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Masoud Pezeshkian

Masoud Pezeshkian

-100

Net harmfulFormula-derived score

Supreme Leader remains commander-in-chief — Ali Khamenei until March 2026, then Mojtaba. The largest negative contribution to the formula-derived score is “Interior forces crack down on wartime protests during Pezeshkian’s presidency” (2026). The largest positive offset is “Pezeshkian sits on the Interim Leadership Council after Khamenei’s death” (2026).

Sources: [1][2][3][4][5]+6

Reformist-adjacent Islamic Republic executiveethnic-Azeri outreachdiplomacy-first rhetoric treated as compatible with Leader-dominated security and nuclear files

Impact

Biggest harms and offsets: signed contributions to the formula-derived score, ranked by size.

Biggest harms

Lowers the score

15 more ranked below in Timeline and Related.

Biggest offsets

Raises the score

1 more ranked below in Timeline and Related.

Editorial assessment (context, not the score)

The presidency is not a reform saint and not a unique author of the IRGC. The heaviest documented costs on his chair are a filtered 2024 field, continued hijab and execution practice he did not repeal, and 2026 wartime protest crackdowns his interior ran. Those rest on Guardian Council notices, judiciary tallies, and wires. The live composite is formula output from those paths plus a competitive runoff, a health-minister past, and a 2026 memorandum his office defends; this paragraph is not the score.

The offsets are dated. A 5 July 2024 runoff against Saeed Jalili is a completed, limited opening inside a filtered system. A 2001–05 health ministry is a completed appointment. He does not sit as Supreme Leader and he does not vote on the IAEA Board. Confidence is high on CEC tallies and inauguration, and medium where the IRGC, Mojtaba’s office, and US-Israeli strikes sit between a signature and a welfare indicator.

Indicators affected

Sorted by the size of this person’s signed contribution. The observed state is the indicator’s own reading, not this person’s doing.

Accountability & contradictions

Claims against the record, the type of responsibility, and what is disputed.

What could change this assessment

  • Lifetime coverage has not been assessed: the record reflects stored facts only (2001–2026).

Causal path

Person → Fact → Driver → Indicator. Select a path to inspect its factors; the full network opens on demand.

  1. PersonMasoud Pezeshkian
  2. FactInterior forces crack down on wartime protests during Pezeshkian’s presidency
  3. DriverDemocratic Resilience
  4. IndicatorHaving a say in government
−16 pts

Contribution size 0.6 · Responsibility 0.5 · Fact impact −0.55 · Driver weight 0.55 · Driver → indicator 0.7 · Indicator importance 0.8 · Deviation factor −3 · Confidence 1

  1. PersonMasoud Pezeshkian
  2. FactPezeshkian defends an Iran–US memorandum reached in Islamabad
  3. DriverEnergy Security
  4. IndicatorInability to keep home adequately warm
−15 pts

Contribution size 0.5 · Responsibility 0.55 · Fact impact 0.25 · Driver weight 0.85 · Driver → indicator 0.6 · Indicator importance 0.8 · Deviation factor −3 · Confidence 1

  1. PersonMasoud Pezeshkian
  2. FactPezeshkian sits on the Interim Leadership Council after Khamenei’s death
  3. DriverDemocratic Resilience
  4. IndicatorHaving a say in government
+4 pts

Contribution size 0.4 · Responsibility 0.55 · Fact impact −0.2 · Driver weight 0.55 · Driver → indicator 0.7 · Indicator importance 0.8 · Deviation factor −3 · Confidence 1

Timeline

The most relevant dated facts, newest first.

  1. −15 pts
  2. 28 February 2026 · Humanitarian Access

    A US-Israeli war on Iran begins; Ali Khamenei is killed
    −11 pts
  3. −11 pts
  4. −14 pts

Evidence & methodology

How the record is sourced and how the score is derived.

31 of 31 linked facts verified, drawing on 11 distinct sources (2001–2026).

Sources include Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Interior of Iran, Office of the Supreme Leader of Iran, U.S. Department of Defense, United Nations human rights system, U.S. Department of State, International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations General Assembly.

