnically patterned attacks. After the RSF consolidated four Darfur states in late 2023, fighting concentrated on North Darfur and El Fasher. The FFM recorded assault, detention, and killing of civilians around the city and found the RSF committed the war crime of using starvation as a method of warfare by the siege. Death integers from any single week are contested. This page does not invent a unique El Fasher massacre size.

Third, famine as a war product. The IPC Famine Review Committee classified famine conditions in Zamzam and later El Fasher and Kadugli. Those are named IPC products, not a Factrail calorie coefficient. Both parties obstructed relief: SAF bureaucratic blockage and RSF looting and siege, as the FFM recorded against S/RES/2724 and 2736.

Fourth, Council command that did not lift the siege on schedule. On 13 June 2024 the Security Council demanded that the RSF end the El Fasher siege and halt fighting around the city (S/RES/2736 (2024)). The siege continued into 2025. On 24–30 October 2025 the RSF launched a final offensive; SAF later confirmed withdrawal. A/HRC/RES/S-38/1 condemned atrocities after the assault. Implementation of 2736 is not stored here as a completed relief.

Fifth, command split. Burhan chairs the Sovereignty Council and commands SAF. Hemedti commands RSF. Sharing execution with allied militias does not move authorship off those two commands. It is a reason not to mint every allied sheikh.

Timing is hours for an assault and months for famine classification. A later nationwide ceasefire with a date would be a new fact.

Evidence base

The best evidence is Council, FFM, and IPC products plus contemporaneous independent reporting of 15 April 2023 and of El Fasher.

S/RES/2736 (2024) is the El Fasher siege demand. The OHCHR FFM press statement of June 2025 and A/HRC/60/22 record starvation-as-method and dual obstruction of aid (https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2025/06/sudan-war-intensifying-devastating-consequences-civilians-un-fact-finding (opens in a new tab)). IPC special briefs classify famine in named localities; they are not copied here as a unique death total. Reuters and AP recorded the 15 April 2023 opening the same day. A UN report on the 24–30 October 2025 El Fasher offensive documents the final assault without this page inventing a unique integer from that week.

This page does not invent a unique national death total, a unique El Fasher massacre size, or Contribution.size from a 150,000 first-year estimate. Where an FFM or IPC product prints a range, quote the document date. Missing integers stay missing.

Evidence is strongest for a Council resolution, an FFM finding, and an IPC famine classification. It is weaker for any unique first-day Khartoum death coefficient. It is weakest where a “rapid support” slogan is asked to rebate El Fasher.

Effect on welfare indicators

This driver, when it actually runs, is a first-order channel into organised-violence deaths and conflict displacement.

• Global deaths from organized violence (UCDP): direction higher deaths when SAF–RSF combat and Darfur assaults intensify. Horizon: same year. Confidence: high for the occurrence of the war; this page does not invent a unique Sudan integer.
• People internally displaced by conflict and violence (IDMC): direction higher displacement when Khartoum, Darfur, and El Fasher empty. Horizon: days to years. Confidence: high that this war moved the global stock; IDMC/UNHCR language belongs on the edge, not as a Factrail headcount.

An electricity-access or PISA path does not follow without a sourced channel. Missing coefficients stay missing.

The welfare sign of the driver on those indicators is negative: strengthening the SAF–RSF war increases a lower-is-better death count and a lower-is-better displacement stock. That is the opposite of treating a later Khartoum recapture as a rebate of Zamzam famine.

Interactions and contested points

The war interacts with humanitarian access, food-price pressure, and the person-command drivers when a siege and a Sovereignty Council decree sit in the same season. Reinforcement is obvious. Offsetting is the claim that SAF is restoring the state or that RSF is protecting Darfur. Those are arguments. They can be stored. They do not cancel 15 April 2023 or 2736.

It is not. hemedti-rsf-war and burhan-saf-civil-war are command files. This node is the civilizational event: the war itself. Facts may attach to both. They must not mint a second Hemedti or a second Burhan.

A second competing view is that this is territorial-revisionism or ukraine-war. It is not.

Established: 15 April 2023 opening; S/RES/2736; FFM starvation-as-method finding against the El Fasher siege; IPC famine classifications in named localities; 24–30 October 2025 El Fasher offensive as a UN-documented assault. Not established: a unique national death total or that a later recapture rebated famine. A later implemented nationwide ceasefire would be a new fact.