What the chair actually holds
Masoud Pezeshkian has been president of Iran since 28 July 2024. Article 113 of the constitution makes the president the highest official after the Leader. It does not give him the IRGC. Ali Khamenei was Leader until 28 February–1 March 2026. Mojtaba Khamenei has been Leader since 8 March 2026. Pezeshkian sat on the Interim Leadership Council for a week. He is still president.
That limit is the first fact about his power. The second is that a president still signs MoUs, appoints ministers, and runs interior during a war.
Costs on the record
The 2021 Guardian Council disqualification is a completed filter he later passed only after Raisi’s death. The 2024 field was still a Council-approved slate. Hijab enforcement and executions continued after inauguration; he did not gazette a repeal. 2026 wartime protest crackdowns are a completed interior file. Internet restrictions are a completed communications instrument.
The February 2026 US-Israeli war that killed Ali Khamenei is stored as a complex contribution: he condemned the strikes; he did not order them; he is not the Leader who commands the IRGC. 2025 US strikes on nuclear sites are a neighbouring US instrument. Far-right accusations of a ‘soft coup’ are stored as allegation, not as a completed judgment.
Gains on the record
The 5 July 2024 runoff against Jalili is a completed competitive round inside a filtered system. Inauguration on 28 July is a completed oath. Mohammad Reza Aref as first VP is a completed reformist-adjacent appointment. The 2001–05 health ministry is a completed earlier executive. UNGA 2024 is a completed diplomatic speech. The 2026 Islamabad memorandum is a completed text his office defends as leaving ‘neither war nor peace’. Meetings with Mojtaba are completed, limited access. Condemning the Minab school strike is a completed statement about a neighbouring attack, not authorship of the munition.
Official carriers include president.ir, the Guardian Council, the Interior Ministry and election authorities, neighbouring IAEA files, and contemporaneous Reuters. He remains president in August 2026. Keep July 2024 and March 2026 on separate dates.
A health-ministry appointment in 2001 is not a 2024 inauguration. A Guardian Council filter is not a runoff. A runoff is not a Leader succession. A Leader succession is not an Islamabad memorandum. Treat those as texts with dates. Interior can police wartime protests without becoming the IRGC. The IRGC can fire without becoming the president. Washington can strike nuclear sites without converting this chair into a unique later crater coefficient. Those limits stay visible so a moderate halo cannot swallow the execution file and a wartime cartoon cannot swallow the health-ministry years.
Shared files and limits
The score does not say that every IRGC missile is a presidential order. It does not say that a 2024 runoff rebates 2026 crackdowns. It does not convert a far-right tweet into a completed coup trial. Related people are Khamenei, Raisi, Trump, Netanyahu, Putin, Xi, Biden, Guterres, Erdoğan, Macron, Sisi, Abbas.
A president of the Islamic Republic is powerful enough to own a cabinet, an interior crackdown, and a memorandum his office defends. He is not powerful enough to be the unique author of the Leader, the Guardian Council, or a US strike order. Keep the 5 July 2024 runoff off the March 2026 interim council. Keep compulsory hijab off a UNGA speech. Keep an execution tally off a health-ministry year. If those distinctions feel pedantic, they are the alternative to a reformist film and the alternative to a cartoon.