The score is formula-derived (Factrail formula v1, version 1.0.0), not an editorial verdict. Read the methodology.

By the Factrail desk · Method: how we source and score · Last reviewed · Sources: 11

Expert analysis

An excerpt; the full analysis opens on request.

What the chair actually holds

Masoud Pezeshkian has been president of Iran since 28 July 2024. Article 113 of the constitution makes the president the highest official after the Leader. It does not give him the IRGC. Ali Khamenei was Leader until 28 February–1 March 2026. Mojtaba Khamenei has been Leader since 8 March 2026. Pezeshkian sat on the Interim Leadership Council for a week. He is still president.

That limit is the first fact about his power. The second is that a president still signs MoUs, appoints ministers, and runs interior during a war.

Costs on the record

The 2021 Guardian Council disqualification is a completed filter he later passed only after Raisi’s death. The 2024 field was still a Council-approved slate. Hijab enforcement and executions continued after inauguration; he did not gazette a repeal. 2026 wartime protest crackdowns are a completed interior file. Internet restrictions are a completed communications instrument.

The February 2026 US-Israeli war that killed Ali Khamenei is stored as a complex contribution: he condemned the strikes; he did not order them; he is not the Leader who commands the IRGC. 2025 US strikes on nuclear sites are a neighbouring US instrument. Far-right accusations of a ‘soft coup’ are stored as allegation, not as a completed judgment.

Gains on the record

The 5 July 2024 runoff against Jalili is a completed competitive round inside a filtered system. Inauguration on 28 July is a completed oath. Mohammad Reza Aref as first VP is a completed reformist-adjacent appointment. The 2001–05 health ministry is a completed earlier executive. UNGA 2024 is a completed diplomatic speech. The 2026 Islamabad memorandum is a completed text his office defends as leaving ‘neither war nor peace’. Meetings with Mojtaba are completed, limited access. Condemning the Minab school strike is a completed statement about a neighbouring attack, not authorship of the munition.

Official carriers include president.ir, the Guardian Council, the Interior Ministry and election authorities, neighbouring IAEA files, and contemporaneous Reuters. He remains president in August 2026. Keep July 2024 and March 2026 on separate dates.

A health-ministry appointment in 2001 is not a 2024 inauguration. A Guardian Council filter is not a runoff. A runoff is not a Leader succession. A Leader succession is not an Islamabad memorandum. Treat those as texts with dates. Interior can police wartime protests without becoming the IRGC. The IRGC can fire without becoming the president. Washington can strike nuclear sites without converting this chair into a unique later crater coefficient. Those limits stay visible so a moderate halo cannot swallow the execution file and a wartime cartoon cannot swallow the health-ministry years.

Shared files and limits

The score does not say that every IRGC missile is a presidential order. It does not say that a 2024 runoff rebates 2026 crackdowns. It does not convert a far-right tweet into a completed coup trial. Related people are Khamenei, Raisi, Trump, Netanyahu, Putin, Xi, Biden, Guterres, Erdoğan, Macron, Sisi, Abbas.

A president of the Islamic Republic is powerful enough to own a cabinet, an interior crackdown, and a memorandum his office defends. He is not powerful enough to be the unique author of the Leader, the Guardian Council, or a US strike order. Keep the 5 July 2024 runoff off the March 2026 interim council. Keep compulsory hijab off a UNGA speech. Keep an execution tally off a health-ministry year. If those distinctions feel pedantic, they are the alternative to a reformist film and the alternative to a cartoon.

Questions

Is Masoud Pezeshkian under sanctions?

Yes. 22 August 2026: Pezeshkian defends an Iran–US memorandum reached in Islamabad (Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran). 21 June 2025: The United States strikes three Iranian nuclear sites (U.S. Department of Defense).

Does Masoud Pezeshkian face an ICC warrant or criminal charges?

31 December 2024: Iran’s execution tally remains high in the first months of Pezeshkian’s presidency.

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